Concept
Availability of the Originals
Summaries
Availability of the Originals
Rule 1006 lets a proponent prove the contents of voluminous records with a summary, chart, or calculation, and it charges a price for that convenience. The proponent must make the underlying originals or duplicates available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and place, and the court may order the proponent to produce them in court.1 The two sentences assign different jobs to different actors. The first binds the proponent from the text of the rule, with no motion or order needed. The second gives the judge a power that the judge may or may not use.
The price buys the opponent a chance to test the exhibit. An admitted summary puts a compact account of thousands of pages before the jury, and the people best placed to catch a transcription error, a lopsided selection, or a miscalculation are the opposing lawyer and the opposing party, who can do so only if they can see the records. Rule 1006 thus answers the risks behind the original writing rule by requiring that the originals or duplicates be made available to the opponent and by allowing the court to order their production at trial.2 The first sentence is taken up next as the duty of access, and the second as the judge’s power to bring the records into the courtroom.
Making Originals Available
Rule 1006 phrases the proponent’s duty in mandatory terms. United States v. Bakker quoted the earlier wording of the rule, under which the originals or duplicates “shall” be made available for examination or copying, or both, at a reasonable time and place, while the court “may” order them produced in court.3 The court’s quotation italicized “shall” and “may,” which marks the first as a duty and the second as a discretionary power. Because the duty comes from the rule itself, no motion from the opponent triggers it, and a proponent who offers a summary should be ready to show that the sources were open to inspection. Three phrases give the duty its content. “Originals or duplicates” lets exact copies stand in for the originals. “Examination or copying, or both” means the opponent may inspect the sources and, where inspection is not enough, take copies away for study. “Reasonable time and place” supplies the standard that courts apply to timing and location.
One court explained the point of the requirement this way: it gives the opposing party who wants to attack the authenticity or accuracy of a chart, summary, or calculation an opportunity to prepare for cross-examination, or to offer exhibits of its own as rebuttal evidence that would counteract the impression the proponent’s witness made on the jury.4 The two uses differ. Cross-examination of the summary’s preparer is only as good as the questions the opponent can frame, and questions about specific entries require the entries. A rebuttal exhibit, such as the opponent’s own tabulation of the same records, requires the records themselves.
When the opponent has in fact had access, courts treat the duty as met and move on. In Gardner v. Gardner, a husband’s lawyer was told as early as November 29, 2010, that the bank records were available for review, and the husband admitted that he and his attorney reviewed the bank statements on December 3, 2010, at the other side’s attorney’s office.5 Those facts left him little ground to say he had been denied access. Access can also take other forms. In Cives Corp. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc., the witness brought the originals to court and the opponent did not claim it had been denied access, so under Maine’s version of the rule his testimony based on his review of the voluminous records was admissible to show the costs of cover.6 A Court of Federal Claims decision shows a third pattern. The summary exhibit itself named its sources, a general ledger, a wire payments log, an IRS form, and payroll summaries, and the government had access to all of them, so it had adequate means to cross-examine the preparer about the underlying documents. The court distinguished Bath Iron Works, where the summaries drew on documents that were not disclosed in connection with the summaries.7
The rule sets no deadline, only “a reasonable time and place,” so a summary does not fall automatically because the sources were disclosed late. Courts ask whether the opponent had a fair opportunity to test the exhibit and whether any lateness caused prejudice. In United States v. Bray, the court of appeals assumed for argument’s sake that the underlying forms were not made available in a timely manner and still found no plain error. At the government’s suggestion, the trial court had offered the defense a chance to reopen the proofs and challenge the foundation for the exhibits. Defense counsel declined, and the offer was enough to mitigate any prejudice. Bray also never argued that the summaries misstated the forms, and he did not explain how earlier disclosure would have changed anything.8
Northwest Acceptance Corp. v. Almont Gravel, Inc. shows the cure coming from the judge after the objection was made. The trial court admitted a summary of repair costs, let the plaintiff review the documents on hand during lunch or overnight, told the plaintiff it could review the originals, and said it would order them produced if the plaintiff wanted them. The Michigan Court of Appeals found no error. Bray turned on a declined offer to reopen, and Northwest Acceptance on an accommodation the judge supplied once the objection was raised, but both apply one measure: a reasonable opportunity, judged with an eye to prejudice rather than by a count of days.
The sharpest case arises when no opportunity can be given because the sources cannot be reached. In United States v. Kim, the defendant offered a telex that purported to summarize a bank’s records, and the underlying records were not available. The telex was not itself admissible as a business record, so the defendant had to qualify it as a summary, and that route required that the underlying documents be available for inspection.9 Where the opposing parties cannot examine the sources, the summary should stay out. An exhibit whose sources nobody can inspect cannot be cross-examined on specifics and cannot be answered with a rebuttal exhibit, so admitting it would give the proponent an unverifiable account of what the records say. Kim differs from Gardner and Northwest Acceptance in the opponent’s position. In those cases the opponent could look, however late, and in Kim no one could. Two errors follow from this. One treats late disclosure as automatic exclusion, and the other treats sources that would be admissible in principle as a substitute for actual access. Summaries of originals that have been lost or destroyed raise a related problem, taken up later in this chapter.
Production in Court
The second sentence of Rule 1006(b) gives the trial judge a power the opponent does not hold: the court may order the proponent to produce the underlying originals or duplicates in court.11 The duty of access binds the proponent without a motion or an order, while production in court happens only if the judge decides to require it. Production is also not introduction. The original records need not be introduced into evidence, although the court may require that they be produced in court.12 The First Circuit read the rule the same way in United States v. Milkiewicz. The underlying documents must be made available to the other parties, and the court may order them produced, and that discretion means the evidence underlying a summary need not be introduced, although nothing in the rule forecloses a party from introducing it.13
The rule leaves the proponent free to keep the originals out of evidence because of what the exception is for. The originals must be made available to the opponent, but they need not be admitted, and the summary is offered in their place.14 A rule forcing the proponent to introduce every source would put the whole pile before the jury anyway and leave the summary with nothing to do. The opponent’s first protection under the rule is access to the sources and cross-examination of the sponsoring witness. The court’s production power covers the harder case, where accuracy is genuinely disputed and testimony about the records no longer settles the question. The judge can then require the originals in the courtroom and let the factfinder compare them with the summary. The proponent’s freedom to leave the originals out therefore depends on a willingness to bring them when ordered.
Bray and Northwest Acceptance show the default and the safety valve. Because the summaries in Bray were admitted under Rule 1006, the district court did not err by failing to require that the underlying documents be in evidence.15 Bray never argued that the summaries misstated the forms, so the production power was never tested. In Northwest Acceptance the opponent did press the point, and the trial court held production in reserve, telling the plaintiff it would order the originals produced if the plaintiff wanted them. Bray shows the proponent’s freedom operating when nothing is disputed, and Northwest Acceptance shows the judge keeping production available so that a challenged summary does not go unexamined.
Nothing in the rule keeps a proponent from introducing the originals as well. One court imagined a lawyer who realizes well into a trial that a summary chart would help, and would be admissible under Rule 1006, because the documents already admitted are too voluminous for the jury to examine conveniently.16 That situation is taken up in the discussion of originals already in evidence. Exam questions go wrong in two ways here. One says the proponent must introduce the originals, which contradicts both the rule and its reason. The other says the opponent can demand the originals in court as of right, when the text gives that power to the judge and gives the opponent only a right of access.