Concept
Completeness in Other Settings
Completeness rule
Completeness in Other Settings
Rule 106 governs statements offered at trial: when a party introduces all or part of a statement, an adverse party may require the introduction, at that time, of any other part, or any other statement, that in fairness ought to be considered at the same time.1 The worry behind that sentence travels farther than the rule's wording. Wherever one side puts a selected piece of a record before a decision-maker, the other side can complain that the selection misleads. This unit follows the completeness idea into two such settings: the partial reading of a deposition or of former testimony, where a civil-procedure provision and a parallel principle supply the answer, and a motion to dismiss, where a court borrowed the rule's logic by analogy. In both, the question stays the one this chapter has asked all along: does the omitted material change what the offered piece means?
Depositions and Former Testimony
Rule 106 did not invent the idea. Its Advisory Committee Note calls the rule an expression of the rule of completeness and substantially a restatement of the provision for depositions in Civil Procedure Rule 32(a)(1).2 A secondary source states that provision at Rule 32(a)(6): when only part of a deposition is offered, an adverse party may introduce any other parts that in fairness ought to be considered with the part introduced.3 The two sources number the paragraph differently; what matters is its content.
The two settings share a rule because they share a problem. A deposition transcript, like a letter or a recording, is a fixed record from which a lawyer can pick, so the Note's two considerations carry over unchanged: the misleading impression created by taking matters out of context, and the inadequacy of repair work delayed to a later point in the trial.4 A single answer shows both. If a party reads the first half of an answer to the jury, the unread half may be the half that qualifies it, and every minute the jury spends with the clipped version makes the later repair less adequate. For that reason the other side may almost always read the rest of an answer once part of it has been read.5
The limit in that scene is the fairness filter that confines Rule 106. Completion reaches the parts that bear on the part introduced; reading part of a transcript does not invite the other side to read all of it.6
Former testimony follows the same pattern. When the proponent introduces only a portion, the result may be a distorted and inaccurate impression. The adversary may introduce the other parts that fairness requires and have them introduced at that time, without waiting for the presentation of the adversary's own case.7 Rule 106 goes further than the common-law completeness rule: it also lets the opponent demand that the proponent expand the scope of questioning to avoid creating a misleading initial impression, and the party who invokes it must specify the omitted portion that serves as essential context.8
In practice, completion is flexible. A state court applying its own Rule 106, identical to the federal rule, observed that a literal application might require the balance of a document to come in during the cross-examination itself, which could interfere with the orderly presentation of evidence. Courts have generally found compliance when the opposing party presents the relevant portions of the deposition, written statement, or document on redirect, and a trial court needs ample discretion to decide which portions maintain the proper context.9
Questions about a partly read deposition or partly read former testimony therefore draw on the same logic as questions about a partly read letter. Two traps follow: treating completeness as a rule about trial exhibits alone, and assuming that reading part of a transcript opens every page of it.
Documents at the Pleading Stage
Rule 106 speaks to evidence, and a motion to dismiss tests a pleading, so the rule's text has no natural application there. A federal court nonetheless carried the rule's logic into that setting in the Magellan litigation, citing Rule 106 as the source of the principle.11 The court reasoned by analogy. The decision shows how far the completeness idea extends; it does not show the rule operating on its own terms.
The court first had to decide whether it could read the exhibits that accompanied Salzgitter's motion to dismiss. It could, because the Rule 12(b) language about “matters outside the pleading” did not apply: the complaint referred expressly or implicitly to every exhibit added to the motion, so the exhibits could properly be treated as part of the pleadings.12 That conclusion rests on the complaint's own reference. A document the plaintiff invoked is already part of the claim as pleaded, and reading it imports nothing from outside.
With the documents properly before it, the court turned to completeness. When parties exchange a chain of correspondence about a transaction within a short period, and one party detaches certain links to state a claim, the party facing the incomplete picture may fill in the skeletal outline by adding the missing links. The court cited Rule 106 for that proposition.13 A motion to dismiss requires the court to view the parties' transaction, as framed by their correspondence, through a lens most favorable to Magellan, the plaintiff. The court could not do so, however, by examining only half of the picture.14
The court grounded the move in the two concerns that drive Rule 106. The rule's embodiment of the completeness doctrine seeks to avoid the “misleading impression created by taking matters out of context,” a phrase the court drew from the 1972 Advisory Committee Note.15 The court added that insisting on a complete picture matters no less on a motion to dismiss than on a motion to admit evidence at trial. The Note's second concern, the inadequacy of repair work delayed to a later point, applies with even greater force at the pleading stage. It would be wasteful to uphold a claim on the false premise of incomplete documentation when delayed consideration of the remaining documents would lead to dismissal of that claim.16
The analogy has a boundary that the court's own reasoning supplies. Everything turned on the complaint's reference to the correspondence, so the reasoning fills in the missing links of an exchange the plaintiff relied on and does not reach unrelated material.
An exam answer should describe the decision as an extension of the completeness principle by analogy. It should not describe it as an application of Rule 106's text, and it should not invoke the rule's hearsay sentence on a motion to dismiss. The answer should also treat the complaint's reference to the documents as the reason the court could read them, and should not suggest that completeness lets a defendant attach anything that bears on the dispute.