Concept
Working Through a Chain
Multiple hearsay
Working Through a Chain
Rule 805 states the test in one sentence: hearsay within hearsay is not excluded by the rule against hearsay if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the rule.1 The two preceding sections supplied the halves of that sentence. Counting levels identifies the “parts,” and the each-level requirement says what must be shown about every one of them. What remains is applying both to an actual item of evidence, where the declarants arrive unnumbered and the proponent must work out, often under time pressure, how every link gets in.
A chain is worked from a list. Write down each declarant in order, from the outermost statement inward, noting what that person said, to whom, and when. The facts about each declarant’s situation decide which exception fits, whether a duty to report, the timing of the statement, a relationship to a party, or a state of excitement, so they belong on the page before any exception is chosen. Then test each link alone. A strong link adds nothing to a weak one, and a link without a basis excludes the whole chain, so test first the link most likely to fail.
Two worked treatments follow. The first takes three declarants and shows one kind of reasoning, applied link by link, carrying a statement through several mouths. The second takes chains whose links need different exceptions, so that the answer for one declarant cannot be assumed for the next. Together they build the habit these problems reward: label, test, and rescue each link separately.
A Three-Link Chain
In Ferber, the government alleged that Ferber had violated the blackout provisions by giving Merrill Lynch substantive help with its oral examination, and it moved to admit Carey’s handwritten notes as substantive evidence of that help.2 The notes recorded what Eisenberg had told Carey about her conversation with Ferber, and Ferber’s counsel objected.3
The government first argued that the notes were offered only to prove that they existed and that the information had reached Merrill Lynch.4 That argument refuted itself. The notes mattered only if Ferber was the source of the information in them, and that depended on Eisenberg’s having accurately recounted Ferber’s statements and on Carey’s having accurately recorded hers, so the notes were offered for the truth of those statements.5 A dependable test for a claimed nonhearsay purpose is to ask what the jury must believe before the item matters. If the jury must believe that each speaker repeated the one before accurately, the item is offered for its truth and Rule 805 governs, whatever label the proponent attaches. Purposes that genuinely escape the hearsay definition appear in a later section.
With the notes treated as offered for their truth, the next step is to diagram the chain. Ferber spoke to Eisenberg, who recounted his words to Carey, who wrote down what he was told and authenticated the notes in court. Ferber’s statement thus “runs through the heads” of Eisenberg and Carey, and their out-of-court declarations were hearsay even though both testified, because those declarations carried infirmities of perception and bias that were not subject to cross-examination.6 The chain therefore has three levels: Ferber’s statement, Eisenberg’s report of it, and Carey’s notes of her report. Admitting the notes required a basis for each, and the court found one for each.7
The first level, Ferber’s statements to Eisenberg, came in against Ferber as admissions by a party-opponent. The court noted that the Federal Rules classify such admissions as nonhearsay under Rule 801(d)(2) rather than as hearsay admitted by exception, so they need not carry the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that admitted hearsay normally requires.8 For Rule 805 purposes, courts hold that this technical difference does not control, and they treat a Rule 801(d) statement as the equivalent of a level that conforms with an exception.9 Attention then shifts to the second and third levels.
Those levels rested on the exception for present sense impressions. The exception rests on contemporaneousness: a statement made almost simultaneously with the event leaves almost no likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.10 The court applied its requirements to each of the two links separately.
Applied to Eisenberg, the requirements were met by inference. The court reasoned that Eisenberg went to Ferber on Carey’s errand, returned to report, and that Carey’s notes did no more than recite what she told him.11 The detail in the notes supported an inference that she reported almost at once, and she had no apparent reason to falsify.12 That observation answers the worry behind the exception, because a reporter allied with the person reported has nothing to gain by distorting that person’s words. Carey’s notes met the same requirements: he made them as Eisenberg spoke or immediately afterward, and he perceived what she told him just as she had perceived what Ferber told her.13
Ferber objected that the exception could not apply because Carey took no part in, and so did not perceive, the conversation between Ferber and Eisenberg. The court answered that the objection misread the analysis: Carey’s notes were a present sense impression of what Eisenberg said to Carey, and because every link had a separate and independent basis, Rule 805 was satisfied.14 Each exception vouches for what its own declarant perceived. Carey perceived Eisenberg’s report, Eisenberg perceived Ferber’s words, and Ferber’s words are covered because he was the party they were offered against. Demanding that every exception reach back to the original conversation would eviscerate Rule 805, since hearsay within hearsay would almost never qualify.15
A chain built on the same exception fails when the facts that made the Ferber links reliable are missing. In Rock v. Huffco Gas & Oil Co. the plaintiffs offered accident reports by Christian and Gardner that recorded Rock’s account of an accident, and the Fifth Circuit called the recording of Rock’s statements a classic example of hearsay within hearsay in which both levels needed an exception.16 Christian’s report was filed only after two days had passed, Rock had time to manipulate the truth before giving the information for the second report, and there was evidence that the accident had been staged for personal gain, so the reports did not qualify as present sense impressions.17 The motive to fabricate also stripped Rock’s statements of the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that any hearsay exception presupposes.18 The two decisions side by side show which facts move the result. Eisenberg and Carey spoke within moments of what each perceived and had no reason to shade the account, while Rock’s account was recorded after a delay by a declarant with something to gain, and no care taken by the report-writers could rescue a link that failed on its own facts.
Mixing Different Exceptions
Rule 805 requires that each part of the combined statements conform with an exception, and it does not require that one exception cover every part.20 That silence matters because the exceptions answer different worries about different kinds of declarants. Routine and duty vouch for a record-keeper. A stake in the matter vouches for a speaker who says something damaging to his or her own interests. A party’s own words, offered against that party, need no voucher beyond having been spoken. Each guarantee attaches to the declarant it fits, so a chain of different kinds of declarants usually needs a different exception at each link. The working question at each link is whether the guarantee suited to that declarant is present, and a search for one guarantee to stretch across the whole chain will usually come up empty.
An insurance investigator who takes a driver’s statement after a collision shows the pattern in its plainest form. The driver admits taking the entire blame, the police have charged a different person with reckless driving, and both the driver and the investigator are unavailable at trial, so the investigator’s report is offered to prove the driver was at fault.21 The driver’s words probably qualify as a declaration against interest, because a person who accepts sole blame has said something damaging and would be unlikely to say it unless it were true. The report clears its own hurdle only if it meets the requirements for regularly conducted business activity, and past recollection recorded is unavailable because the investigator is not a witness at trial.22 The two exceptions cannot trade places. The stake that vouches for the driver says nothing about whether the investigator recorded the words faithfully, and the investigator’s routine says nothing about whether the driver spoke truthfully.
Decided cases pair levels the same way. In Wright v. Farmers Co-op a statement by the defendant’s employee qualified as a statement of an agent, and the transcribed version made by the insurance adjuster who obtained it qualified as a business record.23 In Southern Stone Co. v. Singer, one level of the double hearsay was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A), but the second level was not subject to any exception, and the document was inadmissible.24 The qualifying level did not excuse the other, which follows from the rule’s own wording, since Rule 805 asks about each part and a strong link adds nothing to a weak one.25 A later section explains why a party’s statement counts as a level at all when the Rules define it as not hearsay.
Government records show the same method across three levels. In a traffic-signal illustration, a foreman’s written report records what a worker told the foreman about the bulbs and timing devices, and the report is offered to prove the signals malfunctioned.26 The worker’s words to the foreman and the foreman’s written account of them both fall under the public records exception, because each man was performing a duty of the department and the document was found where such records were supposed to be kept.27 The illustration then adds a third level, because the worker’s account quotes Prince, who made the original statement. The first two levels remain covered by the public records exception, and Prince’s words, which the proponent wants as proof of what they assert, have a basis of their own because they are an opposing party’s statement offered against her.28 A report with the same structure built on a call from a stranger ends differently. The foreman and the worker were probably acting within their duties in listening to the stranger and recording the call, so the first two levels hold, but the stranger’s words, offered to show the lights worked badly, fit no exception. They are neither an excited utterance nor a present sense impression, and the public records exception allows proof that the words were said without allowing them to prove what they assert.29 The department’s routine vouches for the people it pays to observe and report, and a member of the public has no such duty, so the routine guarantees only that the department heard the stranger.
The opinions in United States v. Slatten show judges on one panel assigning different exceptions to the same links, which makes the method, and not any single exception, the constant. A defendant offered a co-defendant’s statements to investigators, and the majority found two levels of hearsay: the co-defendant’s transmission of his statements to the investigators, and the investigators’ incorporation of those statements into their reports. It placed the first within Rule 807’s residual exception and the second within Rule 803(8)’s public records exception, which makes admissible a public record’s factual findings from a legally authorized investigation when they are offered against the government in a criminal case and the opponent does not show that the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.30
A concurring judge reached the same chain by other routes. For the investigators’ reports, the concurrence found the business records exception, because the investigators personally witnessed the co-defendant making the statements and regularly took such statements. At that level the only question was whether the report accurately recorded what the co-defendant said, and whether he spoke truthfully was a question for the other level. That left the co-defendant’s statements themselves.31 For those it turned to the exception for statements against interest, reasoning that he was told the statements could be used in a disciplinary proceeding and could cost him his job, and that a statement jeopardizing the declarant’s employment can qualify when it is so contrary to that interest that a reasonable person would not have made it unless it were true.32
The two opinions disagree about which exception fits each link, yet they share one architecture. Both identify the declarants, both ask what guarantee suits each one, and neither lets a favorable answer at one link stand in for another. The concurrence’s pairing of a business-record route for the investigators with a statement-against-interest route for the speaker is the same pairing as in the insurance-investigator illustration. A link may have more than one sound basis, but a chain needs at least one sound basis for every link.