Concept
Feasibility of Precautions
Remedial measures
Feasibility of Precautions
A repair made after an accident sends a jury two messages, and Rule 407 treats them differently. The first is that the defendant must have thought the old condition dangerous. The rule bars that inference because a legal system that penalizes repairs will get fewer of them.1 The second message is that the repair was possible, since a party that took a precaution afterward cannot say the precaution was out of reach. For that narrower purpose, the court “may admit this evidence for another purpose, such as impeachment or—if disputed—proving ownership, control, or the feasibility of precautionary measures.”2
Feasibility asks whether a safer alternative was available to the defendant when it made the choice under attack. The answer does not ask the jury to treat the repair as a confession, and that separation lets the exception sit beside the exclusion: the rule is not categorical, and it applies only when the evidence is offered to show fault or defect and its relevance depends on an inference that the repair is the actor’s implied recognition of fault.3 The two inferences still lie close together, because proof that a precaution could have been taken invites the thought that it should have been. The exclusion holds when fault is the plaintiff’s purpose. Iowa’s court, for example, held a boat trailer jack manufacturer’s post-injury redesign properly excluded where the plaintiff sought to introduce it to prove negligence or culpable conduct.4
Two questions govern the exception, and they come in a fixed order. The first is whether the defendant has disputed feasibility; the words “if disputed” make the defendant’s own conduct of the case the trigger.5 The second is what “feasible” means, which fixes how much the defendant must contest before the later measure comes in. The second question arises only after the first is answered yes, but its answer sets how often the first can be. A motorcycle case, Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., carries both: the plaintiffs pointed to blueprints showing that Honda had thickened the Gold Wing’s struts, and Honda defended with an argument about tradeoffs between two hazards.6
Feasibility Must Be Disputed
Evidence of a later measure comes in to prove feasibility only if the defendant disputes feasibility, so the defendant’s position at trial opens or locks the exception.7 The reason is practical. A later fix shows that the defendant was able to take the precaution, and that showing matters only when someone denies it. If no one does, the jury has no feasibility question to decide, and the fix has one use left: the inference of fault that the rule forbids. The controverted-purpose requirement therefore calls for exclusion unless a genuine issue is present, and it lets the opposing party lay the groundwork for exclusion by making an admission.8
The requirement does two jobs. It first keeps the exception from swallowing the exclusion. Liberal admission of repair evidence for other purposes would seriously undercut the rule’s basic policy, so the other purpose must be controverted, and evidence offered for an uncontroverted purpose is inadmissible.9 Even a genuine dispute does not guarantee admission, because the risk that the jury will treat the repair as an admission of fault still calls for balancing probative value and need against prejudice under Rule 403.10 The requirement also leaves the defendant in charge of its own exposure: a party can forestall the evidence by admitting the point, and a defendant that never meant to claim impossibility can give the point up cheaply.11
A stipulation closes the gate most cleanly. In Raymond v. Raymond Corp., the parties stipulated to feasibility, and the district court correctly held the feasibility exception inapplicable to the Model 76 design changes.12 The court added that any reliance on Rule 407 was misplaced, because those modifications were on the drawing board before Model 75 was manufactured, a timing point taken up earlier in this chapter.13 That second holding does not change what the stipulation shows. Once both sides agreed the alternative was feasible, the exception had nothing left to prove.
Defending the soundness of a design keeps the gate shut even without a stipulation. Courts have refused to apply the exception where a defendant merely suggests that its original design is acceptable or argues about the tradeoffs involved in taking precautions, and the opinion in Duchess v. Langston Corp. cites Flaminio and Grenada Steel Industries, Inc. v. Alabama Oxygen Co. among its examples.14
Flaminio shows why. Honda did not deny that wobble could be reduced. It argued a tradeoff between wobble and “weave,” and said it had judged weave the greater danger, since weave occurs at high speeds and the Gold Wing was designed for them.15 The court held that the feasibility exception did not apply: “The feasibility, as distinct from the net advantages, of reducing the danger of wobble was not in issue.”16 A tradeoff defense assumes the alternative could be built and argues only that the chosen design was better overall. The later change contradicts that defense only by suggesting the choice was a mistake, and that is the inference the rule bars. The court voiced the same worry about impeachment: if every repair that contradicted a claim of due care counted as impeachment, the exception would swallow the rule.17
A bolder defense opens the gate. A manufacturer controverts feasibility when it denies the technological possibility of a safety measure it later adopts, even implicitly, as by asserting that the product that injured the plaintiff was the safest possible, and it controverts feasibility just as plainly by denying it outright. When a manufacturer explicitly admits the feasibility of precautionary measures, proof that it later adopted them normally should be excluded.18
The plaintiff cannot open the gate alone. One court put the point this way: “Feasibility” is not an “Open sesame” whose mere invocation parts Rule 407, and reading it that casually would make the exception engulf the rule; the defendant must first contest the feasibility of a warning before a later warning becomes admissible.19 The place feasibility holds in the plaintiff’s case, whether as an element of the claim or as a label on the offer, therefore says nothing about whether the defendant has contested it.
Because the dispute is the defendant’s to create, the practical questions are who commits to a position and when. A defendant that will not claim impossibility gains by saying so early and on the record, which closes the gate before the plaintiff offers the repair.20 The court decides the question itself under Rule 104(a), applying the rule to the position the defendant has taken.21 If the gate opens, Rule 403 and a limiting instruction remain available to guard against use of the evidence to show fault, a subject developed near the end of this chapter.22
Defining Feasibility
Rule 407 does not say what “the feasibility of precautionary measures” means, and the definition decides how much of the exclusion survives.24 A narrow reading asks only whether the precaution was possible. A broad reading also counts the defendant’s reasons for not having adopted it earlier, including claims that it was impractical or would not have worked. Nearly every defense of a challenged design explains why the design was chosen, so a broad definition turns much of that explanation into a dispute about feasibility. The cost falls on a premise of the exclusion: a defendant normally should be allowed to assert that its product and actions were safe and reasonable when it acted, without having to contend with proof that it later improved the product.25
Tuer v. McDonald describes the split. Some courts disallow evidence of later measures under the feasibility exception unless the defendant has essentially contended that the measures were not physically, technologically, or economically possible under the circumstances then pertaining. Others sweep a somewhat broader spectrum of motives and explanations for not having adopted the measure earlier into the concept of feasibility, and the effect is to circumscribe the exclusion.26
The narrow reading protects the freedom to defend a choice. Flaminio’s tradeoff defense is its paradigm: Honda called its design the better balance of two dangers and never claimed the alternative was impossible, so the court found no dispute about feasibility, as distinct from net advantages.27 A defendant who calls its design merely acceptable stands in the same position.28
The readings part company when the defense says the alternative would not have worked. In Anderson v. Malloy, the plaintiffs offered evidence that, after Linda Anderson was assaulted and raped, the motel owners installed safety chains and peepholes on the doors of every unit, and the trial court refused it on the ground that Rule 407 “generally prohibits” such evidence.29 The owners had testified that they had done everything necessary for a secure motel and that chain locks and peepholes would not be successful.30 The appellate majority held the plaintiffs entitled to show affirmatively that the devices were feasible and to impeach the owners’ credibility, and it found an abuse of discretion in excluding the only evidence that would effectively rebut the inferences the owners’ testimony created.31 A limiting instruction would warn the jury that the evidence could not prove negligence.32
The dissent disagreed. The majority, it said, found feasibility in issue not from direct testimony about feasibility but by inference from testimony about a false sense of security, which was given as the reason for the police chief’s recommendation; that testimony went to necessity or desirability, and the majority stretched the chain of inferences too far.33 A defendant who says a device would not have worked, or would have given only false security, is arguing about effectiveness. A court that reads feasibility broadly counts that argument as a dispute; a court that reads it narrowly does not. The same testimony can therefore yield opposite rulings, which is why an answer should say which definition governs.
Courts have called the exception no “open sesame.” It has not been applied where a defendant merely suggests that its original design is acceptable or argues about tradeoffs. Courts have applied it where the defendant’s evidence and arguments are framed in categorical terms, are presented in superlatives, or otherwise upset the balance of fairness that Rule 407 seeks to maintain.34
The facts of Duchess show that line inside a single trial. Langston, the defendant, could have addressed the tradeoffs on tempered terms, for example by pointing out that an interlock would require substantial adjustments to the set-up process for printing that were not warranted given the safety of the existing design. Its evidence and arguments went further, advancing the position that visual observation of the anilox/wiper rolls in operation was essential to the machine’s function, so that proper printing would be precluded by an interlock.35 The first framing defends the choice. The second denies that the alternative could have been used, and it is the kind of categorical framing that courts have treated as opening the exceptions.36
Superlatives open the door most easily by accident. In one decision Duchess collects, the defense expert called the design the “safest [design] you could possibly put on the machine,” and the court held that the plaintiff should have been permitted to ask why the safest possible design was modified after the accident.37 A defendant that calls its product the safest possible implicitly denies that any better alternative existed, and the later design is direct proof that one did.38 Many courts allow the plaintiff to show later improvements to demonstrate that the prior design was not the “best possible” or of the “highest quality.” Calling a design “good” or “excellent” asserts adequacy only, and it would be difficult for the plaintiff to contend that such testimony controverted the feasibility of alternatives.39
Cost arguments mark the same boundary. A defendant that says a measure was beyond its economic reach disputes feasibility on either reading, because even the narrow reading counts economic possibility. A defendant that says only that the measure was not worth its cost has given a motive or explanation for its choice; the narrow reading treats that as defending the choice, while the broad reading may count it as disputing feasibility.40
The availability question also arises outside product cases. In Adams v. City of Chicago, officers challenged the method Chicago used to evaluate candidates for promotion to sergeant. Even considering the evidence of a later method, the court found that the officers had failed to show that Chicago had an opportunity to adopt an available alternative before the 1997 promotions were made.41 The core of feasibility is therefore availability at the moment of the challenged choice, and the later measure is offered as evidence of that availability alone.