Concept
Duplicates Under Rule 1003
Requirement of original
Duplicates Under Rule 1003
Rule 1003 puts a duplicate on the same footing as the original, with two exceptions: a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original's authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.1 The sentence holds one presumption and two exceptions, and this section follows that order, beginning with what qualifies as a duplicate.
The presumption exists because copying has changed. In the days of Bob Cratchit, a copy took great labor to make and risked inaccuracy or illegibility, so the common-law tradition frowned on copies almost as much as on testimony describing the original, and even carbon paper and the Thermofax machine did not at once open the door.2 The modern office copier ended that skepticism, because it makes full and accurate copies as readable as the original. Rule 1003 therefore permits the use of any “duplicate” without any need to make excuses for nonproduction of the original under Rule 1004.3 Those excuses are the conditions on which an original is not required and other evidence of content is admissible.4
The two exceptions protect the premise behind the presumption, that an accurate copy tells the factfinder what the original would. Even copies produced by photographic or xerographic processes are not totally free of the risk of alteration that might not be discernible, so in some circumstances a copy is not as desirable as the original.5 Outside those circumstances, insisting on an original instead of a duplicate seldom produces more accurate factfinding, and Rule 1003 itself embodies the exceptions.6 The whole inquiry also has a boundary. It arises only when a party seeks to prove the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph, and the best evidence rule sets up no order of preferred admissibility for proving anything else.7
What Counts as a Duplicate
Only an exhibit that qualifies as a duplicate receives the presumption, and “duplicate” is a defined term. Rule 1001(e) defines it as a counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original.8 For this rule, “counterpart” is apparently synonymous with “copy,” and a duplicate may be made at the same time as the original or afterward through a process such as photocopying.9 In practice the definition covers machine-made copies and excludes handmade ones.10
Handmade copies fall outside the definition for two reasons that reinforce each other: a person's hand adds the likelihood of mistake, and a handmade copy leaves inadequacies in establishing authenticity.11 A handmade copy is not an original either, unless its maker intended it to be one.12 A proponent who offers one therefore gets no presumption and must find another route around Rule 1002, such as an excuse under Rule 1004.
A duplicate differs from a counterpart treated as an original in the intent of the person who executed or issued it: no one intended a duplicate to have the same effect as the original.13 The timing and purpose of the copying therefore play no part in the classification, and a copy of an original made for the purpose of litigation is still a duplicate.14
A duplicate proves what the original says; it does not become the original. Courts have admitted a photocopy of a will in lieu of the original to prove the contents of a lost will.15 In Gushwa v. Hunt, a wife argued that a photocopy of a will and an executed original should receive the same evidentiary weight. The court answered that under the rules of evidence a duplicate is admissible only to the same extent as the original, which means to prove the original's contents, and that she was trying to give the photocopy the legal significance of an executed original, which the state's Probate Code does not permit.16 The court added that photocopies are readily produced and that multiple copies of a will can breed confusion, especially when the issue is whether the will was validly revoked.17 The evidence rules govern how content is proved, and the substantive law, there the Probate Code, decides which document has legal effect.
Genuine Question of Authenticity
The first exception ends the presumption when an opponent raises a genuine question about the original's authenticity. The proponent can then no longer rest on the copy, and only if the original is unavailable as Rule 1004 provides may the duplicate be received as secondary evidence.19
A copy cannot answer doubts about the document it copies. Even photographic and xerographic copies can hide an alteration that no one can discern from the copy,20 a correct copy can mask the color of the ink used, and a copy can conceal that the original was a cut-and-paste creation.21 A reasonable claim of forgery shows the stakes: a court would require the original so that experts could evaluate it.22
The word genuine sets two limits that pull in opposite directions. The question must be genuine, not spurious, or any opponent could force production of the original by announcing a suspicion.23 But the reason offered need not be persuasive, because persuasiveness is a question for the jury once the original is produced or its unavailability is accounted for.24 The bar stays low because the original is the thing that lets anyone test the doubt.
Keogh v. Commissioner shows what does not qualify. The Tax Court there had weighed Whitlock's reputation and the lack of cross-examination in valuing his diary, and the reviewing court found no abuse of discretion. The taxpayers argued that testimony from Mikle failed to prove the source of the tip income entries, and the court said they missed the point. The question was whether the diary of which the photocopy was a duplicate was in fact the diary Whitlock kept, and no one disputed that.25 Doubts about whether a genuine diary's entries can be trusted go to weight, while the authenticity exception asks whether the document copied is the real one.
An objection aimed only at the copy sits closer to the line. The treatise reads Rule 1003 to treat a genuine question about the duplicate's accuracy as also calling for the original, as when the proffered duplicate contains content that differs from the original.26 The text of the rule, though, speaks of the original's authenticity, and the casebook problem keeps the two apart: has Eva raised a genuine question about the authenticity of the original contract, or has she simply questioned the accuracy of the duplicate Dan seeks to admit?27 Whichever she has done, the second exception may still apply, and the next subsection takes it up. Rule 1008 bears on who decides such a dispute, because it allocates to the jury the responsibility of determining whether “(a) an asserted writing ever existed; (b) another one produced at the trial or hearing is the original; or (c) other evidence of content accurately reflects the original,” and the later section on the judge and the jury sorts out the roles.28
Unfairness of Using a Duplicate
The second exception looks at the particular duplicate in the proponent's hand and asks whether using it would be unfair. The examples are concrete: unfairness might result where only part of the original is reproduced and the uncopied section modifies the copied section, or where the duplicate is otherwise misleading, and it would also result if there were genuine concern whether the duplicate faithfully reproduced the original.30
The two exceptions work separately. Rule 1003 contains two escape clauses,31 and the casebook problem asks about them in sequence: whether or not Eva has raised a genuine question about the original's authenticity, do the circumstances otherwise make it unfair to admit Dan's duplicate?32 An opponent who doubts nothing about the original may still show that this copy cannot fairly stand in for it.
The incomplete copy is the clearest case. Rule 1003 treats an accurate duplicate like the original because it gives the factfinder the same information. A copy of pages one and two of a three-page contract fails that premise when page three contains a clause that modifies the terms on the pages copied, because the factfinder would take away terms the whole instrument does not support.33 A copy of all three pages leaves the opponent no such complaint.
A second kind of unfairness arises when the dispute is whether the copy matches what the parties signed. A showing that the proffered duplicate contains different content from the original calls for production of the original.34 The same showing supplies the exception's third example, genuine concern whether the duplicate faithfully reproduces the original.35 A buyer who produces her own signed copy lacking a clause that appears in the seller's photocopy has therefore done more than invite the jury to weigh the evidence, because she has put the copy's fidelity in genuine doubt.
A decision about a recorded deed makes the same point about copies. In Amoco Production Co. v. First Baptist Church of Pyote, the very question in controversy was whether the original 1942 deed had been correctly transcribed onto the recorded version. The court refused to read the rules to exclude all evidence of the original deed other than the recorded version, and it held that Rule 1004(1), which authorizes other evidence of content if all originals are lost or destroyed, and not Rule 1005, applied to the 1942 deed.36 A copy cannot vouch for its own accuracy when accuracy is what the parties dispute.
The exception has limits that keep it from swallowing the presumption. An opponent who says only that the original would be better has identified no infirmity in the copy, and the claim proves too much: insisting on an original instead of a duplicate seldom improves factfinding outside the exceptions Rule 1003 already contains.37 The best evidence rule still serves its purpose of enhancing accurate factfinding, but it grants litigants and judges more flexibility in light of modern technology.38 When an exception does succeed, the proponent turns to the original or to the excuses that Rule 1004 supplies, the subject of the next section.39