Concept
Statements Defined as Not Hearsay
What is hearsay
Statements Defined as Not Hearsay
Rule 801(d) opens with a sentence that reads like a plain definition: a statement that meets the listed conditions is not hearsay.1 The sentence does surprising work. Every element this chapter has built (a statement, a declarant, an out-of-court setting, an offer for the truth of what was said) describes evidence that Rule 802 bars, and Rule 801(d) names two kinds of statement that meet all of those elements and are still defined out of the hearsay category: certain prior statements of a witness who testifies, and statements of an opposing party.2
The vocabulary is odd, since a single statement can satisfy the definition in Rule 801(c) and still carry the label 'not hearsay' under Rule 801(d), but the oddity changes nothing in practice. A statement within an exemption and a statement within an exception both overcome a hearsay objection, and the proponent may use either to prove the truth of what it asserts.3 The history of the party-opponent class shows the point: at common law its statements were admitted under an exception, while the Federal Rules exempt them from the definition.4 A student who sees that a statement fits Rule 801(d) can therefore end the hearsay analysis there and skip the search for an exception. Fitting Rule 801(d) answers only the hearsay objection, however. The statement must still be relevant and authentic, and when it proves the contents of a writing it must satisfy the Original Writing Rule, Rule 1002.5
The two classes earn their place for different reasons. Hearsay exceptions generally rest on necessity and trustworthiness, although some are outgrowths of the adversary system.6 The first class draws its assurance of reliability from the declarant's presence at trial, where the opponent can question the witness about the earlier statement.7 The second class asks for no such presence. The declarant need not testify, and the exemption runs in one direction only, because a party cannot offer its own favorable statements under Rule 801(d).8
Two subsections follow, one for each class. Each is an introduction only, and later readings supply the elements in detail.
Declarant-Witness Prior Statements
Rule 801(d)(1) opens with a condition that governs everything beneath it: the declarant testifies and is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and the statement then fits one of three categories.9 The rule is needed because a witness's earlier words were not spoken at the current trial. They are hearsay even though their speaker is on the stand, and without a special rule the proponent could not use them to prove what they say.10 Rule 801(d)(1) supplies that rule for a narrow set of earlier statements, and a statement inside the set is defined as not hearsay. Everything else a witness said before trial stays on the hearsay side of the line.
The testimony condition is what lets the rule relax the usual bar. Hearsay is suspect because the opponent cannot question the person whose account the jury hears. When the declarant is on the stand, that defect is largely cured: the opponent can examine the declarant about the earlier statement, and the jury can watch the declarant explain or disown it.11 When the earlier statement contradicts the testimony, the trier of fact is in as good a position to judge the one as the other.12 The condition runs to the declarant. A declarant who is available to be called but never takes the stand has not testified, so the earlier statement remains hearsay even if an officer who heard it takes the stand. The condition has no counterpart for an opposing party's statements, which is why a party's words can come in without the party ever testifying.13
The cross-examination half of the condition is easier to satisfy than students expect. United States v. Owens distinguishes two kinds of obstacle. Limits on the scope of examination, or a witness's assertion of privilege, can undermine the process so far that no meaningful cross-examination remains. A witness's assertion of memory loss does not have that effect.14 A witness who claims not to remember the events therefore stays subject to cross-examination about the earlier statement.
Once the testimony condition is met, the statement must fit one of three categories. Each is a separate route with its own conditions, so the proponent must name the one the statement fits. This section only names them; later readings take up the elements and limits of each.
- A prior inconsistent statement: one that contradicts the declarant's testimony and was given under penalty of perjury at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding or in a deposition, such as grand jury testimony the witness now contradicts.15
- A prior consistent statement: one that matches the declarant's testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge of recent fabrication or recent improper influence or motive, or to rehabilitate the declarant when attacked on another ground, such as an earlier telling of the same account that predates a claimed motive to lie.16
- A statement of identification: one that identifies a person as someone the declarant perceived earlier, such as picking a suspect out of a lineup or a photographic array.17
Each category is narrow on purpose. If the out-of-court statements of people who become witnesses were generally admissible, well-organized parties would record interviews with prospective witnesses, with no cross-examination at the time, and offer them at trial, when a witness may be less willing to change or criticize the recollection than if it had been challenged when first expressed.18 The categories answer that concern one at a time. The inconsistent-statement category protects a party against the 'turncoat' witness who changes his story on the stand and deprives the party who called him of evidence essential to the case, a risk the comment to California's counterpart provision singles out.19 A consistent statement comes in only to answer an attack on the witness. When the attack is a charge of improper influence or motive, Tome v. United States adds a timing condition: the declarant must have made the earlier statement before developing the reason to fabricate, or before the improper influence or motive arose.20 The proponent must therefore identify when the declarant-witness acquired a reason to lie and show that the statement came earlier.21 Some jurisdictions are more generous. California, for example, also admits a prior consistent statement that predates any prior inconsistent statement the opponent has introduced, regardless of motive to fabricate.22 That rule can govern substantive use, credibility use, or both, and in California it governs both.23 An identification needs no prior attack on the witness. A courtroom identification is so unconvincing as practically to impeach itself, and the earlier identification, made when memory was fresher and there had been less opportunity for influence, is the more meaningful one.24
The first category is clearest beside a statement that misses it. Suppose Ford sues Chrysler over the color of a car and must prove it was black. Edsel testifies at trial that it was not, and Ford's only evidence of black is Edsel's earlier inconsistent statement. If Edsel made that statement informally, outside any proceeding and not under penalty of perjury, it fits none of the three categories and remains hearsay when offered for its truth, so the judge will direct judgment as a matter of law for Chrysler.25 The jury may still hear the remark to weigh Edsel's credibility, since two incompatible accounts bear on his reliability whichever account is true, but that limited use gives Ford no proof that the car was black. Even the limited use can be excluded under Rule 403 when the jury is likely to treat the remark as proof of the fact it asserts.26
Miguel's grand jury account and Edsel's remark contradict their authors' testimony equally sharply, and the sworn setting is what separates them. Two mistakes follow from overlooking it. A student who reasons that any inconsistent statement of a testifying witness comes in for its truth has erased the sworn-proceeding requirement. A student who reasons that the grand jury transcript would be usable against Rafael even if Miguel had never been called has erased the testimony condition, and with Miguel absent from the stand the transcript would need a separate exemption or exception.27
Opposing Party's Statements
The second class that Rule 801(d) defines as not hearsay is the opposing party's statement. Rule 801(d)(2) applies when a statement is offered against an opposing party and fits one of five descriptions of who made it or how the party is connected to it.29 The older name for these statements is admissions, and at common law they were admitted under an exception to the hearsay rule. The Federal Rules instead remove them from the definition, so a proponent need only show that the opposing party once made the statement and that it is relevant at trial.30 Unlike the prior statements of a testifying witness, these statements carry no requirement that the declarant take the stand, and the declarant's availability is immaterial.31 The paragraphs below explain why the rules favor this evidence and name the five descriptions. They then draw the two limits that most often decide an exam question: the statement must be offered against the party, and it need not have hurt the party when made.
The rationale is clearest when the speaker is the party. A party's own past words, relevant at trial to an issue in the case, are the clearest example, and the party can always disclaim or explain them once they are admitted, for instance by testifying.32 The rationale is less clear for the vicarious admissions of an agent or coconspirator, which the doctrine also embraces, and the justifications for the exemption as a whole are imperfect at best.33
The five descriptions differ in how the party relates to the words, and a proponent should be able to name the one that fits. Each appears here with a single illustration.
- A statement the party made in an individual or representative capacity, such as a driver's remark after a collision that he did not see the traffic light, offered by the person he is accused of injuring.34
- A statement the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true, as when someone tells the driver he did not stop for the red light and the driver answers with an apology, so that the accusation and the reply come in together.35
- A statement made by a person the party authorized to speak on the subject, with a lawyer speaking for a client the most common example.36
- A statement made by the party's agent or employee on a matter within the scope of that relationship and while it existed, such as a company truck driver's remark about her own driving after an accident.37
- A statement made by the party's coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy, which may be used against another member of that conspiracy when both the timing and the purpose requirements are met.38
The opening words of Rule 801(d)(2) settle who may use the exemption: the statement must be offered against an opposing party. The exemption therefore runs in one direction only, and a litigant cannot use it to put in his own favorable out-of-court words.39 When the plaintiff in a collision suit offers the defendant's remark that he did not see the traffic light, the words are the defendant's own and are used against him, as a basis for concluding he was not watching the signal. That is the exemption's central case.40
The test, then, is who offers the statement, and not only who made it. The same driver can be the source of two remarks that receive opposite rulings, because one is offered against him and the other for him.
The word against describes the party the statement is offered against at trial, and it says nothing about what the statement cost the speaker when spoken. A party's words may have seemed favorable, unfavorable, or neutral when the party said them, and the proponent need show only that the party once made them and that they are relevant.41 In an age discrimination suit, an email from a company's chief executive to the board announcing that everyone over forty had to be fired because older workers are expensive and the company wanted a younger image is a likely example.42 The executive need not have thought of the email as damaging when he wrote it. What matters is that, offered against the company, it damages the company's case at trial. The separate exception for declarations against interest does ask whether the declarant knew the statement was damaging to his own interests when he made it, and it requires no tie between the declarant and a party, so the two doctrines should not be run together.43
The truck driver shows how far the agent-or-employee description reaches. If a driver employed by a company is in an accident and afterward says something about her driving, her words are admissible in a suit against the company for the resulting injuries, even though the company probably never authorized her to make statements about driving.44 The authorization category asks whether the party gave the speaker the job of speaking on the subject. The employee category asks only whether the matter fell within the relationship and whether the relationship existed when the words were spoken. Some common-law jurisdictions are more restrictive and require authorization, reasoning that a driver's job is driving and not talking about driving, so an exam that names a state-law jurisdiction calls for checking which view applies.45 The timing language marks the other edge. An autobiography that a former employee writes after retiring was not written during the employment, so it stays hearsay when offered against the former employer to prove that an ingredient was dangerous.46
The closing sentences of Rule 801(d)(2) add a foundation rule. The statement itself must be considered in deciding whether it fits, but it does not alone establish the declarant's authority under (C), the existence or scope of the relationship under (D), or the existence of the conspiracy and the party's participation in it under (E).47 An answer that labels a declarant an employee therefore needs support beyond the declarant's own words. The same provision admits a statement against a party whose claim, defense, or potential liability is directly derived from a declarant or the declarant's principal, if the statement would be admissible against that declarant or principal.48 Adoption by silence, disputes over the scope of employment, and the proof needed for a conspiracy each receive their own reading.