Concept
Subject to Cross-Examination
Prior statements by witness
Subject to Cross-Examination
Before Rule 801(d)(1) asks what a witness's earlier statement says, it asks whether the witness is still answerable for it. The declarant must testify and be “subject to cross-examination about a prior statement”; only then does the rule ask whether the statement is inconsistent, consistent, or an identification.1 All three categories share this requirement,2 so a statement that fits a category perfectly remains hearsay if the declarant never testifies or cannot be questioned about it. Each category then adds conditions of its own. The consistent-statement category, for example, turns on when a motive to lie arose. Courts divide over whether an investigation or arrest by itself marks that moment,3 and the trial judge's finding on the timing is reviewed on appeal only for clear error.4 This section takes up only the shared condition: why it justifies treating these statements as nonhearsay, how little the Supreme Court has demanded to satisfy it, and where it fails.
The Shared Condition
A witness's earlier statement was made outside the trial, without the protections the trial supplies. When the witness later takes the stand, most of those protections return. If the witness admits the statement, or other evidence shows it is his, the danger of faulty reproduction is negligible and the jury can be confident that it has two conflicting statements from the same witness. The witness must now affirm, deny, or qualify the earlier statement under penalty of perjury. The absence of an oath when the statement was made may even become the witness's own explanation for its inaccuracy, an explanation a jury can be expected to understand and weigh.5 On that reasoning, California v. Green held that the Confrontation Clause does not bar the substantive use of a witness's prior inconsistent statements when the witness is available at trial to affirm, deny, or explain them.6
Not everyone accepted later questioning as a substitute for contemporaneous questioning. Lawyers and judges thought that admitting such statements would encourage reliance on them at trial, and that “deferred” cross-examination, which questions the witness at trial about statements made before, is inferior to contemporaneous cross-examination. Congress refused to go along with the drafters, and Rule 801(d)(1)(A) amounts to a compromise.7 Green named the one real danger in deferred questioning: false testimony tends to harden as the witness has time to reconsider and to absorb suggestions from others whose interest may be to maintain falsehood. That danger disappears, the Court reasoned, when the witness has changed his testimony so that his prior statement has softened to the point where he now repudiates it.8 Crawford later confirmed the constitutional point. A prior opportunity to cross-examine suffices for an unavailable witness, and when the declarant appears for cross-examination at trial, the Clause places “no constraints at all” on the use of his prior testimonial statements.9
Green left one question open. Its witness, Porter, had an apparent lapse of memory at trial, and the Court declined to decide whether that lapse so affected the defendant's right to cross-examine as to make a critical difference. The question was not ripe because the state court had not focused on it, having wrongly assumed that an out-of-court statement is inadmissible as substantive evidence whatever the opportunity to cross-examine at trial.10 Owens answered it.
The Owens Standard
United States v. Owens answers the memory-loss question, and the answer favors the proponent. Foster testified at trial about his activities just before the attack, described feeling blows to his head, and described seeing blood on the floor. He testified that he clearly remembered identifying Owens as his assailant during a May 5 interview with Mansfield. On cross-examination, however, he admitted that he could not remember seeing his assailant. He could recall none of his many hospital visitors except Mansfield, and he could not say whether any visitor had suggested Owens's name. Defense counsel tried to refresh his memory with hospital records, including one indicating that Foster had attributed the assault to someone else.11 The identification came in under the rule for statements of identification, and the Court held it admissible under both the Rule and the Confrontation Clause.12
The Court's test is simple. Ordinarily a witness is “subject to cross-examination” when placed on the stand, under oath, and responding willingly to questions. A claim of memory loss does not change that, because forgetting is often the very result cross-examination seeks to produce, and it can destroy the force of the prior statement. The text of Rule 801(d)(1)(C) does not demand more, since it requires only that the cross-examination “concer[n] the statement.”13 Foster was, as one commentary puts it, effectively insulated from many kinds of cross-examination probing, and the condition was still met.14
The constitutional question turns on a touchstone drawn from earlier cases: whether the cross-examination gives the trier of fact “a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.”15 The dissent believed that the majority's construction made Rule 801(d)(1)(C) unconstitutional. It would have required, consistent with Rule 804(a), that the declarant be subject to cross-examination as to the subject matter of the prior statement.16 The majority's reading controls. A defendant who argues that a forgetful witness cannot be tested on what he no longer knows is making the dissent's argument, and Owens rejects it.
Limits on the Standard
Owens itself marks the boundary. The Court recognized that limitations on the scope of examination imposed by the trial court, or assertions of privilege by the witness, may undermine the process to such a degree that meaningful cross-examination within the intent of the Rule no longer exists. A memory loss produces no such effect.17 The difference lies in whether questioning still takes place. Foster answered what he was asked, defense counsel pressed him with hospital records, and the jury heard a witness who could not recall the attack but testified that he remembered making the identification. A witness who invokes a privilege, or whom the court shields from questions about the statement, gives the cross-examiner nothing to test.
Courts also divide over a related procedural point: whether the party offering the earlier statement must itself call the witness and raise the statement, or whether making the witness available is enough. Vaska and State v. Rohrich (Wash. 1997) hold that the prosecutor must call the witness and broach the statement if it is to be used substantively. In Rohrich the child victim was never asked about the events or the statement, and the opportunity to cross-examine “means more than affording the defendant the opportunity to hail the witness to court.” Other courts conclude that making the witness available for cross-examination is enough.18 A proponent who questions the witness about the statement on direct avoids the dispute.
Unavailability and Party Statements
Foster's lost memory raises a second question. Rule 804(a)(3) treats a declarant as unavailable if he “testifies to not remembering the subject matter,” and Owens argued that Foster was therefore unavailable for cross-examination.21 The Court rejected the notion that unavailability for purposes of a hearsay exception is the same as being “subject to cross-examination” under Rule 801(d)(1).22 The texts show why the two differ. Rule 804(a)(3) looks to whether the declarant remembers the subject matter. Rule 801(d)(1) asks whether the declarant is subject to cross-examination about a prior statement, and subdivision (C) requires only that the questioning concern the statement.23 The dissent's proposal would have aligned the two rules, and the majority declined it.
The condition has a boundary on the other side of the rule as well. It applies to every exemption in Rule 801(d)(1) and not to the opposing-party exemptions in Rule 801(d)(2).24 Opposing-party statements are admitted because the party against whom they are offered is responsible for them and cannot complain about the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. The notion is hardest to justify for agents and coconspirators, and the rule does not require a showing that such a declarant is available. If the declarant is available, Rule 806 lets the opposing party call the declarant and question him as if on cross-examination.25