Concept
Elements of the Privilege
Physician/psychotherapist-patient
Elements of the Privilege
Jaffee states the privilege in one sentence: it protects “confidential communications between a licensed psychotherapist and her patients in the course of diagnosis or treatment.”1 That sentence yields three elements. The communication must be confidential, it must pass between a licensed psychotherapist and a patient, and it must be made in the course of diagnosis or treatment. A communication that misses any one of the three falls outside the privilege.
Rule 501 is why courts keep refining these elements. The Supreme Court has said that the rule “manifested an affirmative intention not to freeze the law of privilege” and was meant to “provide the courts with the flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis.”2 Lower courts therefore apply Jaffee’s sentence to counselors, group sessions, and mixed-purpose visits that Jaffee did not decide, and on some of those questions they disagree.
The party who invokes the privilege must prove each element with facts. A bare assertion that a counselor’s file is privileged gives the court nothing to test, because the elements ask who listened, whether the conversation stayed private, and what it was for. The subsections below take those questions in that order.
Licensed Psychotherapist
Licensed psychiatrists and psychologists form the core of the privilege: the 1972 Advisory Committee draft defined psychotherapists as psychologists and medical doctors who provide mental health services. Jaffee added licensed social workers who practice psychotherapy.4
Two facts justified the addition. Social workers now supply a much larger share of therapeutic services than they did in 1972, and all fifty states regulate them where only twelve did then.5 Their clients also include people who cannot afford a psychiatrist or psychologist. The Seventh Circuit, whose ruling Jaffee affirmed, called social workers the “poor person’s psychiatrist” and saw no discernible public purpose in separating the counseling of costly psychotherapists from that of more readily accessible social workers.6 A privilege limited to expensive providers would give patients of modest means less protection for the same conversation.
The extension carries two limits. It reaches social workers who practice psychotherapy, so the communication must be made in the course of therapy, and it reaches licensed social workers, so a worker without a license stands on uncertain ground.7 A license alone does not turn every conversation with the worker into protected therapy.
Licensure thus tells who may receive protected communications, and the purpose of the session tells whether a particular communication is protected. The second question belongs to the diagnosis-or-treatment element below. When the listener holds no license at all, the federal courts divide.
United States v. Durham stands on the strict side. The defendant’s counselor, Dr. Kimberling, was a board-certified professional counselor with the American Psychotherapy Association and an ordained minister who does not lead a church. He had substantial credentials in counseling but had chosen not to seek a license from the state of Oklahoma.8 The United States argued that Jaffee did not apply because he was not a licensed psychotherapist.9 The court agreed that a bright-line rule requires licensing and declined to extend the privilege to the records.10
The court took its reasoning from Jane Student 1 v. Williams, which made two points. The Supreme Court limited the privilege to licensed professionals although it could have included unlicensed psychiatrists and psychologists, as some states do. And a license gives therapist and patient a clear boundary, along with rough assurance that the provider has shown a threshold ability to improve the patient’s mental health.11 A federal district court in Massachusetts took a similar view in United States v. Whitney, reading Jaffee’s repeated word “licensed” as excluding social workers, counselors, and advocates who lack a license even when they perform therapeutic functions.12
The bright line also fits Jaffee’s refusal to let a judge balance privacy against need. A promise of confidentiality that depends on a trial judge’s later evaluation, the Court said, “would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege.”13 A license is a fact the patient can check before the first session. An after-the-fact inquiry into an unlicensed counselor’s credentials invites the case-by-case judgment Jaffee rejected.
Other courts have extended Jaffee beyond licensed providers. In Oleszko v. State Compensation Insurance Fund, the Ninth Circuit protected unlicensed counselors in a state fund’s employee assistance program when a plaintiff sought other employees’ communications with those counselors to support a claim of sex and race discrimination and retaliation. The Sixth Circuit in United States v. Hayes extended the privilege to an unlicensed social worker employed by the Veteran’s Administration before holding that the defendant’s threats fell outside it, although the dissent noted that the government had not argued that the lack of a license mattered.14 A federal court in United States v. Lowe protected rape crisis counselors who worked under the direct control and supervision of a licensed professional, and a Maryland federal court in Richardson v. Sexual Assault/Spouse Abuse Resource Center did the same for an unlicensed counselor supervised by a licensed social worker at a domestic abuse center.15
In each of these cases the counselor worked inside an institution or under a licensed supervisor. Dr. Kimberling held credentials from a private association and had chosen not to seek a license. That difference matters, but it does not resolve the question, because there is no consensus among the federal courts.16 Rule 501 leaves the privilege to case-by-case development, so a strong exam answer states the bright-line approach and the contrary line of decisions, and it points to institutional employment or licensed supervision as the facts that favor extension.
State statutes can reach further than the federal bright line. Wisconsin’s privilege covers a physician, defined to include a person the patient reasonably believed to be one, and persons working “under the direction” of a physician.17 In Johnson v. Rogers Memorial Hospital, the patient, Charlotte, had treated with a therapist, Phillips, who lacked a license when the treatment began. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held the communications privileged on two grounds. The patient’s objectively reasonable perceptions and expectations are the proper gauge of the privilege’s scope, and Phillips worked under the direction of a licensed psychiatrist, Israelstam, who reviewed her diagnoses monthly and periodically reevaluated each patient’s treatment plan.18 The first ground looks to the patient’s belief and the second to supervision, the same fact that moved federal courts to protect supervised crisis counselors.
A state statute governs only where state law supplies the rule of decision, as in a civil claim under state law. A communication to an unlicensed but supervised counselor may therefore be protected there and unprotected under the bright-line approach in a prosecution or a federal-question suit.
Confidential Communication
Therapy depends on frank disclosure of acts, fears, and thoughts that are often personal and embarrassing, and therapists are ethically required to warn patients of any limits on confidentiality.20 The confidentiality element protects that expectation. A communication the patient did not mean to keep private gets no protection, because withholding it would cost the court evidence without securing any candor the patient needed.
Federal courts apply common law under Rule 501, so the clearest written definitions come from state statutes. California defines a confidential communication as information transmitted between patient and psychotherapist in the course of their relationship and in confidence, by a means that, so far as the patient is aware, discloses it to no third persons beyond those present to further the patient’s interest in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary to transmit the information or accomplish the purpose of the consultation. The definition also covers a diagnosis the psychotherapist makes and advice the psychotherapist gives.21 The test looks to what the patient intended and knew when speaking, and it admits a circle of people around the patient. The working rule is that the patient must not have meant the information to reach anyone beyond those present to further the treatment.
Confidentiality is judged when the words are spoken. A communication that was confidential then can still lose protection if the patient later discloses it, for example by basing a claim on the therapist’s communications or by selectively disclosing part of a privileged communication to gain an advantage in litigation.22 That is waiver, which this chapter takes up after the exceptions, and it is a different question from whether the communication was confidential in the first place.
The presence of someone besides the therapist does not automatically defeat confidentiality, because the question is who that person is. When a third person who is not a client sits in on therapy, the communications are normally not privileged. Courts generally agree, however, that members of couples, group, and family therapy are not “third persons” for this purpose.23 Courts explain that each participant has a relationship with the professional and takes part in the treatment of the others, and they have tied the rule to sessions that are an integral part of the patient’s treatment. Fellow participants owe each other no ethical duty of silence: therapists are ethically obliged to protect confidentiality, clients are not, and group leaders cannot promise confidentiality unconditionally.24 The privilege nevertheless follows each participant’s role in the treatment and does not depend on that duty.
The privilege attaches to communications, but communications means more than the patient’s own words. The Seventh Circuit described the protected material as all the information the psychotherapist or counselor learned during treatment that was necessary for treatment.25 California’s statute likewise reaches the diagnosis made and the advice given.26
A subpoena for a whole file shows where the privilege stops. In In re Sealed Case, the D.C. Circuit held that an order that could compel disclosure of material subject to a federal privilege was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.27 Jaffee, the court explained, “flatly rejected” balancing, because a promise of confidentiality that depends on a judge’s later evaluation “would eviscerate the effectiveness of the privilege,” and a district court may not let counsel see covered materials “regardless of its assessment of ‘the interests of justice.’”28 The federal privilege required the withholding of some documents, if they existed, as absolutely privileged. For everything else, Rule 26 required the court to weigh the privacy interest in those documents against the plaintiffs’ need before ordering production, and the court’s failure to weigh required a remand.29 Even for unprivileged information, courts have long recognized that privacy interests may call for a measure of extra protection.30
A treatment file therefore sorts into two tiers. The confidential communications are withheld without balancing, and the rest of the file is tested under Rule 26 with weight given to privacy. The line tracks the privilege’s rationale: the assurance of confidence exists to draw out what a patient tells a therapist, so notes of what was said sit inside the privilege, while scheduling and billing entries do not record what the patient said. A court answers a subpoena for a therapist’s file entry by entry.
Administrative details fall on the unprotected side of that line more often than students expect. Privileges apply only to confidential communications made in the course of a professional relationship, so appointment records are not privileged merely because they relate to treatment, although a number of courts hold that the patient’s name is privileged.31 The therapist’s ethical duty of confidentiality is not limited to communications, a contrast taken up at the end of this chapter.
Diagnosis or Treatment
The third element asks what the communication was for. It rests on the Jaffee Court’s judgment that the mental health of citizens is “a public good of transcendent importance” and that fostering “an atmosphere of confidence and trust” in which a patient makes “a frank and complete disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears” serves important private interests.33 Such communications would unlikely come into being without protection, the Court reasoned, so sacrificing those interests for a modest evidentiary benefit would serve no greater truth-seeking function than if the communication had been spoken and privileged.34
A conversation held for another purpose draws on none of that need, so applying the element means asking what the sessions were meant to accomplish. Marriage counseling will often qualify, because couples usually seek it to address distress and conflict, the same emotional difficulties that individual therapy treats. Vocational or educational counseling usually does not, because advice about a career or a course of study does not address a mental or emotional condition.
The harder cases involve sessions that look like therapy but were attended for reasons other than healing. In Menendez v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court, applying California’s Evidence Code, reviewed sessions that Dr. Oziel recorded with two patients, the Menendez brothers. Because state law governed, the decision illustrates the element without controlling a federal court. The Court of Appeal had called the therapy a charade, reasoning that Dr. Oziel acted out of self-preservation and the brothers out of self-interest, and it implied that psychotherapy cannot take place under conditions of threat. The supreme court rejected both ideas. Motive is largely, if not totally, immaterial, because in virtually all psychotherapy the participants have reasons other than therapy for its own sake, such as a therapist’s livelihood or a patient’s struggle against suicide or antisocial conduct. The dispositive fact is what the participants do, not why.35 The court added that the Court of Appeal’s factual basis, an affidavit from a witness whose testimony needed careful scrutiny and which was replete with hearsay, was too weak to strike down the superior court’s finding.36
A motive test would also defeat the assurance the privilege exists to give. Nearly every therapist and patient has mixed reasons for being in the room, so a court willing to disqualify sessions on a showing of self-interest could do so in almost any case. A patient deciding how much to reveal in an early session could not know whether a judge would later find the therapy sincere enough. Menendez also kept two questions apart. The court treated the sessions as psychotherapy and then asked whether an exception applied, and for one session it sustained a ruling of no privilege because Dr. Oziel had reasonable cause to believe the brothers dangerous and disclosure necessary.37 That dangerous-patient exception is taken up later in this chapter.
The element fails when the record does not show treatment. In Durham, the court added that it could not conclude on the record that the defendant’s visits to the counselor were for diagnosis and treatment. It gave little weight to the defendant’s affidavit, because the defendant did not testify and could not be cross-examined, and the defendant’s father testified that he had not sent his son to the counselor for psychological or psychiatric evaluation or for treatment.38 The court then treated the defendant’s clergy-communicant claim separately and concluded that he had conveyed information to the counselor for purposes of spiritual advisement.39 The label counseling does not decide which privilege, if any, applies; the purpose of the visits does. Because the proponent must establish every element with facts, an untested affidavit set against contrary testimony cannot carry this one.40
Menendez and Durham apply the same element and reach opposite results. One record showed what the participants did, and the other did not show that treatment was sought.
Students most often misapply step two by treating an unsympathetic motive as proof that no treatment occurred.