Concept
Police Reports and Confrontation
Past recollection recorded
Police Reports and Confrontation
Rule 803(8) admits a record or statement of a public office that meets the conditions the rule lists.1 One condition covers a matter observed while under a legal duty to report, but in a criminal case the rule removes from that condition any matter observed by law-enforcement personnel.2 An officer's written account of an arrest therefore fails as a public record when the prosecution offers it, and the prosecution must find another route. Most courts accept recorded recollection as that route, and it draws a constitutional objection. The carve-out and the objection both turn on one fact: whether the officer who saw the events and wrote the report takes the witness stand.
The Law-Enforcement Carve-Out
Unlike the business-records exception, the public-records exception contains specific exclusions that appear aimed at protecting citizens from government in certain situations, though they may sweep more broadly.3 The exclusion for law-enforcement observations is the sharpest example, and courts have debated how far it reaches.4 They have not applied it to every law enforcement report.5 A report prepared under adversarial circumstances is inadmissible under Rule 803(8): it was written after a crime, individualized to the suspect, and it favors the government.6 The author's adversarial motives could have shaped what the report says, so those circumstances raise a trustworthiness question that only cross-examination can answer.7
The carve-out does not end the inquiry, because Rule 803(5) stands apart from Rule 803(8). Most courts allow a police report that Rule 803(8) excludes to come in as recorded recollection, provided the reporting officer testifies.8 Rule 803(5) reaches a past recollection recorded only if the declarant testifies and lays a foundation, so a live witness is always available to shed light on the matter.9 The factfinder watches the officer, and defense counsel can ask what the officer can and cannot recall and how the report was prepared.10 That setting supplies the cross-examination the adversarial circumstances call for, which is why most courts hold that the exclusion in Rule 803(8) does not bar a police report that meets the requirements of recorded recollection.11
Consider an officer who writes a report soon after an arrest, noting whether the arrestee carried a weapon. At trial the officer cannot recall whether the arrestee was armed, but he testifies that he prepared the report soon after the arrest, while his memory was fresh, and that he is sure the entry is accurate.12 Those answers meet each condition of Rule 803(5). The matter is one the officer once knew but cannot now recall well enough to testify fully and accurately.13 The record was made or adopted while the matter was fresh.14 And it accurately reflects his knowledge.15 The report may be read to the jury even though Rule 803(8)(A)(ii) bars it as a public record. It may be received as an exhibit, and so go to the jury room, only if the defense offers it.16
A federal prosecution shows the same route with a real agent. In United States v. Picciandra, agent Dever had written a report in 1977 of a conversation in which Picciandra admitted taking part in the MUSCAVADO smuggling venture. At trial Dever could not remember the substance of the report. Over Picciandra's objection, the trial court let the Government read portions of it as recorded recollection after Dever testified that he could no longer remember its contents.17 An agent's account of what a defendant told him is the kind of law-enforcement observation the carve-out targets, and this report reached the jury only because its author took the stand to qualify it.
The route does not rescue every police report. An officer who remembers the arrest well enough to testify fully and accurately simply testifies, because the exception applies only when memory has failed.18 An officer who cannot vouch that the report was accurate when written, or who wrote it long after the event, leaves the proponent without a foundation.19 And a proponent who offers the report without its author has no Rule 803(5) route at all, as the discussion of confrontation below shows.
The Confrontation Objection
The Sixth Amendment gives an accused the right to confront the witnesses against him, and that right runs separately from the hearsay rules. The Confrontation Clause constrains only prosecutors and applies only in criminal cases, while the hearsay doctrine and its exceptions apply to every party in civil and criminal trials.21 A statement can therefore satisfy a hearsay exception and still face a Clause challenge. A prosecutor who has cleared Rule 803(5) with a police report must still answer the argument that reading the report denies the accused a real chance to test its author. The objection has an obvious source: the exception exists for the witness whose memory has failed, so the accused confronts an author who can say little about the event itself.
Picciandra attacked the report on confrontation grounds, and the facts gave the attack some force, since Dever could not remember what his report said. The First Circuit answered that the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 803(5) expressly records that courts accept the exception despite confrontation challenges. It pointed to the Second Circuit's decision in United States v. Kelly, which dismissed such a challenge as scraping the bottom of the barrel.22 The defendants also relied on United States v. Oates, which involved a government chemist's report and worksheet offered under the business-records exception, and which said in dictum that, because of Sixth Amendment problems, no law-enforcement report should be admitted under any hearsay exception.23 The First Circuit rejected that argument for three reasons. The Fifth and Seventh Circuits had refused to apply Oates outside the business-records setting. Oates conflicted with the First Circuit's own decision in McGarry v. United States, which upheld admission of an IRS agent's record of a conversation with a defendant as recorded recollection. And the exception carries indicia of trustworthiness, because the record was made while events were fresh in mind and accurately reflects them.24 The court concluded that admitting the agent's report was not error.25
A laboratory report drew the same answer in the Ninth Circuit's decision in United States v. Marshall. The chemist there had no independent recollection of the results of the tests he performed. His analysis report, however, was both acknowledged by him to be accurate and prepared contemporaneously with the tests, and the district judge properly admitted it as past recollection recorded.26 State courts reasoned the same way. The Ohio Supreme Court in Scott faced the argument that recorded recollection was unrecognized in Ohio, that the statement was hearsay, and that its admission denied the defendant his right of confrontation and cross-examination. The court held the statement properly admitted as past recollection recorded and found no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights, relying on two United States Supreme Court decisions, California v. Green and Nelson v. O'Neil.27
These decisions share a premise. The declarant is the witness, so the jury watches the person who made the record and the accused can question that person. The rule guarantees the premise, because it reaches a record only when its maker testifies and lays a foundation, which sets the exception apart from those that admit the statements of absent declarants.28 What cross-examination can reach is narrower than in the ordinary case, though. The exception applies only when the author can no longer recall the matter well enough to testify fully and accurately, so little memory remains to test.29 Counsel can still ask the officer or chemist when and how the record was prepared, whether the author had any reason to shade it, and how the author knows it is accurate. Counsel cannot test the perception behind the entries, and may argue that residual weakness to the jury.
The two prosecutions differ in the one fact on which the carve-out, the exception, and the constitutional objection all depend. With the author present, Rule 803(5) supplies a witness who can vouch for the record, the concern behind the carve-out recedes, and the decisions above reject the confrontation challenge. With the author absent, Rule 803(5) is unavailable, the carve-out applies as written, and the confrontation concern returns at full strength. A statement offered against a criminal defendant is inadmissible under the Clause when the declarant is unavailable, the statement is testimonial, and the defendant had no earlier chance to cross-examine, even if a hearsay exception fits it.30 What makes a statement testimonial belongs to separate Confrontation Clause study. Picciandra, Marshall, and Scott each involved an author who testified, so none of them supports admitting a report whose author stays away.