Concept
Why Hearsay Is Excluded
What is hearsay
Defining Hearsay
Why Hearsay Is Excluded
Federal Rule of Evidence 802 makes hearsay inadmissible unless a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence themselves, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.1 That sentence sets the default for the whole subject. Hearsay stays out, and the party who wants the jury to hear it must find a specific authorization. The definition of hearsay is assembled later in this chapter, one element at a time. For now, picture a witness who repeats what someone outside the courtroom said and asks the jury to treat those words as proof of what happened. This part asks why the law shuts the door on that evidence, and the answer governs how every element of the definition is read.
The reason lies in what the jury would be missing. When a witness relays an absent speaker’s account, the cross-examiner can question only the witness, and only about what the witness heard. The witness cannot say whether the speaker had an opportunity to perceive the event, remembered it accurately, or described it faithfully. The questions that might show the speaker was mistaken or lying go unanswered, because the person who actually observed the event, whom the rules call the declarant, is not on the stand.2 Having someone repeat another person’s out-of-court statements is a poor way for a jury to learn the truth about what those statements describe.3
Nothing in the motorist’s objection turns on relevance. The passerby’s statement bears directly on whether the motorist was careless, and hearsay can be far more probative than that. Relevance measures how much a fact helps the jury decide the case. The hearsay concern is whether the jury can fairly weigh the account it is handed. A statement can score high on the first measure and fail the second, which is why Rule 802 excludes it anyway.
Raleigh’s Case shows how the two questions separate. The out-of-court statement there was that Raleigh intended to kill the King. It is relevant to an element of treason, intent, but it helps prove intent only if it is true.4 The analysis therefore asks two things: what fact the words assert, and what fact the proponent wants to prove with them. When the two are the same, the jury can use the words only by trusting the person who spoke them.
The three subsections below take up Rule 802 itself, the safeguards that attend live testimony, and the four ways an account can go wrong.
The Exclusionary Rule
Rule 802 pairs a bar with a permission clause. The bar says hearsay is not admissible. The clause says that result changes only when a federal statute, the Federal Rules of Evidence, or other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court provide otherwise.5 Because exclusion is the default, the party offering a statement that fits the definition of hearsay must point to the authorization that lets it in.
Rule 802 operates on evidence that is already relevant, so relevance and admissibility are separate questions. Relevance asks whether the evidence helps prove a fact of consequence. Rule 802 asks whether the rules allow the evidence to reach the jury by the route the proponent has chosen, here a witness repeating someone else’s words. Words people said or wrote out of court can contain relevant information and still be excluded.6 Suppose Walker, suing Driver after a collision, testifies that a bystander said, “The light was red.” The remark is relevant for exactly the reason Walker offers it, because if true it establishes that Driver was in the wrong. It is also hearsay, no exemption or exception is identified, and Rule 802 bars it. The bystander is not in court to say whether the signal was visible from where the bystander stood, or whether the bystander arrived just after the collision and guessed who was at fault.7
The rule works by category rather than by a judge’s impression of each statement. The Advisory Committee rejected an approach that left hearsay to judicial discretion. It found that approach gave judges too much discretion, made rulings less predictable, complicated preparation for trial, and required substantially different rules for civil and criminal cases. The Committee also observed that hearsay differs in probative force from other testimony only in the absence of oath, demeanor, and cross-examination as aids in determining credibility.8 The preparation point is the practical one. A lawyer cannot plan a trial around a ruling that turns on how trustworthy a particular judge finds a particular remark. Fixed categories let the lawyer match a statement to a rule’s terms before the trial begins.
A flat ban, though, would shut out valuable proof. Some evidence not given under oath, before the factfinder, and subject to cross-examination may be inherently superior to some that is, and when the choice is between less-than-best evidence and none, a policy of doing without across the board would be folly.9 A vast amount of hearsay is in fact admissible at common law and under the Federal Rules. The full analysis of a hearsay problem therefore asks whether the evidence is hearsay and, if it is, whether any exception to the rule of exclusion applies.10
The routes around the bar fall into three groups. The Rules define some statements that fit the general definition as not hearsay, namely certain prior statements of witnesses and an opposing party’s own statements (Rule 801(d)), which later sections cover. Rules 803 and 804 list exceptions, those in Rule 803 applying whatever the declarant’s availability and those in Rule 804 requiring that the declarant be unavailable. Rule 807 adds a residual exception for statements outside those lists that carry equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.11 Jurisdictions also draw the categories differently. California, for example, admits prior consistent statements that predate any prior inconsistent statement the opponent introduces, regardless of motive to fabricate, and it does so for both substantive and credibility use.12
Offered that way, Carter’s cry is hearsay in the same sense as Walker’s bystander’s remark, yet it comes in as an excited utterance. It relates to a startling event or condition, either the injury that had happened shortly before or the shock produced by the sight of Evers.13 The two statements are equally secondhand. What separates them under Rule 802 is that an exception describes Carter’s words, while on the facts given nothing in the rules describes the bystander’s.
The analysis can fail in two directions. A student who stops at the label hearsay will exclude statements that an exemption or exception admits, as with Carter’s cry. A student who stops at finding an exception will admit statements that still must satisfy the rest of the Rules. A statement within an exception must also be relevant, be based on personal knowledge when made, and be properly authenticated, and Rule 1002 applies when a writing’s contents are being proved.14 Fitting an exception answers only the hearsay objection.
Safeguards of Live Testimony
Rule 801(c)(1) builds the line between testimony and everything else into the definition: a statement counts as hearsay only if the declarant does not make it while testifying at the current trial or hearing.16 The line falls there because testimony arrives with protections that other statements lack. In Williamson v. United States, the Supreme Court said that the dangers of out-of-court statements are minimized for in-court statements by the oath, the witness’s awareness of the gravity of the proceedings, the jury’s ability to observe the witness’s demeanor, and, most importantly, the opponent’s right to cross-examine, and that these protections are generally absent for things said out of court.17 The Advisory Committee reduced the list to three conditions under which witnesses ideally testify: under oath, in the personal presence of the trier of fact, and subject to cross-examination.18
The oath works on the speaker’s incentives. A witness who swears to tell the truth is impressed with the seriousness of the matter and risks a penalty for perjury, the crime of lying under oath, for a knowingly false answer.19 The Advisory Committee conceded that the practice is perhaps less effective than in an earlier time but found no inclination to relax it, other than to allow affirmation by persons with scruples against oaths.20 The missing oath remains one of the chief reasons given for excluding hearsay, alongside the missing cross-examination.21 Yet the oath cannot carry the rule alone. An affidavit sworn before a notary is still a statement the declarant did not make while testifying at the current trial, so it stays within the hearsay definition despite the oath.22 A student who reasons that a sworn statement must be admissible has treated one of three safeguards as if it were all of them.
Demeanor, meaning the witness’s manner, tone, and bearing while speaking, gives the jury information a transcript cannot carry. Traditionally it has been believed to furnish the trier and the opponent with valuable clues, and the Advisory Committee added that willingness to falsify may become harder in the presence of the person against whom the testimony is directed.23 The Supreme Court has made the same point about an accused: personal presence makes it more difficult to lie against someone who sits at trial.24 Demeanor offers the jury clues rather than proof, and the jury can use it only when the speaker is in the room.
Cross-examination, the opposing party’s questioning of the witness, does what the other two safeguards cannot, because it produces information rather than pressure or impressions. An oath tells a witness to be truthful but does not reveal that the witness watched from half a mile away. Demeanor shows how the witness seems but not that the witness is reconstructing the event from what others said afterward. The cross-examiner can ask how the witness knew, how close the witness stood, what the weather was, what details of the scene the witness still recalls, and what a word like “fast” or “slammed” was meant to convey.25 Each answer, or each evasion, gives the jury something concrete to weigh against the direct testimony.
That capacity is why the drafters and the courts rank cross-examination first. The Advisory Committee observed that emphasis on the basis of the hearsay rule today tends to center on cross-examination, and that although not everyone shares Wigmore’s view of it as the “greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” everyone agrees it has become a vital feature of the Anglo-American system.26 The belief, or perhaps hope, that cross-examination is effective in exposing imperfections of perception, memory, and narration is fundamental to the rule.27 The safeguards also reinforce one another, since one critical goal of cross-examination is to draw out discrediting demeanor for the factfinder to see, as Maryland v. Craig observes.28 A declarant who is absent from the courtroom therefore loses all three safeguards at once, including the one that matters most.
Return to the passerby on the flooded bridge. The county’s witness is sworn, the jury watches that witness, and the motorist’s lawyer may cross-examine that witness. Every one of those safeguards lands on the person who heard the remark. None of them reaches the passerby, whose eyesight, attention, and candor are what the jury would have to take on faith.29 The witness can vouch for one fact only, that the passerby spoke those words.
In the courtroom version, the passerby’s words about the water are testimony, because the declarant makes them while testifying at the current trial.30 Hold that contrast in mind when an exam fact pattern stresses that the repeating witness is sworn, composed, and thoroughly cross-examined. Those facts describe safeguards working on the wrong person. The protections that matter must reach the one whose perception, memory, wording, and honesty the jury is relying on.
The Testimonial Infirmities
Rule 802 rests on a theory about how out-of-court statements go wrong. The dangers the safeguards guard against, as Williamson describes them, are minimized for in-court statements by the oath, demeanor, and cross-examination and are generally absent for out-of-court ones.32 This subject calls those dangers the testimonial infirmities: perception, memory, sincerity, and ambiguity, the last also called narration.33 Each belongs to a different step on the path an account travels from the event to the juror, so the clearest way to learn them is to walk that path in order.
The path has three stages. The first is the real past event. The second is the speaker’s belief about that event, which the speaker formed by perceiving it. The third is the set of words the speaker chooses to express that belief, and those words are the only part a juror ever receives.34 A juror who uses the words to learn about the event must retrace the path backward, deciding first whether the words fairly reflect what the speaker believes and then whether that belief fairly reflects what happened. Each infirmity is a weak point on that return trip.
Mr. Observer, who watched a red car speed into a blue one, says that the red car was going “very fast” and “slammed” into the blue car. A listener who wanted to test that account would ask questions that sort into the four infirmities, taken here in the order of the path.35
- Perception asks whether the speaker could actually see the event, so the listener would ask how close Mr. Observer stood and how clearly he could have seen the accident.
- Memory asks whether the speaker still recalls what was seen, so the listener would ask about the weather and the style of the cars, which test how strong his memory is.
- Narration asks whether the words mean to the listener what the speaker meant by them, so the listener would ask what Mr. Observer meant by “fast” and by “slammed,” both of which are ambiguous.
- Sincerity asks whether the speaker is reporting honestly, so the listener would try to get an impression of Mr. Observer’s honesty from how he answers.
The four risks fall into two groups, and the grouping shows where each one sits on the path. Perception and memory control the accuracy of the belief the speaker holds about the past event at the moment of speaking. Narration and sincerity control whether the words match that belief, because a speaker with an accurate belief can still choose words that convey a false impression of it.36 Some sources list three infirmities rather than four. Cross-examination is traditionally credited with exposing imperfections of perception, memory, and narration, and the Advisory Committee treated sincerity as merely an aspect of those three.37 The questions a cross-examiner would ask are the same under either count.
The difference between hearing from the speaker and hearing from a repeater shows up in how many of those questions survive. If Mr. Observer testifies himself, the cross-examiner can ask how he came to see the collision, how much he recalls, and what speed he meant by “very fast,” and the way he answers lets the jury weigh his honesty.38 If Ms. Friend testifies instead that Mr. Observer described the collision to her over lunch the week before, the same questions have nowhere to go. She can say which words she heard. She cannot say where he stood, how sharp his memory was, or what he meant by “fast,” and she cannot vouch for his candor.39 Her own report has infirmities too, since she could mishear or misremember his words, but those can be probed because she is on the stand. His remain hidden.
Not every infirmity is equally live in every case, and spotting which ones are is part of the skill. In the collision case from the last subsection, the bystander who announced that the light was red may have arrived just after the collision and guessed who was at fault, which raises perception. The bystander may also not have meant to say anything about whether the light favored the driver or the pedestrian, which raises ambiguity. Memory was the one infirmity that posed little risk there, because almost no time passed between the event and the remark.40
The analysis changes when the words matter only because they were spoken. In a suit over an injury from a machine’s sharp edge, a witness testifies that the plaintiff was told, “Look out for the sharp edge,” and the words are offered to show that the plaintiff was warned and how the plaintiff responded. The words are neither true nor false for that purpose. If the speaker meant to lie, that does not matter. If the speaker meant “pointed” rather than “sharp,” that does not matter either. A mistaken impression about the machine’s danger is equally unimportant, because on the question of the plaintiff’s conduct it is the fact that the words were once spoken that gives the jury something to consider.41 In terms of the path, the jury never leaves the words. When the only issue is whether the words were spoken or written, the hearsay rule allows them, and none of the testimonial infirmities is involved.42 Offer the same words to prove that the machine really had a dangerous edge, and the jury must credit the speaker’s eyesight, recollection, vocabulary, and candor all at once. That is why Rule 801(c)(2) defines hearsay by the use the proponent makes of a statement, namely offering it to prove the truth of the matter asserted in it.43 The same utterance can engage every infirmity for one purpose and none for another.