Concept
Summaries Versus Illustrative Aids
Summaries
Summaries Versus Illustrative Aids
Every chart a lawyer shows a jury raises a threshold question: is it evidence, or is it a drawing board? Rule 1006(a) answers for the first kind. The court may admit as evidence a summary, chart, or calculation offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court, whether or not they have been introduced into evidence.1 That exhibit stands in for the records, and the jury relies on it for what they say. Many charts do no such work. A lawyer who has already put several witnesses and a stack of exhibits before the jury may draw a timeline to help the jurors follow them, and the timeline adds nothing the record lacks. Rule 1006(c) sends charts of this second kind to Rule 107, which governs illustrative aids.2
The two regimes treat the exhibit differently because the exhibits do different jobs. A Rule 1006 summary is evidence, so it can prove what the records contain. An illustrative aid is not evidence, and it has value only because of the evidence it helps the jury understand; treating it as proof would let a party's own drawing displace the record. The same figures can fall on either side of the line. A chart of monthly totals that replaces 6,000 admitted invoices no juror could read through does a summary's work. A chart of the same totals drawn from a short log the jurors have already read only helps them organize what they know. The sorting question is what the chart replaces and what the jury would otherwise have in front of it.
Older opinions use different words for the second kind. They call an exhibit that only helps the jury understand other evidence a “pedagogical device,” and they locate the judge's authority to allow it in the broad standards of Rule 611(a).3 Rule 107 now regulates that ground, so a reader who meets “pedagogical device” or “Rule 611(a)” in an older decision should translate both into the law of illustrative aids. The advisory committee's note adds a warning about vocabulary: “demonstrative evidence” is better applied to substantive evidence offered to prove a disputed fact by demonstration, and it is the wrong name for an aid.4 The first subsection takes up aids under Rule 107. The second takes up a middle category that some courts recognize for exhibits that fit neither description cleanly.
Pedagogical Devices and Rule 107
The two rules hand the same exhibit back and forth, and the purpose of the offer decides which one applies. Rule 1006(c) sends a summary, chart, or calculation that “functions only as an illustrative aid” to Rule 107.5 The advisory committee's note to Rule 107 draws the line from the other side. A summary of voluminous admissible evidence offered to prove a fact is subject to Rule 1006. A summary offered solely to help the trier of fact understand the evidence is an illustrative aid, which courts had regulated under the broad standards of Rule 611(a) and which Rule 107 now regulates with more particular requirements.6 The label on the chart therefore settles nothing. As the First Circuit said in United States v. Milkiewicz, the key difference among the approaches is the purpose for which the summary is offered.7
The note defines an illustrative aid as “any presentation offered not as evidence but rather to assist the trier of fact in understanding evidence or argument.”8 A timeline lining up several witnesses' accounts, a diagram of who dealt with whom, and a graph of figures the jury has already seen are typical examples. None of them proves what any source says, so the safeguards that make a substitute trustworthy do not fit. The risk lies elsewhere. A party designs the aid and chooses its layout, emphasis, and wording, and through captions or other organizational devices the aid may carry the party's own inferences and conclusions. The Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Bray, quoted an earlier decision to call such a device “more akin to argument than evidence,” because it organizes the jury's examination of testimony and documents already in evidence.9
Rule 107(a) supplies the check. The court may allow a party to present an illustrative aid to help the trier of fact understand the evidence or argument if the aid's utility in assisting comprehension is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or wasting time.10 Comprehension is the only benefit an aid offers, so the test sets that benefit against the costs a persuasive, party-designed picture can impose. A loaded caption risks unfair prejudice, a diagram that omits part of the record risks misleading the jury, and an elaborate animation of a simple point risks delay. A court can answer by trimming the aid instead of excluding it. In United States v. Buck, the district court required that the photograph of MACE's president, Ruby Buck, be covered with tape on the government's diagram, leaving only her name and title visible.11
Two further provisions govern the aid once the jury has seen it. Rule 107(b) provides that an illustrative aid is not evidence and must not be provided to the jury during deliberations unless all parties consent or the court, for good cause, orders otherwise. Rule 107(c) directs that, when practicable, an aid used at trial be entered into the record.12 The bar on deliberations keeps the verdict resting on the testimony and exhibits actually received. A chart one side drew and left on the jury-room table would go on arguing that side's case after the lawyers had stopped. The two exceptions leave room for the case in which both sides want the jury to have the aid or the court finds a real need for it. The record requirement does different work. An aid entered into the record has not thereby become evidence, but a reviewing court can see what the jurors saw when it asks whether the trial judge struck the balance properly.
Courts reached this result long before Rule 107. They aligned the photograph, for instance, with maps, models, and diagrams: constructed visual aids that a witness could use to illustrate testimony, not independent evidence, allowed because some matters are more easily explained visually than orally.13 Bray applied the same thinking to summaries. It understood a pedagogical device to be an illustrative aid, such as a chalkboard, flip chart, or drawing, that summarizes or illustrates evidence already admitted, is itself not admitted, and may reflect the proponent's inferences through captions or other organizational devices.14 Milkiewicz drew the contrast with Rule 1006 charts, which reflect the contents of the documents they summarize and typically substitute for the voluminous originals, so they must fairly represent those documents and be accurate and nonprejudicial.15 The consequence for deliberations followed from the aid's status. Courts usually did not allow such charts into the jury room without the parties' consent, and Weinstein's treatise observes that a court may permit the jury to take such aids into deliberations but most courts do not.16 Rule 107(b) now writes that practice into text.
Buck also shows the line at work. The government's diagram put the MACE logo at the center and ran lines from it to fifteen employees, listing the number of checks and the total amount each had received.17 It summarized checks and testimony already before the jury, not records too voluminous to present, so it was a pedagogical aid. The Fifth Circuit held that showing it to the jury was proper but that admitting it as an exhibit was error, and the error was harmless because the diagram accurately summarized evidence properly before the jury.18 The court added that, under either Rule 611 or Rule 1006, a chart need not be free of assumptions so long as the record supports them. Here previously admitted documents and testimony supported each of the more than three hundred checks and showed that Buck had signed all but one.19
What separates an aid from a summary, then, is the jury's position. The Buck jury already held the checks and the testimony about them, so the diagram only arranged what jurors could consult. A jury that cannot conveniently examine the records holds nothing to consult, so a chart of them is its proof of what they say, and the conditions for a Rule 1006 summary apply. Earlier admission of the sources does not change that analysis. Rule 1006(a) reaches voluminous materials “whether or not they have been introduced into evidence,”20 and Milkiewicz recognized that the lines between the two kinds of chart are easily blurred: a chart first offered as an aid to voluminous documents already in evidence could instead be admitted under Rule 1006 if the court concluded that the documents could not be conveniently examined in court.21 A fact pattern that calls a chart a “summary” therefore does not choose the rule. The purpose question does.
Hybrid Secondary-Evidence Summaries
Some courts recognize a third category that sits between the Rule 1006 summary and the pure aid. In Bray, the Sixth Circuit sorted secondary-evidence summaries into three forms: Rule 1006 charts, pedagogical devices, and a third form that a court admits “not in lieu of the evidence they summarize but in addition thereto.”23 A trial judge admits a summary of this third kind only on concluding that it so accurately and reliably summarizes complex or difficult evidence received in the case as to materially assist the jurors in understanding that evidence, and Bray called the occasion “unusual.”24 The category is a hybrid because it borrows from both sides. Like a Rule 1006 summary, it becomes an exhibit; like an aid, it condenses evidence already in the case.
Two opinions state the idea in passing. Bray observed that a pedagogical-device summary may in appropriate circumstances be admitted into evidence even though it falls outside Rule 1006, when it is so accurate and reliable a summary illustration of the evidence as to assist the factfinder reliably.25 Milkiewicz said that such devices may be accurate and reliable enough to be admissible even though they do not meet the specific requirements of Rule 1006.26 It left the judgment to the trial court, quoting Fraser v. Major League Soccer: “It is hard to imagine an issue on which a trial judge enjoys more discretion than as to whether summary exhibits will be helpful.”27
Courts recognize the category because an accurate summary of a tangled record helps jurors even when the proponent cannot satisfy every condition of Rule 1006. The price is a narrower role for the exhibit. Because the summary sits on top of evidence the jurors already hold, the jury is told that it is not independent evidence of its subject matter and is only as valid and reliable as the underlying evidence it summarizes.28
The instruction tracks the exhibit's position. Bray treated a limiting instruction on the government's Rule 1006 summaries as a mistake, though one that favored the defendant and so supplied no ground for reversal.29 A Rule 1006 summary may be the jury's only proof of what the records contain, and telling jurors it is not evidence would strip that proof away. A hybrid summary reverses the situation. The underlying evidence is before the jury and remains the proof, so the instruction costs the proponent nothing and keeps the exhibit from passing for a source of facts.
The two exhibits share a subject and differ in what the court found. The judge admits the chart because the judge finds it accurate and reliable enough to help. The slide is the pedagogical device Bray describes: it summarizes admitted evidence, is itself not admitted, and may reflect the proponent's conclusions through captions or other organizational devices.30 Admission of the first kind is the unusual instance. An accurate chart of admitted evidence starts out as an aid, and reaching the hybrid category takes a trial-court finding of exceptional accuracy and reliability, which a reviewing court treats with deference.31 Two errors follow from forgetting that. One treats every accurate chart of admitted evidence as an admissible exhibit, which skips the finding that makes the category exist. The other carries the no-instruction rule over from Rule 1006 summaries, although for this category the instruction is part of what makes admission acceptable. Bray and Milkiewicz also came before Rule 107 stated that an illustrative aid is not evidence, and a court that follows them must now square the hybrid with that statement.32