Concept
Statements and Conduct in Negotiations
Compromise offers and negotiations
Statements and Conduct in Negotiations
Rule 408(a)(2) bars evidence of “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim,” with one exception for criminal cases in which the negotiations concerned a claim by a public office acting in its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement capacity.1 The clause works inside the prohibition that governs all of subdivision (a): no party may offer the evidence to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim, or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a contradiction.2 Clause (a)(1) covered the exchange of value itself, meaning the furnishing, promising, or offering of consideration in compromise, and its acceptance.3 Clause (a)(2) covers the talk and conduct around that exchange: the explanations, concessions, and assessments that give the figures their meaning.
The breadth follows from how negotiators work. The rule exists to facilitate settlement by shielding what parties say in working it out,4 and settlement talk is mostly talk about what happened and what each side can prove. A party who could safely name a figure but could not describe the accident would have to bargain in riddles, so protecting statements and conduct lets the parties discuss the dispute itself.5 The protection stops where settlement stops, however: it is not meant to reach statements made in non-settlement activities.6 Three questions mark where it applies in full and where it ends:
- Does a factual admission made during the talks, such as a concession about how an accident happened, stand or fall with the offer, or is it protected on its own?
- Does a document or fact that existed before the talks become inadmissible because a party disclosed it during them?
- Does the exception for criminal cases remove protection when the other party to the negotiation is a government agency?
Each question assumes that the statement or conduct belonged to a genuine effort to compromise a disputed claim. A suit or a threat of suit makes later discussions easy to characterize as compromise negotiations; where no litigation has been mentioned, conversations between the parties are likely to be treated as ordinary business give-and-take, and what they say falls outside Rule 408.7 The first question comes first because it is where the clause departs furthest from the older rule.
Collateral Admissions of Fact
Rule 408(a)(2) protects a statement made during compromise negotiations whether the statement proposes a trade or merely reports a fact.8 A collateral admission of fact is the second kind: an acknowledgment, made while the parties bargain, of something that bears on the underlying claim, such as how an accident happened. It accompanies an offer without being one of the offer’s terms. Protecting such admissions is the clause’s largest departure from the common law, which shielded the offer and left the acknowledgments around it open to use.
Under the traditional approach, counsel could protect an admission of fact in two ways. One was to preface the statement with an assuming phrase such as “hypothetically speaking,” “without prejudice,” or “for purposes of discussion only.” The other was to tie the fact so closely to the offer that the two could not be correctly understood apart.9 An admission that met neither test, sometimes called an independent fact, was admissible even though it was spoken in the middle of the talks.10 Protection therefore turned on drafting: a label or a tight link saved the statement, and nothing else did.
Rule 408(a)(2) rejects that distinction as difficult to apply in practice. It makes conduct and statements made in the course of negotiation inadmissible without regard to assuming phrases or inseparability.11 The reasons are practical. A rule that protected hypothetically phrased statements preferred the sophisticated and trapped the unwary, because a formula costs nothing to recite and protects only those who know to recite it.12 The current rule fosters free discussion and eliminates the need to decide whether an unlabeled statement falls within or without the protected area; the question is whether the statements or conduct were intended to be part of the negotiations toward compromise.13 No label is required, because the rule’s pro-settlement purpose is served best by an approach that does not trip up the unwary,14 and the rule follows the trend toward protecting all statements made in compromise negotiations.15 The clause reaches statements of fact even when they would otherwise be admissible against the party who made them.16 A party’s own words ordinarily come in against that party, so the exclusion works as an override, and a statement’s factual character no longer helps the proponent.
None of the old escape routes fits: the remark is not hypothetical, carries no label, and can be understood without the offer. Under the older rule only the $5,000 figure would have been excluded, and the admission would have reached the jury as an independent fact. The usual exam error is to admit the remark because it is separable or unlabeled, which applies a test the clause displaced.
The talk around an offer is part of the negotiation as much as the offer is. In Davis, Davis asked Hammock what it would take to “make this go away”; Hammock said to pay back what he had taken; Davis countered with an offer to split $29,000; and Hammock answered that the missing funds totaled more than $100,000.17 The source treats Davis’s other statements in that conversation as statements of the same sort, part of one compromise negotiation, and it notes that Hammock understood the give and take that way.18 Nothing in that account asks which sentences could be lifted free of the offer; the exchange was a single negotiation.
The same protection reaches a document made of facts. In Ramada Development Co. v. Rauch, Rauch offered a report to prove the existence of defects, and he argued that the report was usable because the parties had reached no pre-trial understanding about its nature. The court answered that the rule does not require such an understanding, and that Rauch’s position would partially revive the common-law practice of requiring a party to declare a statement “without prejudice.”19 The report’s content was factual, so protection turned on the part it played in the negotiation and not on what it said.
Fesmire v. Digh shows a proponent pulling one fact out of an offer and the court putting it back. A master admitted redacted copies of settlement letters, cut down to lines about an alleged $20,000 payment, on the ground that the lines were admissions of fact and so were not privileged as statements made in connection with settlement negotiations.20 The reviewing court read the letters whole. Viewed in the context of the unredacted versions, the references to the alleged payment were assumptions made for purposes of negotiating a compromise, and they were inextricably linked to the offer of settlement.21 The court spoke in the older vocabulary of assumption and linkage. Under Rule 408(a)(2) the result follows more directly: the lines were statements made during compromise negotiations about the claim, and cutting the offer away from them does not turn them into independent facts, because separability is no longer the question.22
A proponent cannot escape the clause by recasting the purpose, either. In a retaliation case the defendants argued that evidence of settlement negotiations showed the plaintiff’s underlying harassment claim had been made in bad faith. The court answered that, even if the evidence was limited to the retaliation claim, it was offered precisely for the forbidden purpose of showing that the claim under negotiation was frivolous.23
The protection attaches to statements made during negotiations, so a factual admission loses it when it is spoken outside them. The same sentence can therefore come out either way depending on where and why it was said.
A court sorting the two remarks looks to the setting: was a claim disputed, and was the exchange an effort to compromise it?24 The roadside remark preceded any claim or negotiation, so it is ordinary conduct outside the rule. The meeting statement was made during compromise negotiations about a disputed claim. The two statements are equally factual, and that fact decides nothing in either direction.
Two questions remain. Whether a document or fact that existed before the talks survives disclosure during them is the subject of the next subsection, and the criminal-case exception, which removes protection for statements but leaves offers and acceptances protected, follows it.25
Preexisting Evidence Not Shielded
Rule 408(a)(2) excludes “conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations about the claim,” and clause (a)(1) excludes furnishing, offering, or accepting valuable consideration to compromise it.27 Every item on that list is something the negotiation produced: a proposal, a payment, an acceptance, a remark, an act. A record written years before the dispute, or a fact that exists whatever anyone says at the bargaining table, is none of those things, and the rule’s terms leave it alone. When Congress enacted Rule 408 in 1975, it added a third sentence that said so: the rule “does not require the exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it is presented in the course of compromise negotiations.”28 The Senate Judiciary Committee explained that the sentence ensures documents are not made inadmissible merely because they are presented in negotiations, and that “[a] party should not be able to immunize from admissibility documents otherwise discoverable merely by offering them in a compromise negotiation.”29
The Conference Report drew the line between the statement and the fact it discloses. A party who presents a fact during negotiations does not thereby prevent the opponent from proving that fact at trial with evidence obtained from independent sources. The factual matter may therefore be admissible although the statement that disclosed it is not, and no “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is intended.30 An independent source is any route to the fact that does not run through the negotiation, such as a document obtainable in discovery or a witness to the events. The 2006 amendment deleted the third sentence as superfluous, and prior practice remains unchanged.31
The line follows from what the exclusion protects. Rule 408 gives up relevant evidence to encourage free discussion, and the party who speaks at the table supplies that discussion. A record made in the ordinary course of business supplies none; its author wrote it for reasons unrelated to the dispute. Shielding it would also invite abuse, because any litigant holding a damaging log or email could attach it to a settlement letter and claim the rule’s protection. The Senate Committee rejected that result, and the rule is read the same way today: a party may not shield evidence that the discovery rules would reach simply by presenting it to the opponent in compromise discussions.32
Material created for the bargaining stands differently. In Ramada Development Co. v. Rauch, the court rejected the argument that a report fell within the exception for otherwise discoverable evidence, because the report would not have existed but for the negotiations, so the negotiations were not being used as a device to thwart discovery by making existing documents unreachable.33 The exception targets documents that already exist, and a document manufactured for the talks was never available to anyone before they began.
The wet-installation fact appears on both sides of the line in that scene. The homeowner may prove it from the logs or from a crew member, but may not prove it by the lawyer’s concession. A report manufactured for the talks, like the one in Ramada, falls on the protected side because the negotiation created it. The job logs fall on the other side because the negotiation merely delivered them. When an exam stem says documents changed hands in settlement talks, ask whether they existed before the dispute and could be reached by ordinary means. The 2006 deletion changed none of this, and a proponent who relies on the fact must identify the independent source, because the negotiation statement itself remains off limits as proof.
Criminal Cases and Public Agencies
Rule 408(a)(2) shields conduct or a statement made during compromise negotiations, but it carries one exception for criminal prosecutions: protection is lost when the evidence is “offered in a criminal case and when the negotiations related to a claim by a public office in the exercise of its regulatory, investigative, or enforcement authority.”35 A public office here is a government body such as the SEC or the FTC acting in its official capacity,36 and its claim is the civil demand it makes in that capacity. An amendment effective December 1, 2006, added the exception.37 Both conditions must be met: the evidence must be offered in a criminal case, and the negotiations must have concerned a public office’s claim. If either fails, the ordinary protection of subdivision (a)(2) continues to apply.38
Before the amendment, prior law on the use of such statements in criminal cases was in conflict.39 The Mead court took the admitting side, holding that admissions and statements made at a conference to settle claims of private parties are admissible in any criminal proceeding, because the public interest in presenting probative and otherwise admissible evidence in criminal prosecutions outweighs the public interest in the settlement of civil disputes.40 The amended federal rule does not go that far. Only negotiations over a public office’s claim lose protection in a criminal case; civil settlements between private parties remain excludable there, whether the evidence is an offer, conduct, or a statement.41
The carve-out is narrow in one respect and controversial in another. It reaches only conduct and statements; it does not except an offer or the acceptance of a compromise of such a claim.42 The amendment is also somewhat controversial, because it may chill discussions seeking to compromise claims made by agencies such as the SEC and the FTC.43
Both rulings come from a single meeting, so the dividing line runs through the conversation itself: the taxpayer’s account of the facts is exposed, and the dollar proposal stays shielded.44 Students over-read the exception when they see an agency and a criminal charge and conclude that everything said at the table comes in; that skips the limit to conduct and statements.
A private claimant changes the result. Had the taxpayer been bargaining with a private creditor instead of a revenue agency, the same admission would stay protected in the criminal case, because the exception does not reach negotiations over a private party’s claim.45 The reverse also holds: a statement made to a regulator keeps its protection in a civil case, because the exception requires a criminal case as well as a public claimant.
Efforts to buy off a prosecution travel by a separate route. Rule 408(b) lets the court admit compromise evidence for another purpose, such as proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.46 Evidence of an effort to settle a civil case is not barred when it is used to prove an effort to obstruct a criminal prosecution,47 and subdivision (b) contains no public-claimant condition. Admission for such a purpose rests in the court’s discretion, to be balanced against the policy of encouraging settlements.48 A later section takes up subdivision (b) in full.