Concept
What Rule 1006 Does Not Cover
Summaries
What Rule 1006 Does Not Cover
Rule 1006(a) lets the court admit a summary, chart, or calculation offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court, whether or not those sources have been introduced.1 Each phrase of that sentence sets a boundary. The sources must be writings, recordings, or photographs, so what witnesses said stays outside. The exhibit must prove their content, so a report that the records are silent on a point stays outside. The exhibit must condense the records, so a witness who adds assumptions or inferences stays outside. And the rule presumes sources that exist and could be examined if examining them were convenient, so business records that already stand as originals, and records that no longer exist, stay outside.
The boundaries matter because Rule 1006 comes with safeguards fitted to the situation it describes. The sources must themselves be admissible, and the summary may not become an argumentative synopsis.2 The proponent must also make the originals or duplicates available to the other parties.3 An exhibit outside the description cannot claim the exception’s convenience, and a court asked to receive it as a Rule 1006 summary should decline. Declining the label decides only the route, however. In each of the five situations below, the underlying evidence usually has another way in, through the rules that govern testimony, opinion, business records, or lost originals. Exam questions test both errors: treating any chart-like exhibit as a Rule 1006 summary, and assuming that an exhibit failing Rule 1006 must be excluded.
Testimony Is Not Summarizable
Rule 1006(a) names three kinds of source: writings, recordings, and photographs. The spoken word is not one of them.4 A chart that condenses what witnesses said on the stand therefore falls outside the rule, however many witnesses testified and however long they spoke. The First Circuit has stated the limit directly, noting in McElroy that Rule 1006 “only allows the introduction of summary evidence that summarizes documents, as opposed to evidence that summarizes testimony.”5
Two features of the rule explain the line. Rule 1006 supplies secondary evidence of voluminous writings that could not conveniently be introduced at trial,6 and testimony has no writing for a summary to stand in for. The rule also pairs the exception with the opponent’s right to examine the originals,7 a check that spoken words cannot supply. A chart of testimony would also invite the abuse the rule forbids, because Rule 1006 may not serve as a guise for placing before the jury an argumentative synopsis of oral testimony or documentary evidence.8 A chart that only helps jurors follow testimony they have already heard may still be shown as an illustrative aid under Rule 107, but it is not a Rule 1006 summary.
The opposite mistake treats a chart of documents as disqualified because a witness also described the same facts. Appolon answers it. Two defendants there argued that the summary charts impermissibly summarized testimony in addition to documents, pointing to entries that, they said, rested only on the testimony of a witness named Lamerique.9 The First Circuit rejected the objection entry by entry. Haltiwanger complained that only Lamerique’s testimony connected her $17,000 to the scheme, yet the documents showed that she received that sum in two installments from a bank account associated with the scheme within three months of buying one of the properties involved.10 Daniel made the same argument about three checks totaling $16,000, but two bore his endorsement and Levine made out the third to him. The court held: “That a particular fact may have been the subject of testimony does not mean that it cannot be corroborated through admissible documents summarized under Rule 1006.”11
The grid and the Appolon charts differ in what each entry rests on. Every entry on the grid is a witness’s words. Every entry the court examined in Appolon restated a bank record or a check, and the witness merely told the same story. A fact can have two proofs, a witness and a document, and Rule 1006 reaches only the proof that is a record. A proponent accused of offering a chart that is really testimony should therefore point to the record behind each entry, including the entries that tie a person to the scheme. An exam stem noting that a witness “already testified” to the facts on a chart points at the wrong feature. The question is what the chart summarizes.
A related boundary concerns what a witness knows firsthand. In U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Scott, the Scotts offered an amortization schedule that Repp had prepared from their income tax returns. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that it was not a summary of documents at all but a conclusion Repp reached from his own calculations and assumptions. Because only writings, recordings, or photographs may be the subject of a Rule 1006 summary, the court explained, such a summary “cannot properly incorporate a witness’ personal knowledge as the basis for any of the matters summarized.”12 The access safeguard shows why. Subdivision (b) gives the opponent the originals so that the summary can be checked against its sources,13 and that check works only when every entry traces to a source. Content drawn from the witness’s own experience has nothing to inspect, so it would carry a document summary’s standing while escaping the check. How far a summary witness may go before supplying opinion is taken up below.
Objections must also be kept alive. In Georgiou, the appellant’s counsel told the court that his concerns about the charts had been “resolved,” and the appellant lodged no objection at trial to the testimony of the witness who presented them or to the admission of the charts.14 A party who believes a chart condenses testimony should press that objection at trial.
Absence of Entries
Rule 1006(a) admits an exhibit “offered to prove the content” of the records,16 and the word content defines the job a summary does: it restates what the records say. Every figure on a proper chart corresponds to an entry, and the exception lets the jury receive those entries in compressed form because it cannot read them all. Testimony that a witness searched hundreds of records and found no entry for particular transactions does something else. No entry exists to condense. The witness reports a gap, and the only reason to offer the report is the inference that the transaction never happened. That testimony says nothing about what the records contain, so it does not travel under Rule 1006, however many records the witness had to read to find nothing.
The line falls there because Rule 1006’s safeguards are built around entries. An opponent tests a summary by locating the source entry behind each figure, and subdivision (b) guarantees access to the originals so that the test can be run.17 A claim of absence offers no figure to trace. The opponent needs to probe whether the search was thorough, whether the system would have recorded such a payment at all, and whether the search missed an entry. Those questions belong to a different rule, Rule 803(7), which lets the silence of a regularly kept record prove that a matter did not occur unless the source or circumstances show a lack of trustworthiness. The foundation turns on regular recordkeeping because silence carries meaning only where events are reliably entered when they happen. A ledger that captured payments sporadically would be silent even about a payment that was made.
The ledger is the same in both uses. What separates them is what the witness reports from it: the chart restates entries, and the testimony reports their absence. Rejecting the Rule 1006 label decides the route and leaves the result open. The testimony can come in if the exception’s foundation is laid, and it can be excluded if the ledger was not reliably kept or the circumstances undermine trustworthiness. Two instincts mislead on exam questions. One treats any testimony about a large set of records as a Rule 1006 summary. The other assumes that testimony failing Rule 1006 is inadmissible. A stem that stresses how many records the witness reviewed points at volume, and volume matters only once the testimony condenses what the records say.
Opinions and Calculations
Rule 1006(a) admits a summary, chart, or calculation only when it is offered to prove the content of voluminous admissible records.19 A calculation that totals the figures in the records does that. A witness who fills gaps in the records with assumptions, reconstructs events the records do not show, or draws inferences from the figures has stopped reporting and started interpreting. Interpretation is opinion testimony, and the rules on lay and expert opinion govern it.20 Two questions therefore place any accountant’s schedule: what does each figure rest on, and what will the witness say about it?
The line falls there because Rule 1006’s safeguards work only when every figure traces to a source. The opponent uses the access that subdivision (b) guarantees to find the entry behind a number and see whether the summary got it right.21 An assumption has no entry behind it, so inspecting the records cannot test it. The opponent can test an assumption only by questioning the witness about premises and method, and the opinion rules organize that inquiry. Letting a reconstruction enter as a calculation would bypass them. The opposite mistake costs something too. A witness who only adds up figures and says where they came from needs no special expertise, and demanding expert formalities would add procedure without protecting anyone.
Cives Corp. v. Callier Steel Pipe & Tube, Inc. shows the permitted side. Cives’s accountant, Keniston, testified at trial to the company’s costs of cover. Before trial he had put together an exhibit listing those costs. The trial court excluded the exhibit as hearsay, so he used it only as a device to explain the basis for his calculations, and he had all of the original records and data with him at trial.22 Maine’s highest court applied the state’s counterpart to Rule 1006, which allowed the contents of voluminous writings to be presented as a chart, summary, or calculation, and held that his testimony based on his review of the records was admissible to show the costs of cover.23 The deciding facts were that Keniston brought the originals to court and that Callier did not claim it was denied access to them.24 The court added an alternative ground: under Maine’s Rule 703, an expert such as Keniston may testify to conclusions drawn from materials made known to him, whether or not those materials were admitted, where experts in the field reasonably rely on that type of data.25 His totals could come in because each came from a record available in the courtroom, which left the opponent everything needed to check the work.
Scott shows the failing side. Repp built an amortization schedule from the Scotts’ income tax returns, and the majority held that it was a conclusion based on his calculations and assumptions, not a summary of documents.26 Both witnesses worked from voluminous records. Keniston’s totals came from entries in records sitting in the courtroom, while Repp’s schedule depended on assumptions the returns did not contain. The majority also found other defects: the schedule was created because the writings were unavailable, not for the court’s convenience, a problem taken up below under lost originals.27
The dissent in Scott would have analyzed the schedule differently. It maintained that these expert opinions are not covered by Rule 1006: “[N]ot all expert testimony that is seemingly summary in form falls within the parameters of Rule 1006. Opinion evidence, even if based upon review of voluminous data, remains opinion evidence ... and it need not satisfy Rule 1006.”28 On that view, Rule 1006 was the wrong yardstick. The dissent also faulted the majority for concluding, without any analysis, that Repp’s deposition testimony fails as expert opinion under South Dakota’s counterpart to Rule 702.29
The two opinions agree that the schedule is not a document summary and divide over whether it could come in as expert opinion. The sequence carries over to other problems. Failing the summary rule does not end the inquiry, because the evidence may have another path, and that path is tested by the opinion rules and not by Rule 1006’s conditions. The expert path also explains the one exception to the admissible-sources requirement: a summary resting on inadmissible originals fails except to the extent an expert has reasonably relied on them.30
A witness who only compiles and explains records can testify as a lay witness. In Georgiou, the prosecution’s witness Koster presented testimony and charts analyzing trading activity and explained how his trading analysis related to the other evidence.31 Rule 701 allows lay opinion testimony that is rationally based on the witness’s perception, helpful to understanding the testimony or a fact in issue, and not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within Rule 702.32 The Third Circuit agreed with the district court that Koster’s comparisons of stock quantities and prices required no such knowledge, so the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting his testimony as a lay witness.33 Comparing quantities and prices is a task a juror could perform given time and the records, so no method needs vouching for, and expert qualification would have screened nothing.
A court addressing an accountant offered as a summary witness drew the same boundary from the witness’s side. It held that Mr. Cohen could testify as a summary witness without being admitted or considered as an expert, but only to authentication matters within his personal knowledge: that he created the summary exhibits, that he relied on the identified documents in doing so, and that the exhibits accurately reflect the documents’ contents. He could not opine on inferences to be drawn from the summaries or present conclusions to the court.34 The decisive fact was the content of the proposed testimony. The same profession can produce either kind of testimony, depending on what the witness is asked to add to the records.
An exam stem that introduces an accountant or a schedule invites two opposite shortcuts, and each loses points. One treats every witness who works with numbers as an expert, which overlooks that totaling and explaining records falls within the summary rule and, for a lay witness, within Rule 701. The other treats every schedule drawn from voluminous records as a summary, which overlooks that a figure resting on an assumption reports no content. The working question is what each figure rests on: an entry in an admissible record that the opponent can examine, or a premise the witness supplied.
Business-Record Compilations
A compilation that a business made for its own purposes, long before anyone expected a lawsuit, may be admissible as a record of regularly conducted activity under Rule 803(6) and then has no need of Rule 1006. In United States v. Draiman, the defendant argued that an exhibit the government offered was a Rule 1006 summary, so the government had to establish its accuracy and give the defense copies of the underlying documents. The government answered that Rule 803(6) made the exhibit admissible because it was prepared in the regular course of business and not for litigation. The Seventh Circuit agreed.36
The court tied each rule to a different kind of exhibit. Rule 1006 contemplates a summary, prepared for trial, as secondary evidence of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that could not conveniently be introduced at trial. The entries on a business record, by contrast, are considered the original entries, so the record is admissible without regard to the availability of the underlying documents.37 The business-records exception asks whether the record was made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge. It asks whether the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity and made as a regular practice of that activity. And it asks whether a custodian or other qualified witness shows these things, unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.38
The exception can dispense with access to the sources because its reliability comes from the routine itself. A clerk who compiles figures month after month for management has no lawsuit to win, and the business relies on the figures to run its affairs. A summary assembled for trial has no such guarantee, so it must borrow reliability from its sources and open them to the opponent. Confusing the categories misfires in both directions. Treating a regularly kept compilation as a Rule 1006 summary imposes access requirements that do not fit it, and treating a litigation summary as a business record strips away the safeguards that make a summary tolerable.
A telex offered as a summary of a bank’s records shows the other side. The telex carried two hearsay links, the bank records behind it and the telex itself. The defendant argued that the business-records exception accounted for the first link and the summary rule for the second, which together would overcome the double hearsay. The court held that the telex was not itself admissible as a business record, so the defendant had to qualify it as a summary, and in that posture the underlying documents must be available for inspection.39 The principle behind the holding is general. A summary built on documents that are hearsay and inadmissible under any exception is itself inadmissible, and so is one built on documents inadmissible for any other reason, such as irrelevancy, unfair prejudice, or lack of authenticity. The proponent must also have made the documents available for examination or copying by the other parties at a reasonable time and place.40 The business-record status of the telex’s sources could not carry over to the telex.
Draiman and the telex case turn on the same hinge: when and why the compilation was made. The exhibit in Draiman was produced in the regular course of business, so its entries counted as original entries and the availability of the documents behind it did not matter. The telex had to qualify as a summary, so access to its sources mattered. An exam stem that calls an exhibit a “summary” has not invoked Rule 1006 by the label. The first question is whether the exhibit is a regularly kept record that a custodian can sponsor, and Rule 1006’s foundation and access requirements come into play only if it is not. The business-records route has its own foundation, so a regularly kept compilation still needs a qualified witness and a showing of trustworthiness.
Summaries of Lost Originals
Rule 1006 rests on two assumptions about the records behind a summary: that there are many of them, and that they still exist. Subdivision (a) admits a summary of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs that cannot be conveniently examined in court,42 which describes records a jury could examine if time allowed and that the rule spares it from reading. Subdivision (b) then requires the proponent to make the underlying originals or duplicates available to the other parties for examination or copying.43 A proponent whose records have been destroyed can satisfy neither provision. The summary spares nobody an inconvenience, because no one can examine the sources, and there is nothing to give the opponent. Missing originals fall instead under the rule governing proof of contents when the original is unavailable, and a proponent who wants the figures before the jury must qualify under that rule.
The line falls there because of what makes a summary trustworthy. A Rule 1006 summary compresses sources the opponent can open, so an error or a slanted selection can be caught by comparing the chart with the records. That checkability lets a court receive an exhibit it cannot verify on its own. When the sources are gone, the exhibit stops compressing anything and becomes the only account of what the records said, prepared by the party it helps. If Rule 1006 reached that exhibit, a party could escape the access duty by showing that the records no longer exist, and the loss of the evidence would make the proponent’s proof harder to attack. The rule for unavailable originals closes the gap by making the proponent earn the right to use secondary evidence.
In Scott, the Scotts offered Repp’s amortization schedule, which he had created from income tax returns that purportedly no longer existed, and the South Dakota Supreme Court asked whether a summary of nonexistent documents is admissible.44 The court applied the state’s counterparts to the federal rules, so the provision numbers are South Dakota’s, but the structure matches. It found the schedule defective for two reasons. The schedule was created because the writings were unavailable, not for the convenience of a court faced with voluminous writings, and the originals used to create a summary must be made available to the other party.45 The two defects track subdivisions (a) and (b), and each follows from the missing records.
Having found the summary rule a poor fit, the court turned to the state provision on admissibility when documents are unavailable. It admits other evidence of contents when, among other grounds, all originals are lost or destroyed, unless the proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith.46 The bad-faith exception keeps a party from destroying damaging records and then proving their contents through a more favorable account.
The proponent carries the burden of proving the loss or destruction. The Scotts did not carry it, and the court held that the amortization was not admissible as a summary.47 Their only effort to lay a foundation was to file Repp’s deposition, which did not establish the admissibility of the underlying documents.48 The court also described the schedule as a conclusion Repp drew from calculations and assumptions applied to the returns, a separate defect of the kind discussed under opinions and calculations.49
The wholesaler and the Scotts both lacked their originals. The wholesaler proved the loss, and the Scotts did not. Qualifying under the unavailable-originals route solves only the original-writing problem. The other safeguards still apply: the underlying records must be admissible, and a witness’s assumptions still fall outside any summary. An exam stem that describes a chart built from records that “were destroyed” tempts a student to run the Rule 1006 conditions. Ask first whether the originals exist and can be inspected. If they cannot, the analysis moves to whether they were lost or destroyed and whether the proponent acted in bad faith. The opposite instinct, that missing records mean the contents cannot be proved at all, overlooks the route open to a proponent who can prove the loss.