Concept
Rule 501 and Federal Privilege Law
Other privileges
Rule 501 and Federal Privilege Law
Rule 501 is the general provision on privilege in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and it answers one question: which body of law decides a claim of privilege. The default is the common law, as United States courts interpret it in light of reason and experience, unless the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise. For civil cases the rule adds a proviso: state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.1 A student who opens the rule hoping to find the attorney-client privilege or the spousal privilege will find neither, because the rule names no privilege at all. It points the court to a body of law and leaves the privilege itself to that law.
A privilege problem in federal court therefore has two layers. The first asks which body of law governs: federal common law, a higher federal source that displaces it, or state law under the civil proviso. The second asks what that law says about the communication in dispute. Rule 501 settles only the first layer, and the first layer matters, because one jurisdiction may protect a communication that another leaves open to compelled disclosure. A court that reasons carefully about the privilege but consults the wrong jurisdiction’s law reaches the wrong answer.
This unit follows the order in which a court uses the rule. It begins with the history, since the choice of one short provision over a list of privileges explains why the rest of the chapter turns on case law. It then covers the common-law default and the sources that override it, the civil proviso that sends some claims to state law, and the lawsuit that joins federal and state claims, where the first-layer question can have two answers.
Why Congress Chose One Rule
Rule 501 is short because Congress rejected a long one, and the text records only the settlement. The Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence drafted a detailed article on privilege, and the Judicial Conference and the Supreme Court approved it.2 The article defined nine non-constitutional privileges: required reports, attorney-client, psychotherapist-patient, husband-wife, clergyman-communicant, political vote, trade secrets, secrets of state and other official information, and the identity of an informer.3 Four more rules covered matters such as waiver, privileged information disclosed under compulsion, and the bar on comment or inference from a claim of privilege, so the proposal ran to thirteen rules in all.4
Proposed Rule 501 would have worked as a closed list. Apart from the Constitution, an Act of Congress, or other rules adopted by the Court, including the nine privileges in proposed Rules 502 through 510, no person could refuse to testify, refuse to disclose a matter, refuse to produce an object or writing, or prevent another from doing any of those things.5 The Committee also expressly refused to honor state privileges broader than the ones it listed.6
Congress could not agree on these provisions, and the objections came from several directions.7 Privileges seem substantive, and some members thought that a list promulgated by the Court exceeded its authority under the Rules Enabling Act.8 The proposal omitted the physician-patient and marital confidences privileges, it included a state secrets privilege that some saw as overbroad, and it would have displaced state privilege law in diversity cases.9 The recent Watergate controversy over executive privilege also weakened Congress’s appetite for detailed definitions.10
The state-law objection shaped the civil proviso, so it deserves a closer look. A state creates a privilege because it decides that a relationship matters more than the litigation, and that decision fails if a confidence stays protected in a state courthouse but is compelled in a federal courthouse down the street only because the parties are citizens of different states.11
Congress responded by eliminating every proposed privilege rule and enacting Rule 501 in their place.12 Its intent was not to freeze the law of privilege but to give courts the flexibility to develop privileges in light of reason and experience, case by case.13 The standard was familiar. It derives from former Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,14 and it echoes Wolfle v. United States, which held that the competence of witnesses in federal criminal trials is governed by common-law principles as federal courts interpret and apply them in light of reason and experience.15 The civil proviso answered the state-law objection. It binds federal courts to state privilege law in actions founded on a state-created right or defense, and so it removes the incentive to shop for a forum.16
Congress went further and barred the Court from adopting privilege rules on its own. Under the revised Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2074(b), a rule “creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privilege” has “no force or effect” unless Congress enacts it.17 Ordinary rulemaking works differently, because a rule amendment the Supreme Court approves becomes law if Congress takes no action for seven months.18 For a privilege rule, congressional silence accomplishes nothing. The history points the same way. In the states, new privileges have come mainly from legislatures since the nineteenth century, beginning with New York’s physician-patient privilege in 1828, and statutes now control even the old husband-wife and attorney-client privileges in most states.19
Federal courts therefore decide privilege claims case by case. In criminal cases and in civil cases governed by federal law, they apply and develop a federal common law of privilege. They may consider state privilege law without being bound by it, and they may look for guidance to the proposed rules that were never adopted.20 The deleted rules thus keep a second life as indicators of what reason and experience suggest.21 That life is a limited one. In United States v. Gillock the Court said that a privilege’s omission from the proposal would not by itself compel a federal court to refuse it, but suggested that the privilege was not thought to be indelibly ensconced in the common law or an imperative of federalism.22 The Supreme Court has also said that Rule 501 gave courts flexibility, yet it is “disinclined to exercise this authority expansively,” and “especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself.”23
Because no enumerated privilege exists to cite, a privilege argument in federal court starts with Rule 501 and the common law.
That route is open because Rule 501 sends the question to the common law, and federal courts recognize a clergyman-penitent privilege.24 The deleted proposal helps the court as evidence of what reason and experience supported, and it binds no one.25
The opposite error is to hunt for the privilege inside the Rules. The nine proposed privileges once occupied proposed Rules 502 through 510, but the Rules as enacted contain no such rules.26
Rule 502 protects a privilege that other law provides and does not supply one.27 The two scenes share one hinge. The first court turns to the common law because Rule 501 tells it to, and the second litigant fails because a rule that never created a privilege cannot be the source of one.
The Common Law Default
Rule 501 answers the first-layer question with a default and three overrides. The default is the common law, the body of law that judges build through decisions in individual cases, as United States courts interpret it “in the light of reason and experience.” It governs a claim of privilege unless the United States Constitution, a federal statute, or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.29 The rule’s last sentence adds the civil proviso on state law, which the next subsection takes up. This subsection covers the main clause and the cases it governs.
The three overrides outrank the default because the common-law process cannot overrule them. A judge applying reason and experience fills only the space that the Constitution, Congress, and the Supreme Court’s prescribed rules leave open. The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the constitutional example, and a federal statute that creates or limits a privilege controls the same way, although federal statutory privileges are rare.30 That structure suggests an order of operation.
Step four does most of the work in criminal cases, because the Evidence Rules list no privilege to apply and the Constitution speaks to only one.
In federal criminal cases and in civil cases where federal law supplies the rule of decision, Rule 501 calls for the federal law of privilege, which the federal courts develop under a single standard for civil and criminal cases alike.32 In practice that covers criminal prosecutions, civil actions brought by the United States, and private federal-question suits.33 It also covers grand jury proceedings. The Rules of Evidence otherwise do not apply before a grand jury, but the rules on privilege do, so a grand jury witness’s claim is decided under federal common law unless a constitutional or statutory privilege applies.34 The policy is that a state should not be able to say when a federal court must go without useful testimony in a matter involving federal law.35 If state privileges controlled, the same federal prosecution could proceed on different evidence depending on which state hosted the trial.
Because the source of law is judicial decision, a federal court deciding such a claim may consider state privilege law without being bound by it, and it may look for guidance to the privilege rules that the Advisory Committee proposed and Congress did not adopt.36 The proposals have no force of law. They matter as indicators of what reason and experience suggest, which makes them influential without making them binding.37 The rule’s wording also looks forward, because it points to the common law as courts interpret it over time. Congress did not intend to freeze privilege law, so courts may recognize and refine privileges as experience accumulates.38
That flexibility has a brake. The Supreme Court has not articulated a precise test for recognizing a privilege, but it has placed considerable weight on federal and state precedent.39 The general question is whether the privilege “promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for probative evidence.”40 The default therefore allows growth without licensing courts to invent privileges, a balance that the later section on recognizing new privileges develops.
The attorney-client privilege shows how the default works when no rule names the privilege. In Upjohn the Court reasoned from the purpose of the privilege, which exists to protect not only professional advice to those who can act on it but also the giving of information to the lawyer so that the lawyer can give sound and informed advice.41 It rejected a view that overlooked that purpose. Upjohn and Trammel are decisions in which federal courts shaped privileges under the common-law standard of Rule 501.42 Rule 502 on waiver stands apart from this analysis, because by its own terms it applies even if state law provides the rule of decision.43
The marital privileges show a privilege that survived the deletion of the proposed rules because it already existed at common law. Congress eliminated every proposed privilege rule without freezing the law, so a privilege that federal courts already recognized continued without any text to support it, and federal courts accordingly recognize both a spousal testimonial privilege and a spousal confidential communications privilege.44 Trammel v. United States shows the Court developing privilege law in this way. In 1980 the Court announced that in federal criminal cases only the witness spouse, the spouse whom the prosecution calls to testify, may claim the spousal testimonial privilege.45 Identifying the holder matters because the holder is also the one competent to waive.46
The usual mistake runs the other way: treating a constitutional claim as one more common-law question. An answer that meets a Fifth Amendment objection by weighing reason and experience, or by hunting for a privilege rule, has skipped the first override.
The two scenes turn on the source of the privilege. The marital privilege exists because courts recognized it and may refine it under Rule 501, while the self-incrimination privilege exists because the Constitution provides it. The self-incrimination material later in this chapter takes up Hoffman v. United States and the test for when an answer is incriminating.
State Law in Civil Cases
The last sentence of Rule 501 adds a civil proviso to the federal default: “in a civil case, state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision.”48 The rule of decision is the substantive law that determines whether the claim or defense succeeds, so the proviso asks whose law controls the merits of the claim on which the privileged material is offered. When state law controls the merits, state law also controls the privilege.
Which law governs a federal court when the case does not rest on a specific federal law, most commonly in a diversity case, is among the hardest problems in federal litigation, because it goes to the relationship between the federal and state governments.49 For privilege, the proviso supplies the answer. Under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, federal courts often apply state common and statutory law, notably in diversity cases, where federal jurisdiction exists only because the parties are citizens of different states.50 A plaintiff from Virginia who sues a Delaware defendant in federal court over a collision in Virginia presents the clean case. Virginia substantive law governs the claim, so the federal judge applies Virginia’s law of privilege as well, including any Virginia rule that defers to the privilege law of another state such as Delaware.51 The federal court takes state privilege law as it finds it, so it enforces a state privilege that federal common law might not recognize.
The proviso rests on the state’s interest in the relationship. A state creates a privilege because it decides that a relationship matters more than the litigation, and when the suit rests on a right the state created, no federal interest justifies overriding that decision.52 A congressional committee added a second reason: a federal privilege law that differed from the state’s would encourage forum shopping, and binding federal courts to state privilege law in actions founded on state-created rights removes the incentive to shop.53 Both reasons rest on the substantive character of privilege. Most rules of evidence are housekeeping devices that direct the court along the best route to the truth, so they come from forum law alone, and no forum need defer to another’s view of them.54 Privileges, by contrast, are generally viewed as substantive.55
The proviso opens with the words “in a civil case,” and that phrase marks its first limit. In a federal criminal prosecution, federal law supplies the rule of decision, so Rule 501 calls for the federal law of privilege.56
The same logic applies to civil matters that federal law governs. In United States v. Schenheinz, a stenographer had to testify and produce records on an employer’s tax matters in response to an IRS summons, even though a state employer-stenographer privilege covered the information.57 The case shows what the proviso’s limits cost, because state privilege law protects communications less effectively when federal courts do not honor it in federal-question and criminal cases.
The second limit sits in the phrase “rule of decision.” Students often shorten the proviso to the slogan that diversity means state privilege law, and the slogan is right most of the time. It fails because Rule 501 turns on the rule of decision for the particular issue in the particular case, and that cannot be resolved mechanically from the basis of jurisdiction. At times state law is looked to in a federal-question case, and at times federal law controls an issue in a diversity case.58 The simpler formula, that state law applies in diversity cases and federal law in federal-question cases, was apparently rejected because it does not completely comport with the Erie test that Congress sought to incorporate, so a state privilege may theoretically control in a federal-question case.59 When federal substantive law supplies the rule of decision for an issue, even in a diversity suit, the federal common law of privilege applies to it.60
One federal rule also overrides the proviso inside a diversity case. Rule 502, which governs waiver of the attorney-client privilege and work-product protection, applies in a diversity action even if state law is to the contrary.61 State law therefore decides whether a privilege exists and how far it reaches in such a case, while Rule 502 decides whether a disclosure has waived it. Whenever a problem pairs a diversity case with a privilege question, ask what law supplies the rule of decision for the claim or defense to which the evidence relates. The answer to that question selects the body of privilege law.
Mixed Federal and State Claims
Rule 501 sends a privilege claim to federal common law unless the Constitution, a federal statute, or a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court provides otherwise, and its civil proviso hands the question to state law for any claim or defense on which state law supplies the rule of decision.63 Read claim by claim, the two halves of the rule give a clean result: a federal claim draws federal privilege law, and a state claim draws state privilege law.64 Complications begin when one complaint joins both kinds of claim. A plaintiff whose principal claim rests on federal law may add a state-law claim arising from the same events, and the federal court can hear it under supplemental jurisdiction, the power to decide a closely related state claim alongside the federal one.65 The two claims share a factual core, so the same witnesses and documents bear on both, and a communication that state law protects and federal law does not falls under two rules at once. The text of Rule 501 never says which rule yields.
A court of appeals applying District of Columbia statutes described the gap in just those terms. It observed that when a plaintiff asserts both federal and state claims, relevant evidence may be privileged under one body of law and not the other, and that the proper resolution is unclear.66 The Supreme Court has seen the problem as well. In Jaffee it noted the question in a footnote and found its resolution unnecessary to decide the case.67 No Supreme Court holding controls, so the working rule comes from the courts of appeals.
The Third Circuit has supplied the clearest version. In Pearson v. Miller, the appellants relied on privileges of the kind found in several state statutes, and the court observed that no decision of its own and, so far as it could determine, none of its sister circuits had recognized comparable privileges under federal common law.68 The appellants were therefore asking the court to recognize quite novel privileges as part of the federal common law.69 The court relied on its earlier decision in Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., which reasoned that “applying two separate disclosure rules with respect to different claims tried to the same jury would be unworkable,” and held that when federal claims appear in a case alongside state claims, the federal rule favoring admissibility, and not any state privilege, controls.70 A state statute could not carry the argument alone. The party could prevail only by persuading the court that federal common law should recognize the privilege, a demanding standard that the next section teaches.
Several reasons support giving federal law the whole field, and each answers a different problem. The first is the jury. If the state rule governed the state claim and the federal rule governed the federal claim, the jury would be told to use a communication on one claim and to disregard it on the other, which is silly.71 The second is that the federal evidentiary interest should be primary where the federal claim anchors jurisdiction and the state claim is only supplemental, whether the interest lies in privilege or in production.72 At least in discovery, it would be meaningless to hold a communication privileged for one set of claims and not for the other.73
The last reason explains why federal law, and not state law, wins the tie. Where one law of privilege must apply to both claims, a rule applying state privilege law would have the federal court excessively deferring to state law by applying it to a federal claim.74 The rule is therefore that federal privilege law governs the shared evidence, whichever way that law cuts. A federal privilege protects the evidence on the state claim as well, and the absence of one leaves the evidence open on both claims.
The hinge in all of this is the federal claim. An answer that assigns state privilege law to the state claim and federal privilege law to the federal claim, one claim at a time, misses the problem whenever the same evidence is relevant to both, and a question that stacks the two claims is testing for exactly that.
The seller’s suit and the one in Pearson differ in a single respect. With a federal claim in the case, federal privilege law reaches the shared evidence for every claim, and without one, the state’s privilege rules decide.
The D.C. court’s approach shows the cautious alternative. It did not adopt a rule for mixed claims, because the choice did not change the outcome: the federal psychotherapist privilege required the withholding of some documents as absolutely privileged, and the District of Columbia statutes appeared at least as protective, so both bodies of law pointed the same way.75 The two decisions are compatible. The Third Circuit decided a case in which the two rules diverged and held that federal law controls, while the D.C. court had no divergence to resolve. A conflict exists only when the evidence is privileged under one body of law and not the other.
One refinement remains less settled. Most federal courts that have faced the question apply federal privilege law, though the problem has usually arisen where the predominant claims were federal. A few courts have looked instead at the predominant nature of the claims and at the issues to which the allegedly privileged information relates, so a case dominated by state claims with a peripheral federal claim sits on less settled ground.76