Concept
Rule 106 and the Half-Truth Problem
Completeness rule
The Rule of Completeness
Rule 106 and the Half-Truth Problem
A passage can mislead a jury even when every word of it is accurate. The usual cause is a proponent who presents a small piece of a larger picture and so distorts its meaning.1 Federal Rule of Evidence 106 answers that tactic by letting the other side insist that the missing context come in along with the fragment.
The rule's text has a trigger, a remedy, and an override. The trigger is a party's introduction of “all or part of a statement.” The remedy is that an adverse party “may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part—or any other statement—that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.” The override is that the adverse party “may do so over a hearsay objection.”2 Two phrases carry most of the weight, “at that time” and “in fairness,” and later sections take each in turn. A treatise states the fairness standard in practical terms: the added material is something necessary to give a fair picture, to avoid misleading the trier, or to put the matter into proper context.3
The words “at that time” matter because repair delayed to a later point in the trial may not undo the harm. The original introduction is misleading without immediate completion, and completing material offered later, perhaps on cross-examination or in the other party's case, “comes too late then to completely defuse the misleading impression.”4 A later, separate reading of the omitted parts may not avert the danger, since the distorted impression can linger and work its influence at the subconscious level.5 Against that danger stands a cost. Requiring the whole to be offered can waste time and clutter the record with passages that have no bearing on the controversy.6 That cost is why the rule reaches only material that fairness requires.
At common law, the opponent could not force the proponent to broaden her questioning of a witness. When the proponent turned the witness over, however, the opponent could elicit the other parts relevant to the same topic.7 Rule 106's text speaks to timing, so the opponent need not wait. The Federal Rules do not expressly codify this older facet of the doctrine, but under Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey the opponent can still invoke it in modern federal practice.8 A later section works through that case.
The common-law sequence fits the ordinary order of proof, in which cross-examination is generally restricted to the subjects of direct and redirect to the subjects of cross. Trial judges nonetheless have broad discretion to depart from that rule and from other traditional practices regarding the order of proof.9 Rule 106 gives the opponent a textual basis to demand completion at the moment of the offer, so the opponent need not rely on that general discretion.
Rule 106 is also not the only tool for a misleading excerpt, and its remedy differs from the others. Rule 403 lets the court balance and exclude the portion offered as misleading, which removes evidence. Rule 106 lets the adverse party require “any other part” of the statement that ought in fairness to be considered at the same time, which adds evidence.10 One treatise quotes the rule as speaking of “a writing or recorded statement,” and points out that the same principle plainly could apply to unwritten statements and to other evidence. Trial courts have authority enough under Rules 401 through 403 and 611 to apply it there.11 The current text speaks simply of a “statement.”12 A later section takes up which statements are covered.
The rule also has a limit that students often miss. The tempting reading treats any other part of the same document as fair game, but the text asks a narrower question: whether the other material in fairness ought to be considered at the same time as the part introduced.13