Concept
The Rule and Its Purpose
Payment of medical expenses
Payment of Medical Expenses
The Rule and Its Purpose
Federal Rule of Evidence 409 bars evidence that someone furnished, promised to pay, or offered to pay medical, hospital, or similar expenses resulting from an injury when that evidence is offered to prove liability for the injury.1 The sentence has three working parts: the conduct (a payment, a promise, or an offer), the subject matter (the injured person's medical, hospital, or similar expenses), and the barred purpose (proof of liability for the injury). Later sections take each part in turn. This one asks a prior question: why would a rule of evidence exclude such conduct at all?
The question has bite because the evidence is relevant. Under the broad definition in Rule 401, an offer to pay medical expenses has some tendency to prove liability.2 Suppose one driver offers, after a collision, to pay the other driver's hospital bill. Other explanations are possible, such as a wish to help someone in need without regard to fault. But a person who believes herself responsible for an accident is more likely to offer medical aid than one who does not, and that generalization satisfies the minimal test of relevance.3 Rule 409 excludes the evidence anyway, to encourage assistance to injured parties.4
The policy has two strands, and the second does the heavy lifting. The first strand concerns what a payment proves. A person may pay another's expenses because he believes he is responsible, or as a Good Samaritan who thinks himself blameless but wants to help someone in need. Responsible behavior after the fact therefore does not necessarily prove legal fault.5 The second strand explains why the exclusion is categorical. U.S. law generally does not require people to assist others in need, but it does not want to discourage such efforts or punish the Good Samaritan.6 If the payment could be used as an admission at a later trial, assistance might be withheld, and the injured person would go without help.7 The Advisory Committee tied the rule to the reasoning behind Rules 407 and 408, which deal with subsequent remedial measures and offers of compromise. Such payments are usually made from humane impulses rather than from an admission of liability, and holding otherwise would tend to discourage assistance to the injured person.8 The same reasoning lets an insurer that anticipates both liability and a dispute over amount advance sums to a claimant while still maintaining that it does not owe the full amount claimed.9
The rule protects the conduct whoever engages in it. It does not require that the person who pays or offers was involved in the accident or is a party to the suit. A payment made weeks after the accident is excluded just as one made at the scene.10
Home Ins. Co. v. Spears shows the rule at work. The plaintiffs were injured when the guard rails on a public bridge gave way. At trial they called a witness, Mr. England, to testify that the Washington County Judge had told him to bring in all his medical bills and the insurance company would pay them. The plaintiffs conceded that they offered the testimony only to show liability.11 The Arkansas Supreme Court, applying its state's version of the rule, held that the evidence should not have been received over the appellant's objection and presumed its prejudicial effect on the issue of liability.12 The offer came from a county official speaking about what an insurer would pay. The rule looks to what the evidence is offered to prove, not to who made the offer.13
Purpose, then, is the first question to ask on any exam problem about this rule. If the proponent wants the jury to reason from the payment, promise, or offer to fault, the evidence is out. If the proponent offers it for another purpose, the rule does not bar it, though it remains subject to exclusion under Rule 403.14