Concept
Authorized Spokespersons
Statements attributable to party-opponent
Authorized Spokespersons
A party that hires someone to speak for it answers for what the speaker says. Rule 801(d)(2)(C) builds that idea into the hearsay rules. A statement “made by a person whom the party authorized to make a statement on the subject” is attributed to the party, and it comes in as the party's own statement when offered against that party.1 Once a party delegates speaking authority to an agent, the agent's statements made in the course of exercising that authority are admissible against the party.2 The lawyer is the standard example, because a client authorizes counsel to speak for her in a case. An accountant stands in the same position when the client authorizes the accountant to speak on financial matters.3 Like every admission, a (C) statement needs no confession in its content. What matters is who the declarant is and against whom the statement is offered.4
Two ideas justify the attribution. The first is responsibility. A person who sets another to act in that person's place answers in law for what the delegate does under the authority, and the delegate's statements made while exercising it carry the same power to discredit the party's present claim as the party's own words.5 When one hires another to speak, it is fair to let the speaker's words establish facts at trial against the one who hired.6 The second idea is a modest assurance of reliability, since a party that authorizes a statement must have some basis for doing so. That assurance weakens for agents and coconspirators, whose statements come in because the party is responsible for them and cannot complain of lacking a chance to cross-examine.7
Four questions decide a problem under (C): how the authority arose, whether the statement had to reach an outsider, whether the authority covered the statement's subject, and how the proponent proves the delegation. The subsections below take them in that order.
How Authority Arises
Authority under (C) may be express or implied, and agency law decides whether it exists.8 Express authority is the easy case: a client tells a lawyer to speak in a dispute, or leaves an accountant in charge of the financial paperwork. In Melamed v. Melamed, a child support action, the husband acknowledged that bank records and tax documents had been prepared for his company. The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that the documents could be viewed as statements by a person authorized by the party to make a statement concerning the subject.9
Implied authority comes from the job the delegate was given, and it follows the common-law view, because (C) mostly codifies prior common law, under which an authorized statement by a party's agent was receivable to the same extent as the authorizing party's own.10 That view required express or implied authorization to make the statement. A truck driver's admission that he was going too fast therefore could not be used against his company in a suit over the collision. The company's claims agent's statement to the injured person's family that the driver was going too fast could.11 The difference lies in the authority the company granted: the claims agent's job included speaking for the company about the accident, and the driver's did not. The category can reach further than a job title suggests. In United States v. Iaconetti, a government official solicited a bribe from a company's agent and expected the agent to pass the solicitation along to other company personnel, and the court treated the agent as the official's own spokesperson for that purpose under (C).12
Category (C) asks whether the party delegated the speaking, and it does not ask whether the speaker works for the party. In the Wild Canid Survival and Research Center case, the court said the statements of Poos, who had custody of the animal at issue, were not a (C) situation because nobody had authorized or directed him to make a statement on the matter. The court turned instead to (D), under which Poos spoke as an agent or servant of the Center on a matter within the scope of his employment, during the relationship.13 Category (D), which a later section treats, now reaches a driver's remark about the driving when it concerns a matter within the job, with no speaking authority required. Category (C) remains available whenever the company has authorized the driver to speak.
Statements to the Principal
A statement by an authorized speaker counts under (C) even when the speaker addressed it only to the principal and never to an outsider.15 Before the Rules, the Third Circuit held in Nuttall v. Reading Co. that an employee's statement made to the employer, rather than to a third party, could not be an admission by the employer. The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 801(d)(2)(C) make clear that a statement may be an authorized admission even though it was never communicated to a third party, and the court in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. accordingly viewed Nuttall as legislatively overruled on this point.16
A rule that demanded an audience would produce odd results. A report that went to a supplier would come in against the company, while the identical report in the company's own files would stay out, though the company's authority to make the statement is the same in both cases. The category turns on delegation, and an audience adds nothing to it. The same reasoning has reached (D): a court answering the objection that Rule 801(d)(2) admits no “in house” statements applied the Advisory Committee's rationale to a (D) statement.17
Authority Must Reach the Subject
The rule attributes a delegate's words to the party only when the delegate was authorized to make a statement “on the subject.”19 The limit follows from the idea behind the category, which holds the party responsible for statements made “in the course of exercising that authority.”20 Delegation has a purpose, and the authority stops where the purpose stops. Without the limit, a narrow delegation such as letting an accountant handle the books would make the party answerable for whatever the accountant chose to say about anything.
Hanson v. Waller shows the limit where authority is clearest. In a wrongful death suit against a truck driver and his employer, the plaintiffs' first attorney had sent defense counsel a letter enclosing photographs meant to show that the driver could not have seen the pedestrian. The Eleventh Circuit held the letter admissible against the plaintiffs under (C). An attorney lacks authority to make an out-of-court admission for the client in every instance, but does have authority to make admissions directly related to the management of the litigation, and this letter was of that kind.21 The attorney's authority also reaches judicial admissions on matters relating to the progress and trial of the action.22 In every case the authority is real, and in every case it is tied to a subject.
Proving the Authority
The proponent of a (C) statement must prove the delegation, and the speaker's own say-so does not do it. The last sentence of Rule 801(d)(2) directs that the statement must be considered but does not by itself establish the declarant's authority under (C).24 The reason is plain: if a speaker's claim of authority could prove the authority, anyone could create admissible evidence against a company by announcing that the speaker talks for it. When authority is disputed, the judge decides the question under Rule 104(a), and the proponent may prove it through the asserted agent's testimony, through anyone else who knows, or through circumstantial evidence.25 Courts once refused to consider the speaker's own assertions of agency at all. The Federal Rules let the judge use them but say they cannot stand alone.26 The statement thus counts as one strand of proof, and it needs independent evidence beside it. A later section returns to this limit.