Concept
Proving the Record Is Accurate
Past recollection recorded
Proving the Record Is Accurate
The first two conditions of Rule 803(5) look at the witness and the clock: the witness once knew the matter but now has insufficient recollection to testify fully and accurately,1 and the record was made or adopted while the matter was fresh in the witness's memory.2 The third condition looks at the writing. Clause (C) requires that the record “accurately reflects the witness's knowledge,” and it closes by providing that an admitted record may be read into evidence but received as an exhibit only if an adverse party offers it, a point taken up later in this chapter.3
Freshness makes accuracy likely without establishing it. The Advisory Committee found the exception's guarantee of trustworthiness in a record made while events were still fresh in mind and accurately reflecting them, and the third condition enforces the second half of that phrase.4 A note written minutes after an event can still hold a misheard figure, a transposed digit, or a slip of the pen. The witness who has forgotten the event cannot check the note against memory, so something other than memory must persuade the judge that the note got it right.
The rule's text does not say what that offer must be. The Advisory Committee made no attempt to spell out how knowledge, contemporaneity, or accuracy is to be established and left those matters to the circumstances of each case.5 Courts have filled the gap in two ways. Some require the witness to testify at trial that the record was accurate when made, and the Florida Supreme Court so held.6 Others let the judge find accuracy from the circumstances surrounding the record, even when the witness gives no such assurance.7 The next subsection takes the stricter rule, the one after it the flexible rule, and the last the witness who cannot remember making the record but may still verify it. On an exam, state the requirement, show where the facts supply it, and raise the vouching question whenever the witness does not affirm the record.
Witness Must Vouch
Rule 803(5)(C) says the record must accurately reflect the witness's knowledge but not who must prove that it does.8 The Florida Supreme Court answered in Polite v. State that the witness must: a record offered as past recollection recorded qualifies only if the witness indicates that it was made while events were fresh and attests to its accuracy.9 Federal and Florida law treat the exception in substantively the same way, though the wording differs,10 so the reasoning in Polite is useful well beyond Florida even though its holding binds only Florida courts.
The facts show how the question arises. Intruders had broken into Levine's home. At trial she testified that she spoke to them but could not remember what she said, and when the prosecutor asked about the sworn statement she had given police, she admitted that it was hers and that she gave it about an hour after the crime. She added that the events were “not really” fresh in her mind at the time, because the “police and everybody was pressuring [her].”11 Asked on cross-examination whether she could have made a mistake in the statement, she answered, “Yes. They was pressuring me. I don't even know if I got the right person.”12
The State's other evidence was strong. Levine's door had been kicked in, leaving a shoeprint, and her phone lines had been cut. A camera across the street recorded three men arriving, one of them going to the side of the house where the phone lines were located, and all three going inside and leaving several minutes later. Polite's probation GPS device placed him within fifty feet of the house at the time of the crime, and he was shoeless when police arrested him later that day.13
The Fifth District treated evidence from any source as enough. It called the requirement that the witness attest to accuracy “contrary to the plain language of the statute and rule” and held a statement admissible “so long as the state presented evidence (from any source) sufficient to support a finding that the statement was made when the matter was fresh in the witness' mind, and that it was accurate.”14 The Florida Supreme Court rejected that totality test and held that admission requires the witness to indicate that the record was made while events were fresh and to attest to its accuracy.15 It quashed the decision under review while approving Hernandez,16 because the witness had not vouched for the statement's accuracy or correctness and no proper foundation had been laid.17
The reason lies in what the exception admits. When a record comes in as past recollection recorded, the facts come from the record, not from the witness's testimony; the contents of the record substitute for what the witness would have said.18 The reliability of the assertions therefore “rests upon the veracity of a witness who is present and testifying.”19 Florida's earlier decision in Garrett states the working rule: a writing is admissible when a witness identifies it as made contemporaneously with the events in question and testifies that it was accurate when written.20
That reasoning also shows why other evidence cannot take the witness's place. If the record stands in for testimony, the witness's present adoption of it is what gives the substitution its force. A witness who refuses to confirm the record, or doubts it, has adopted nothing, and corroboration, however strong, supplies no person who answers for the words. The Florida court added that the decisions the Fifth District relied on never discussed why the witness is asked to attest to accuracy and never answered the historical and legal analysis that supports the requirement in Montano.21
Levine's testimony shows the gap. She identified the statement as hers and placed it about an hour after the crime, which establishes authorship and timing. But she said the events were not really fresh and conceded that she might have named the wrong person, so nothing in her testimony adopted the record. The door, the video, and the GPS data bear on whether the crime happened as described. The vouching rule asks a different question, whether the witness stands behind the record, and on that question her testimony gave the State nothing.
Witnesses who do vouch have an easier path. A chemist who had no independent recollection of his test results acknowledged that his report was accurate and had been prepared contemporaneously, and the court upheld its admission as past recollection recorded.22 In another case the court said that testimony by the witness that he read an FBI agent's report over after it was made, and was then satisfied that it was correct, would have sufficiently proved the report's accuracy; because he gave no such testimony, the question became whether any other basis supported admitting the license plate number it recorded.23 A letter failed where the witness, Mishler, could not state that its entries accurately reflected his memory, where it was not written while the facts were fresh, and where not all of the entries were made by him or under his direction; the district court did not err in excluding it for lack of foundation.24 One state court has also upheld admission of a witness's statement as past recollection recorded and held that the admission did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights, an issue taken up later in this chapter.25
Recanting witnesses show how often the requirement decides cases. In one decision the recanting witnesses did not testify that they had given the tape-recorded statements or that the statements accurately reflected their memory when made; each said either that the witness did not remember giving a statement or that the witness had not given one. The court stated the rule that the witness must testify to having made an accurate record of the fact or event, or to being confident that the facts would not have been written unless they were true.26 A recantation is the setting where the rule matters most, because the proponent offers the earlier statement precisely when the live testimony hurts, and a witness who will not stand behind the statement has not adopted it.
The third step is where Levine and the recanting witnesses fell out of the exception. The second step previews the verification by habit that the last subsection develops, and the Fifth District's totality approach, taken up next, would let a court skip the third step when the circumstances look reliable.
Totality of Circumstances Approach
Because Rule 803(5)(C) names no method for proving accuracy, some courts let the judge find it from the circumstances of the record.30 The Sixth Circuit took that view in United States v. Porter. The trial court there admitted the witness's statement as past recollection recorded after weighing several factors, among them that the statement was consistent and detailed, that it was signed under penalty of perjury, and that the witness made it when she feared reprisal from the defendant. The Sixth Circuit upheld the admission, reasoning that Rule 803(5) specifies no particular method of establishing the declarant's knowledge or the statement's accuracy, that it is not a sine qua non of admissibility that the witness actually vouch for the memorandum, and that admissibility is determined case by case from the factors indicating trustworthiness or its absence.31
The Sixth Circuit also answered the usual objection to hearsay. Recorded recollection, it observed, is not hearsay of a particularly unreliable genre, because the out-of-court declarant is actually on the witness stand and subject to evaluation by the finder of fact.32 The factfinder can watch the person who made the record and discount it accordingly, so the judge's task is to decide whether the circumstances of its making give enough reason to let the jury weigh it at all. Detail and consistency make an account harder to invent, and a signature under penalty of perjury gives the maker a reason to be careful. The practical appeal of a flexible test is plain, too: a vouching requirement hands an evasive or hostile witness a veto over a record that may be reliable.
The Marcy decision reached a similar result. The court there found that the trial court correctly admitted a taped interview based on factors that included how close the statement came to the event, its coherence, and its consistency with other testimony.33 The Fourth District in Montano v. State expressly rejected Marcy's reasoning because it did not “reflect[] the law of Florida,” but the Fifth District later embraced both Marcy and Porter in Polite, declaring the attestation requirement “contrary to the plain language of the statute and rule.”34
The flexible reading is not confined to these courts. The Comment to Delaware's Rule 803 says the rule “should be read more broadly than its literal language” and that a recorded statement should qualify “even if it was recorded by another party if it appears that the statement does in fact reflect the prior knowledge of the witness.”35 On that view the question is whether the record in fact reflects what the witness knew, and the views differ over who may answer it.
The totality approach keeps the accuracy condition and changes only what can satisfy it. A refusal to vouch becomes one fact among many, and thin circumstances still defeat admission.
Florida did not follow. The Florida Supreme Court rejected the totality test and held that admission requires the witness to indicate that the statement was made when events were fresh and to attest to the accuracy of the record.36 It reasoned that the cases the Fifth District relied on never addressed the purpose of having the witness attest, and that because the contents of an admitted record substitute for the witness's testimony, the reliability of what it asserts rests on the veracity of a witness who is present and testifying.37 On that view, corroboration and the circumstances of the statement bear on whether the events happened as described, yet none supplies a person who now stands behind the words. Porter's answer is that the maker is on the stand either way and the factfinder can see her decline to vouch. That answer explains why the approach survives in courts that read the rule as silent on method.
The two courts do not apply different elements. The federal and Florida exceptions are substantively the same,38 and both ask whether the record accurately reflects the witness's knowledge. They differ over whether the witness's own testimony is the only way to prove it: the Sixth Circuit said vouching is not a sine qua non, and the Florida Supreme Court said attestation is required.39 The contrast is therefore a matter of jurisdiction, so an answer should identify which approach governs and, when the facts leave that open, present both.
Vouching Without Memory
Rule 803(5)(C) asks whether the record accurately reflects the witness's knowledge; by its words it does not ask whether the witness remembers writing the record.43 The difference matters, because a witness who has lost the memory of an event has often lost the memory of recording it too, especially when the record is one entry among many or a statement given long before trial. The Florida Supreme Court addressed that witness in Polite right after announcing the vouching rule. A witness who cannot adequately recall making the record may still verify it by testifying that, although the witness does not recall the statement, the witness has a habit of recording such matters correctly, or that the witness believes the statement is correct because the witness would have been truthful in giving it.44 The vouching requirement thus survives a total loss of memory about the occasion, and what changes is the kind of testimony that satisfies it.
Testimony that satisfies the accuracy condition takes one of three forms:45
- The witness remembers making or adopting an accurate record of the matter, even though the matter itself is now forgotten.
- The witness cannot recall making this particular record but testifies to a routine of making accurate records of this kind.
- The witness has forgotten the occasion entirely but is confident, from the circumstances, that the witness would not have written or adopted the account unless it truly described what the witness observed at the time.
The forms differ in how much the witness must remember about the writing. The first asks for the most, and the second and third substitute a routine or a conviction for a recollection. Each gives the court a rational reason to credit the writing without asking the witness to reconstruct the moment of writing.
The second and third forms can look paradoxical, since a witness who remembers nothing of the matter seems unable to say that a record of it is correct. The paradox fades once you see that the witness vouches for the record and does not recall the facts it contains. The exception applies when the witness cannot recall the matter well enough to testify fully and accurately,46 so a witness may be unable to describe the collision or the conversation and still be able to say what the document is and how reliable it was when made. Polite explains why the vouching must still come from a live witness: the record's contents take the place of the witness's testimony, so its reliability rests on the veracity of a witness who is present and testifying.47 The habit and confidence routes meet that demand because each is itself testimony from the witness stand.
The writing itself often carries the confidence. Its surrounding circumstances and features such as the witness's signature or handwriting can remind the witness at least that the witness wrote accurately at the time, and accuracy can be presumed when people inventory their possessions or give statements to the police, unless contrary evidence is introduced.48 Nothing so marked is required, though.
Habit works by inference from regularity. Consider a security guard who checks an alarm system and cannot recall the night in question. He can testify that he always records the working condition of each alarm and, when he fills out his report, notes any problems he detected. That routine gives the court enough to conclude that his entries were correct.49 A practice repeated on every inspection makes it more likely than not that the same care went into this one, and it hands the cross-examiner something concrete to test: how consistently the guard completed reports, whether there were exceptions, and whether he filled them in on the spot or afterward.
The line the cases draw separates the witness who cannot remember from the witness who disclaims or doubts the record. In Polite the court found no proper foundation because the witness did not vouch for the statement's accuracy or correctness.50 The recanting witnesses discussed earlier fall on the same side: they said they did not remember giving a statement or had not given one, and so offered neither a habit nor confidence that the facts would not have been written unless they were true.51 A forgotten occasion supplies no foundation by itself. What follows “I do not remember writing this” decides the outcome.
The judge ordinarily accepts the witness's word on these points, including whether the witness remembers making the record, whether the witness is confident it was accurate, and whether the document refreshed anything.52 The witness stays on the stand while the judge decides, so the finder of fact can evaluate that testimony as well.53