Concept
Evidentiary Status of Summaries
Summaries
Evidentiary Status of Summaries
Once a judge admits a summary under Rule 1006, two questions remain. What may the jury do with the exhibit: rely on it as proof, carry it to the jury room, or hear that it is something less than evidence? And does the summary stay available when the proponent has already put the underlying records into evidence, in whole or in part? The text of Rule 1006(a) answers both, but the cases show that courts have not always read it that way.
Summary as Substantive Evidence
Rule 1006(a) permits the court to “admit as evidence” a summary, chart, or calculation offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or photographs.1 Those words fix the exhibit’s status: a qualifying summary is proof of what the records contain, and the jury may rely on it as proof. The logic is simple. The summary stands in for the originals, and the rule lets the proponent leave the originals out of evidence entirely, so the summary is often all the jury ever sees. If jurors could not treat it as proof, the rule would permit the shortcut and then leave them with nothing to weigh. Courts therefore reason from the text itself: because the underlying documents need not be in evidence, “it is plain that a summary admitted under Rule 1006 is itself the evidence that the trier of fact should consider.”2 The summary remains evidence for the factfinder whether or not the originals are ultimately introduced.3
Evidentiary status carries consequences once the exhibit reaches the jury. An admitted Rule 1006 summary may go to the jury room like any other exhibit, which is why accuracy and neutrality matter so much: a summary with argumentative captions works as a mini-summation every time a juror looks at it, particularly when the jurors cannot also review the underlying documents.4 A caution about accuracy can protect against that risk without demoting the exhibit. In United States v. Bakker, the court called mutual consent to publication of the government’s summaries preferable but found no prejudice, because the trial court had cautioned the jurors that summaries are used only as a matter of convenience and that they were to disregard any summary they found was not in truth a summary of facts or figures shown by the evidence.5 That caution differs from a limiting instruction. It tells jurors what to do with a chart that proves unfaithful to the evidence, and it says nothing to demote a faithful chart from proof.
United States v. Bray shows how the opposite mistake happens. When the government’s summary charts came in, the trial judge told the jury that charts made up by a witness are “not in themselves really substantial evidence” and that the underlying data is “the real evidence or the real matter of substance.”6 Later, the defense asked for the same instruction in the final charge. The prosecutor objected that no instruction was appropriate and that a limiting instruction would prejudice the government, which had chosen not to admit the underlying data.7 The prosecutor had the mechanism right: when jurors learn that a summary is not evidence, and the records it condenses never came in, they have no proof of what the records say. The judge refused to repeat the instruction, and the Sixth Circuit held the refusal proper, because the summaries fell within the first of three categories and were admitted under Rule 1006. The earlier instruction was a mistake, but it favored the defendant and gave him no ground for reversal.8 The working rule follows. Since Rule 1006 authorizes admission of the summary itself, “it is generally inappropriate to give a limiting instruction for a Rule 1006 summary.”9
The trial judge’s instinct was not eccentric. The Sixth Circuit conceded that its own opinions had been less than clear: in DeBoer, for example, it observed in dicta that the district court “properly instructed the jury that the [Rule 1006] summaries ... were not evidence or proof of facts,” and other opinions suggested the same misunderstanding.10 The confusion comes from treating as alike two exhibits that look alike, since each may be a chart prepared by a witness and shown on an easel, but that do different work. The court described three categories of summary, a classification it drew from earlier authority such as Gomez, and only the first is the subject of Rule 1006:11
- Primary-evidence summaries condense voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot conveniently be examined in court. Admitted under Rule 1006, the summary itself is evidence for the factfinder.
- Pedagogical-device summaries are linked to evidence previously admitted and usually are not themselves admitted. When a chart is introduced solely as a pedagogical device, the jury should be told that it is not evidence but only an aid in evaluating the evidence.12
- Secondary-evidence summaries are a hybrid that falls between the two, and the later section on illustrative aids takes them up.
The instruction follows the category. When a chart rearranges evidence the jury has already received, the real evidence sits in front of the jurors, and telling them the chart is only an aid costs the proponent nothing. When the chart is the evidence of what the records say, the same words strip away the only proof the jury has. Bray’s charts belonged to the first category, which is why the refusal to repeat the instruction was proper.
Two errors recur on this point. The first reasons that a summary cannot be substantive evidence because the originals never came in, which reverses the rule, since the originals’ absence is the reason the summary must serve as proof. The second concludes that no instruction of any kind may accompany a summary, when the bar runs only against an instruction that the summary is not evidence, and a caution about accuracy like the one in Bakker leaves its status intact. Exam fact patterns often turn on the category: a judge’s statement that a chart is “only an aid” is correct for a chart of evidence already received and wrong for a chart standing in for records the jury never saw. Evidentiary status also does not excuse the proponent from the conditions covered earlier in this chapter, because the exhibit the jury may rely on and take to the jury room must still be accurate, nonargumentative, and properly sponsored.
Originals Already in Evidence
Rule 1006(a) allows a summary of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or photographs “whether or not they have been introduced into evidence.”14 Those closing words make the originals’ status irrelevant to whether a summary is available. A party may offer a qualifying summary before any original comes in, in place of the originals, or after some or all of them have been admitted. The First Circuit confirmed the point as an express holding in United States v. Milkiewicz: summaries that are otherwise admissible under Rule 1006 are not rendered inadmissible because the underlying documents have been admitted, in whole or in part.15
The holding was needed because First Circuit law had been ambiguous. In Air Safety, Inc. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, the court observed that, contrary to statements in earlier cases, the evidence underlying a Rule 1006 summary need not be admitted, and that “[t]he requirement of prior admission actually applies to a different sort of summary.” It did not say which rule governs that other sort of summary, or whether Rule 1006 became unavailable once the documents were in evidence.16 A footnote that assigns summaries of admitted evidence to some other category invites a trial judge to conclude that Rule 1006 no longer reaches them.
The older sorting appears in United States v. Buck. The government’s diagram put an organization’s logo at the center and ran lines from it to the names of fifteen employees, listing the number of checks and the total amount each had received.17 The Fifth Circuit held it proper to show the diagram to the jury to help them understand testimony and documents already produced, but error to admit it as an exhibit or take it to the jury room, and it quoted a treatise for the rule that a chart introduced solely as a pedagogical device calls for an instruction that it is not evidence but only an aid in evaluating the evidence.18 The label carries consequences. The basis on which a summary comes in affects whether jurors may rely on it as primary evidence and whether it may go to the jury room during deliberations, which is the status question the previous section addressed.19
Milkiewicz resolved the tension by separating a document’s legal status from the jury’s practical ability to use it. One might object that when the originals are already in evidence, a summary substitutes for nothing, so the exception has no work to do. The court answered by agreeing with the Fifth Circuit’s statement in United States v. Stephens that “[t]he fact that the underlying documents are already in evidence does not mean that they can be ‘conveniently examined in court,’” so Rule 1006 still lets the jury consider secondary evidence as a substitute for the originals.20 Admission gives the jury permission to consider a document, while convenience depends on whether the jury can realistically work through it. Subdivision (a) asks the second question, and the proponent’s earlier decision to introduce the records cannot answer it. A contrary reading would also penalize the lawyer who realizes well into trial that the admitted records are too bulky for the jury, a situation the court expressly imagined.21
What separates a Rule 1006 chart from a pedagogical aid is purpose, not the status of the records. A summary chart used as a pedagogical device must be linked to evidence previously admitted and usually is not itself admitted.22 Such aids may be less neutral in presentation: they tend to be “more akin to argument than evidence,” and their captions or other devices may reflect the inferences and conclusions the proponent draws from the evidence.23 A Rule 1006 summary, by contrast, stands in for voluminous originals as evidence of their content. Whether the records are already in evidence is therefore a fact worth noting, but the question that sorts the chart is whether the jury could conveniently examine them.
Two mistakes recur on exam questions. The first is to reject a summary because its sources were already introduced, which the closing clause of subdivision (a) forecloses. The second is to assume that earlier admission qualifies the chart automatically. A summary offered on top of admitted records must still satisfy the conditions taught earlier in this chapter: voluminous sources that cannot be conveniently examined, admissible underlying materials, accurate and nonargumentative content, and a foundation through a sponsoring witness.