Concept
What the Statement May Describe
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment
What the Statement May Describe
Rule 803(4)(B) limits a qualifying statement to four subjects: medical history; past or present symptoms or sensations; their inception; and their general cause.1 The earlier sections addressed part (A), which asks why the declarant spoke and whether the content fit the care sought. Part (B) asks what the statement is about. The list follows a clinician's questions: what has the patient felt, when did it start, what happened to bring it on, and what has the patient had before? Patients have reason to answer those questions accurately, because the desire for proper diagnosis or treatment outweighs any motive to falsify.2
In United States v. Iron Shell, the Eighth Circuit grouped the four phrases into three types of statements: medical history, past or present sensations, and the inception or general cause of the disease or injury. All three are admissible where they are "reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."3 Pertinence therefore governs every item on the list.
The list and the pertinence requirement work as two separate filters. A statement on a listed subject still fails if it has no bearing on the care sought, and a statement that bears on the care still fails if it describes something outside the list. History and symptoms come first because one line of reasoning governs both. Inception and general cause follow, because they carry part of the rule's change from older law.
History and Symptoms
A patient who tells a clinician that the pain began three weeks ago, that a similar episode struck last year, or that a parent had the same condition is describing events outside the examining room. Rule 803(4)(B) lists "medical history" and "past or present symptoms or sensations" among the permitted subjects, so a court may receive that account for its truth.4 The permission carries a limit from part (A): the statement must have been made for, and be reasonably pertinent to, diagnosis or treatment.5 The Eighth Circuit read that limit into every category on the list, so history and past sensations come in only where they are reasonably pertinent to the care sought.6
The reach backward shows most clearly against the exception for a declarant's then-existing condition. Rule 803(3) admits a statement of the declarant's then-existing sensory or physical condition, such as pain or bodily health, but it excludes a statement of memory or belief offered to prove the fact remembered or believed.7 Timing supplies the guarantee there. A person who says "my head is pounding" reports a sensation while having it. A person who says the headache lasted all last week speaks from memory, and the remark, offered to prove the headache occurred, falls on the excluded side of Rule 803(3).
Rule 803(4) fills that gap because diagnosis depends on the history of a condition as well as on how the patient feels at the examination. A physician needs to know how long a symptom has lasted, how it has changed, and what came before it. Rule 803(4) covers more kinds of physical-condition statements than Rule 803(3) does, and it makes admissible statements of past medical history as well as current symptoms when they are made for diagnosis or treatment.8 The rationale is the patient's compelling self-interest in speaking truthfully to those who provide medical services, and that interest extends to past conditions and history because a patient who misreports them risks the same misdiagnosis as one who misreports a current pain.9 Medical purpose and pertinence therefore do the work that timing does under Rule 803(3).
The two rules can also overlap. In Iron Shell, Dr. Hopkins testified that a child named Lucy told him she was experiencing pain in her vaginal area. The Eighth Circuit observed that this expression of a present symptom falls within the second category of Rule 803(4) and would also be excepted under Rule 803(3) as a then-existing physical condition.10 A proponent may therefore offer a statement of present pain through either door. Rule 803(3) asks only that the condition be then-existing and says nothing of a medical purpose. Rule 803(4) asks for a medical purpose and pertinence but does not require that the condition be present.
The words describe the same kind of past headache in both scenes, and only the purpose for which they were spoken changed the result. Had the homeowner told the neighbor that his head was pounding at that moment, Rule 803(3) would admit the statement without any medical purpose, because it describes a condition he was experiencing as he spoke. The error to avoid on an exam is using Rule 803(3) to carry a past symptom or a history. That route draws a memory objection that is hard to answer. The correct route is Rule 803(4), which requires proof that the statement was made to obtain care and was pertinent to it.
Inception and General Cause
Rule 803(4)(B) ends its list with two phrases that look past the patient's condition to the events behind it: "their inception; or their general cause."12 Inception refers to when and how the symptoms began, and general cause refers to what brought the condition about, such as a fall, a collision, or an exposure. Patients seldom report a bare symptom. The account usually runs from an event to the pain. In Iron Shell, Lucy's report of pain was a present symptom, and the remainder of her statement concerned the general character and nature of the cause of her injury, which is the third type the court identified.13
Cause earns its place on the list because it is often a medical fact before it is a legal one. A physician cannot examine every part of the body with equal care, and an account of how the injury happened shows where to look and what to set aside. Dr. Hopkins described exactly that use. When he asked what happened, Lucy said she had been dragged into the bushes, and when he asked whether the man had taken her clothes off, she said yes.14 He explained outside the jury's presence that a discussion of the cause of the injury gave him guidelines for his examination, because it pinpointed areas of the body to be examined more closely and narrowed the examination by eliminating other areas.15 The same guarantee of trustworthiness that supports statements about symptoms extends to statements about the inception or general cause of the condition.16 A patient who misdescribes how the injury happened sends the examination to the wrong places, so the patient has as much reason to be truthful about the event as about the pain.
The Eighth Circuit described the change in the law in these terms: the rule adopted an expansive approach by allowing statements concerning past symptoms and statements related to the cause of the injury.17 The court added that the older cases are no longer controlling, though they may still offer persuasive authority on whether a given statement is reasonably pertinent.18 Cause is therefore not excluded merely because it describes an event and not a condition. It is tested for pertinence like every other subject on the list.
The usual exam setting for this rule is the one the ladder scene resembles. Cases litigated under this portion of the exception have typically involved statements by people who bring an accident victim to an emergency room and say something about the circumstances of the injury. A statement that "he hurt his head diving into a swimming pool" would probably be treated as admissible to show the circumstances, because those details are significant to medical personnel. If the statement adds that the pool had no warning signs about which end was the shallow end, the opponent would have a strong argument that the information about warnings is not closely enough related to providing care.19 The pair shows where the word "general" sets the limit. Cause is admissible in its clinically useful core, meaning the event or exposure that tells a clinician where to look and what to test.
The same line separates what happened from who did it. In Iron Shell the statements concerned what happened rather than who assaulted the child. The former is in most cases pertinent to diagnosis and treatment, and the latter would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related.20 The next section takes up that line and the rule's treatment of statements that assign fault.