Concept
Child Declarants
Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment
Child Declarants
Rule 803(4) says nothing about the age or abilities of the person who speaks. Its text asks only whether the statement was made for, and is reasonably pertinent to, medical diagnosis or treatment.1 That silence matters most in child-abuse cases, where a physician's report of a young child's words may be the fullest account anyone has. Two questions arise when the declarant is a young child. The first is whether a child too young to testify competently can still be a declarant, and the cases say yes. The second is whether this child actually spoke for the purpose of treatment, which the clinic setting does not always answer. The first subsection takes up competence and age, and the second takes up the child's understanding of the provider's role.
Competence and Age
The defendants in Morgan v. Foretich argued that Hilary's incompetence to testify as a witness in court made her statements for diagnosis or treatment inadmissible, and the Fourth Circuit held that the argument must fail.2 Her statements should have been admitted regardless of her competency to testify at trial. Hilary was never called as a witness, so the court did not decide whether she would have been competent under Rule 601. It held the statements admissible whichever way that question came out.3
The court relied on decisions that admitted children's statements across a range of ages. Physicians testified to statements by two nine-year-old victims and by an eleven-year-old victim, and social workers testified under Rule 803(4) to statements by a five-year-old.4 Those decisions tie the exception neither to a particular age nor to a physician as listener.
The result follows from the structure of the two-part test, because neither prong asks whether the declarant could testify. On the motive prong, Morgan reasoned that a young child has the same motive as an adult to make true statements for diagnosis or treatment.5 On the pertinence prong, a physician does not stop listening to a patient's complaints because the patient is a child, and in child-abuse cases a physician may rely on factors, such as an assailant's identity, that would not matter for an adult.6 Both prongs look at the clinic at the moment the child spoke. Competence looks at a later moment, when the child might take the stand, so making competence a condition would add a requirement the text omits. It would also remove the physician's account in the cases where a child's youth leaves few other sources.
Youth does bear on the analysis, but it favors admission. In Iron Shell, the court said that the age of the patient, Lucy, mitigated against a finding that her statements fell outside the traditional rationale of the rule. The trial court had placed special emphasis on that factor, and the appellate court likewise found it important to its holding.7 Nothing in that passage makes age a condition the proponent must prove.
In Blake v. State, a Wyoming court applying its counterpart to the rule held that a child's age and personal characteristics go to the weight of the hearsay statements and not to their admissibility. It cited a Ninth Circuit decision for the point, and it observed that the defendant had the opportunity to attack the victim's credibility and chose not to.8 Admitting the statements was therefore no abuse of discretion. Together, Iron Shell and Blake treat age as an argument about how much the factfinder should believe the statement, and never as a bar to admitting it.
Bar questions on this topic typically pair a young declarant with an objection about competence or age, and the right answer turns on purpose and pertinence.
Competence cannot explain the difference between the two scenes, because the child is equally unable to testify in both. Purpose explains it. Missing that point produces errors in two directions: excluding the clinic statement because the child is incompetent, and admitting whatever a young child says on the theory that the exception is generous to children.
Understanding the Doctor's Role
Rule 803(4)(A) admits a statement only if it was made for diagnosis or treatment, so the declarant must have spoken with that purpose in mind.11 Courts ordinarily infer the purpose from the consultation itself, and VanPatten v. State shows where that inference weakens. The Indiana Supreme Court there described its counterpart rule as a two-step inquiry. First, was the declarant motivated to provide truthful information in order to promote diagnosis and treatment? Second, would an expert in the field reasonably rely on the content of the statement?12 Indiana's text is narrower than the federal rule, because it reaches only statements made by persons who are seeking medical diagnosis or treatment. The foundation point below is therefore persuasive authority for applying the federal 'made for' language, and it is not a federal holding.13
For an adult patient, the first step is easy. The desire to seek and receive treatment may be inferred from the circumstances, so the proponent needs no testimony about what the patient was thinking.14 The inference rests on the reason the exception exists: people are unlikely to lie to their doctors, because doing so might jeopardize their opportunity to be made well.15 An adult who sits down with a clinician knows the clinician is there to help, and knows that a false account can lead to wrong treatment.
A young child brought to a provider by a parent is the case where that reasoning may fail. The parent decided that care was needed, and the child may experience the visit as questions from an unfamiliar adult, with no idea that the answers will shape what the clinician does. For such a declarant, the VanPatten court required evidence that the child understood the professional's role, because that understanding triggers the motivation to provide truthful information.16
That evidence need not come from the child. It may take the form of the medical professional's testimony detailing the interaction with the child, how the professional explained the role to the child, and an affirmation that the child understood it, a method the court drew from Barrett.17 Whatever its source, the foundation must be present and sufficient.18 The provider is the natural witness, since the provider was in the room, and a child young enough to raise the issue may never take the stand. The showing stays narrow. It concerns only why the child spoke, and once it is made, the ordinary reasoning about motive applies.
Exam stems that place a five-year-old in a clinic with a parent invite the quick answer that the medical setting proves motive. That answer fits an adult patient and is incomplete for the child.
The missing evidence is easy to name, and a proponent can usually obtain it by asking the provider about the visit. The facts of Renville show what it looks like. As a separate opinion in Morgan recounts them, the physician explained to the child before questioning her that the examination and his prospective questions were necessary to obtain information to treat her and to help her overcome any physical and emotional problems the recurrent abuse may have caused.19 The Renville court concluded that the young victim had a motive consistent with the purpose of treatment.20 The explanation supplies the part of the foundation a court most needs, because it records what the provider told the child about the provider's role, in terms that link the questions to getting better. An affirmation that the child understood would complete the showing, and the quoted passage does not say whether the physician obtained one.