Concept
Related Spontaneous Exceptions
Statements of mental, emotional, or physical condition
Related Spontaneous Exceptions
Rule 803(3) shares the head of Rule 803 with two exceptions that fit similar facts, and an exam stem seldom says which one it wants. Rule 803(1) admits a statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while or immediately after the declarant perceived it.1 Rule 803(2) admits a statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.2 Rule 803(3), the subject of this chapter, admits a statement of the declarant's own then-existing state of mind or emotional, sensory, or physical condition, subject to the memory-or-belief clause.3 Lawyers call them the present sense impression, the excited utterance, and the then-existing condition exceptions. Each has its own requirements, so the same words can satisfy one of them, two of them, or none.
All three work whether or not the declarant is available as a witness, so the proponent never has to show that the speaker is dead, missing, or unable to testify.4
Spontaneity grounds the first two. A present sense impression follows the perception so closely that the declarant has no time to lie.5 An excited utterance rests on stress: the excitement caused by a startling event temporarily stills the capacity for reflection, so the statement is free of conscious fabrication.6 Rule 803(3) borrows neither device. Its text asks only whether the words express the declarant's own mind, emotion, sensation, or body, and it requires no event, perceived or startling.7 Its one timing demand is the one developed earlier, that the condition exist as the words are spoken.
The quickest sort on an exam stem asks what the words are about: the speaker's own condition, an event the speaker is perceiving, or a startling event that has shaken the speaker. Two short scenes show the first two answers.
The first remark needs no perceived event, so the absence of one costs the proponent nothing. The second remark is about the truck. A sincere belief about an outside fact, offered to prove that fact, is the kind of statement the memory-or-belief clause keeps out of Rule 803(3).8 Extending the condition exception to the truck would therefore push it past its text.
The closer call lies between Rules 803(1) and 803(2), because the circumstances that produce the two kinds of statements often overlap.9 The present sense impression is the narrower rule. Only the descriptive part of a statement qualifies, and the rule demands a tight connection between the statement and the event. Suppose a son tweets within minutes of an accident, “Dad just ran a red light because he was late picking me up from school!” The red-light clause is descriptive, but the reason for it falls outside Rule 803, even though the tweet came within the rule's time frame.10
The excited utterance measures time differently. The yardstick is the duration of the state of excitement, and elapsed time is only one factor. A court also weighs the nature of the event, the age and condition of the declarant, the presence or absence of self-interest, and whether the statement was volunteered or made in response to a question.11 The rule's wording asks only that the statement relate to the startling event, which is looser than the describe-or-explain wording of Rule 803(1). One remark can draw on more than one rule, as the next scene shows.
One more point belongs in an exam answer. The Federal Rules carefully avoid the old label res gestae, a term so broad and loose that its main effect was to forestall rational analysis of whether a challenged statement was admissible hearsay.12 Name the specific exception that fits, and leave the label out.
The first step does the work that separates this chapter's rule from its neighbors. A statement about the speaker needs no event and no excitement, while a statement about an outside event must find its home in Rule 803(1) or Rule 803(2). The common error is to reach for Rule 803(3) because a statement sounds emotional or because the speaker sincerely believed it, when the proponent actually needs the words to prove something that happened outside the speaker.