Concept
Foundation Requirements
Business records
Foundation Requirements
Rule 803(6) admits “a record of an act, event, condition, opinion, or diagnosis” only if five conditions are met.1 Three describe the record itself, one governs how the proponent proves them, and one lets the opponent defeat the record:
- Condition (A): the record was made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, someone with knowledge.2
- Condition (B): the record was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit.3
- Condition (C): making the record was a regular practice of that activity.4
- Condition (D): the custodian or another qualified witness, or a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification, shows all these conditions.5
- Condition (E): the opponent does not show that the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness.6
Conditions (A) through (D) make up the foundation, the preliminary showing of facts the proponent must make before the court may receive the record. Condition (E) is worded differently, and the wording allocates the burden. Business people have a financial interest in keeping accurate accounts, so a record of the sort regularly made during the ordinary activities of the business, by someone with knowledge of the event and contemporaneously with it, is presumed trustworthy.7 To overcome that presumption, the opponent must make the showing condition (E) describes. That showing has its own section later; this section covers what the proponent must prove.
Reliability runs through every condition, just as it does when a statement comes in under the residual exception, where the most important question is whether the statement is reliable.8 The foundation also underlies Rule 803(7), which admits evidence that a matter is absent from a record described in paragraph (6) to prove the matter did not occur, if a record was regularly kept for matters of that kind and the opponent shows no lack of trustworthiness.9
In practice, one witness can usually prove conditions (A) through (C). That witness must understand how the organization makes and keeps its records, but need not have made the record or seen the events it describes.10 Each condition gets its own treatment below, beginning with the demand that the information originate with someone who actually knew the facts.
Source With Knowledge
Condition (A) asks where a record’s information came from. It requires that the record be “made at or near the time by—or from information transmitted by—someone with knowledge.”11 The timing half of that phrase has its own section below, so this section stays with knowledge. The words “by” and “from information transmitted by” describe two routes to the page: the person with knowledge may write the entry, or may pass the facts to someone else who writes it. The drafting has a consequence worth stating at the outset. The person who types an entry may know nothing about the underlying event, provided the information began with someone who did and reached the record through a regular chain of people doing their jobs.
Knowledge in this phrase means firsthand perception: the source must have personally seen, heard, or otherwise sensed what the record reports. The rule says only “knowledge,” but the reasonable reading is firsthand knowledge, which makes the person who first feeds a fact into the record-making process the one who must have perceived it.12 The exception’s reliability depends on the routine around the entry, since those who rely on recorded facts and figures have an incentive to monitor the accuracy of their informational base.13 Monitoring cannot improve a fact that was only a guess when it entered. A bookkeeper who copies a rumor into a ledger produces a rumor in a careful hand, so the bookkeeper’s own ignorance is harmless while a gap at the head of the chain is fatal.
Composite records show how the requirement works in a large enterprise. A clothing store’s inventory statement may draw on entries from many parts of the business. The person who vouches for the statement need not know each underlying transaction. That person must know the store’s record-keeping procedures well enough to confirm that each statement or entry contributing to the composite was made in the regular course of business.14 Demanding testimony from every contributor would defeat the purpose of the exception.
Longer chains work the same way. At a loading dock, the worker who receives a shipment of widgets can tell the inventory clerk how many arrived, the clerk can pass the figure to the financial office, and the entries built on the dock worker’s count can each fit the exception. That is why the exception contemplates multiple hearsay: one entry based on another based on another.15
The bookkeeper and the clerk know equally little about the events in both scenes, so their ignorance cannot be what separates the two entries. The difference lies at the head of the chain, where one entry begins with a perception and the other with a rumor. On an exam, trace the information backward from the entry to the first person who perceived the fact, then ask whether each link passed it along as part of the job. The tempting question, whether the person who made the entry saw the event, is the wrong one.
One complication belongs to a later section. The originating declarant must also have a duty within the organization to provide the information, and the information must be of a type the organization usually records. When someone with no duty to report supplies the information, the document proves that the words were communicated, but the words come in for their truth only if some other exception applies to them.16
Timely Recording
Condition (A) also requires that the record be “made at or near the time” of the event it describes.18 The rule sets no number of hours or days, so the phrase works as a reliability question. A substantial factor in the reliability of any system of records is the promptness with which transactions are recorded, and a later entry is timely enough unless the gap between transaction and entry was so great as to suggest a danger of inaccuracy from lapse of memory.19 No fixed deadline separates timely from late. A bright-line period would give the wrong answer where a short delay is harmless or a longer one is explained by the routine.
Delay raises two separate dangers. The first is faded memory, which the test names directly. The second concerns the character of the record: a failure to make a timely record may suggest that the entry was not part of a regular routine, and it may indicate motivational problems related to records prepared for litigation.20 Both dangers grow with delay, so the inquiry is one of degree. The judge asks whether this entry, made at this distance from this event, still carries the assurance the exception relies on.
In United States v. Gibson, a cooperating heroin seller kept a ledger of the balloons she sold each day and the money she took in. The ledger was incomplete, with blank pages, unrelated entries, and some entries out of sequence. The Ninth Circuit still found that the entries were made at or near the events they described, and it treated their order on the page as irrelevant. The reasoning follows from what the requirement measures. Page order says nothing about when a given line was written, and gaps show only that some sales went unrecorded, which does not make the recorded ones less accurate.
Advance entries raise the reverse question. In one state prosecution, payroll vouchers were made up before the payroll was completed. The custodian testified that she would have been notified of any change in the information on a voucher and that no change was transmitted. The court found no violation of the timing standard, because the rule permits a memorandum in any form of acts, events, or conditions made “at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge,” and the routine of notification supported the early entry’s accuracy.21
The ledger in Gibson and the reconstruction here differ in the two respects the rule watches. The ledger entries were written while memory was fresh and as part of the routine, while the reconstruction was written after delay had done its damage and for the dispute. An exam stem that mentions a gap in time asks whether that gap is the kind that fades memory or signals a litigation purpose. The number of days alone does not answer it.
When the record is computer data, the measure applies to the original entry. If a printout makes no change in data routinely entered near the time of the transaction and merely reproduces it, the timing requirement is satisfied, because what matters is the proximity of the original data entry, not the printout, to the transaction.22 Data also does not lose its business-record character because the printout offered in evidence was generated for litigation.23 A later section on computer and electronic records returns to both points.
Regularly Conducted Activity
Condition (B) shifts attention from the origin of the information to the setting in which the record was kept. It requires that the record “was kept in the course of a regularly conducted activity of a business, organization, occupation, or calling, whether or not for profit.”25 A regularly conducted activity is an undertaking that recurs as part of an enterprise’s ordinary work, so the condition asks two things at once: whether the activity goes on regularly, and whether keeping this record belonged to that activity’s ordinary course. The rule’s nouns are wide, and its closing phrase removes profit from the inquiry.
The drafting history confirms the breadth. Rule 803(6) liberalized the definition of “business” to include practically any organization, profit or nonprofit, and a still broader approach, dropping “business” and covering “any regularly conducted activity,” was rejected in drafting, although that phrase survives in the rule’s title.26 Language in the Conference Report makes clear the intent to cover schools, churches, and hospitals.27 Hospitals, charities, fire departments, and public utilities therefore fall within the rule.28
The rule looks to regularity because that is where the reliability comes from. The unusual reliability of business records is attributed to systematic checking, to regularity and continuity that produce habits of precision, to the business’s actual experience in relying on its records, and to a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation.29 A hospital relying on its charts and a one-person occupation relying on its own notes share that discipline, and a profit motive adds nothing to it. The tempting error is to read “business” in its commercial sense and conclude that a church’s or a charity’s records cannot qualify.
Illegality does not remove a record from the rule when the record keeping itself is regular. In Gibson, the cooperating witness, Logan, testified that she kept a record of most of her large heroin transactions, that her regular practice was to enter the number of balloons that went out each day and the money she took in, that she recorded the transactions as they happened, and that she relied on the entries. The Ninth Circuit held that testimony sufficient to show the ledger was kept in the regular course of a business activity. The exception is understood to reach the records of illegal enterprises like drug selling, because the reliance and routine that make a ledger trustworthy do not depend on the lawfulness of the trade.30
A single person with no employer-run system can also keep records in the course of a regularly conducted activity. In Keogh v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the Commissioner estimated the tip income of a casino blackjack dealer from a diary kept by a co-worker, Whitlock, who listed his wages and the tips he received beside each date. The Ninth Circuit held the diary admissible under Rule 803(6), because, although it was personal to him, it showed every indication of being kept in the course of his own business activity, occupation, and calling.31 Reliability in such a record rests on systematic checking and on regularity and continuity in keeping it.32 The two decisions mark different edges of the rule. Gibson shows that the lawfulness of the activity is beside the point, and Keogh shows that the activity need not belong to an organization, because an individual’s occupation counts when the record is kept for it.
The breadth stops at records of purely personal matters. Congress’s changes, including the addition of “business” alongside “occupation” and “calling,” made clear that the exception does not apply to personal records.33 A diary of a purely personal nature, unconnected to the writer’s business activities, falls outside the rule, while a diary kept for business purposes falls inside it, and memoranda of telephone conversations are treated the same way.34 Keogh turned on that line. Whitlock’s diary was personal in the sense of being his own, yet it recorded the income of his occupation and was kept to track it.
Where the notebook sits and when the entries were written do not decide the question. The inquiry asks what the record documents and why it was kept, which is why the dealer’s diary of wages and tips can qualify while the employee’s account of a family quarrel cannot, though both are private writings by one individual. An exam stem that mentions a diary or journal tests this line, so ask whether the writer kept it to run an occupation or activity or to record private life.
Regularity attaches to the record itself as well, because the key is regularity and, in particular, regularity in record keeping.35 The regularity of the activity therefore cannot rescue a one-off writing, and email shows the trap. A message that issues from a business or its employee is not automatically a business record, because many emails are one-time and non-routine, are not written under the author’s assigned business duties, or are personal.36 In United States v. Ferber, a district court rejected a subordinate’s email to his superior summarizing a telephone call with the defendant, because even if the employee routinely wrote such emails, nothing showed that the employer required records of that type to be maintained. Condition (C), next, supplies that separate requirement of regular practice.
Regular Practice of Recording
Condition (C) requires that making the record was a regular practice of the activity in which it was kept.38 Congress added that requirement when it revised the rule.39 The condition follows directly on condition (B), and the two are easy to run together even though they ask different questions. Condition (B) asks whether the enterprise’s ordinary work recurs and the record belongs to it. Condition (C) asks whether making records of this particular kind is itself part of that ordinary work. A freight company can operate every day, with every operation routine, and still write a given kind of document exactly once.
That distinction does the screening. If the rule demanded regularity only of the activity, almost any writing connected to a running business would pass. The reliability of business records comes from systematic checking, from regularity and continuity that produce habits of precision, from the business’s experience in relying on its records, and from a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job.40 A document written once has none of that behind it. Letters, memos, and emails on an isolated or individual matter frequently present problems on exactly this score.41
The condition concerns the kind of record, not how often the underlying event happens. A store with few customer injuries can still have a standing practice of preparing an incident report each time one occurs. Volume can help prove the practice. In one illustration, a store prepares about fifty incident reports a year, so the reports are a regular occurrence in the business, and a court would likely act within its discretion in admitting one. The same illustration adds that some courts hesitate to admit accident reports because they are prepared with litigation in mind, so meeting the regular-practice condition does not end the inquiry for such a report.42
An exam stem that stresses how seldom the event occurs invites the wrong objection. The right inquiry is whether the enterprise has a routine of recording events of that kind, and the proof is a policy or a consistent course of past reports. Duration is equally beside the point. In one reported decision, a school searched student lockers and recorded the contents for only two weeks in its entire history, and the records still qualified as a regular enough practice.43 That outcome suggests the condition looks to whether recording was a settled procedure while it lasted, not to how long or how often the procedure ran.
The practice that counts belongs to the enterprise, which is where the email in Ferber fell short. The employee may have made a habit of writing such summaries, but nothing showed that the employer required records of that type to be maintained, and an email not written under the author’s assigned business duties does not qualify.44 An individual’s private habit of writing things down therefore does not make record-making a regular practice of the employer’s activity. How finely the record is described also matters. The text leaves open how specifically to describe the type of record, whether “regular” means regular for this company or for its whole industry, and over how long a period, and isolated letters, memos, and emails frequently raise exactly those questions.45 The proponent is safest proving this enterprise’s own practice for this specific type of record.
Condition (C) is also where the concern behind Palmer v. Hoffman, covered in its own section below, first surfaces. A routine of writing accident reports can satisfy the condition while producing a record whose real purpose is a lawsuit. Rule 803(6) handles problems of this kind under the trustworthiness clause, which gives the court considerable flexibility on the facts of each case, rather than through a doctrine about what can constitute a business record.46 The later sections on Palmer and on the trustworthiness clause develop the point.
Custodian or Certification
Condition (D) completes the foundation by requiring that the other conditions be shown “by the testimony of the custodian or another qualified witness,” or by a certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or with a statute permitting certification.48 Conditions (A) through (C) are facts about how a record was made and kept, and a fact needs someone to prove it. A letterhead or logo tells the court whom the paper claims to come from, but nothing on its face shows that the entries were made at or near the time by people with knowledge, or that the enterprise routinely makes records of that kind. Business records are also not among the writings that vouch for themselves. Self-authenticating writings, such as acknowledged deeds, certified copies of public records, and statute books printed by public authority, are received without an authenticating witness,49 and a repair shop’s bill is none of these. In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., the court agreed that a witness who can explain the organization’s record-keeping is essential, and it adopted the principle that “[i]f the witness cannot vouch that the requirements of Rule 803(6) have been met, the entry must be excluded.”50
The failing side is easy to picture. In a negligence trial over a car collision, the plaintiff offered the itemized bill she had received from the repair shop’s cashier, stamped “PAID.”51 Her lawyer argued that the document spoke for itself, but the court sustained the hearsay objection because no witness familiar with the business had laid the foundation, and it kept to that ruling even after learning that the shop had closed and its owner could not be found.52 The closing of the shop explains why the plaintiff had no witness, and it does not supply one. Nothing in the rule excuses the foundation because the business has disappeared.
The rule asks for a witness who understands the record-keeping, and it deliberately does not ask for the person who made the record. The traditional approach was far more demanding: the record maker and each human link in the chain of information, if living and competent, had to testify, and only when a necessary witness was incompetent or absent could other witnesses identify the record and explain how and by whom it was kept.53 Today anyone with the necessary knowledge of the particular record-keeping process qualifies, and that witness need not have firsthand knowledge of the matter reported or have prepared the report or observed its preparation.54 The witness typically describes the company’s system and practices and then explains that the document offered came out of that system. In a small or informal business, the person who pays the bills or sends and files the letters can often do that.55 The people who contributed entries to a large enterprise’s records usually cannot be found or could say nothing useful about a routine entry, so a rule demanding that the foundation witness be the entrant would restore the very burden the exception removed.
Condition (D) is separate from the knowledge element in condition (A). There, someone in the chain of information must have perceived the event. Here, the foundation witness need only know the system, so a witness who knows the system thoroughly and nothing about the event is enough, while a witness who saw the event and knows nothing about the system is not.
The minimum knowledge is a real requirement, though. The foundation witness or certifier may rely on a kind of “circumstantial” knowledge, but one who lacks this minimal knowledge cannot lay the foundation.56 In United States v. Evans, the Fifth Circuit allowed accountants to authenticate records whether or not they were employed when the records were made. In State v. Radley, a credit union manager could not authenticate a clearing house’s reports, because she was neither employed there nor in any way involved in those reports. The accountants had a basis in the record-keeping system, and the manager had none. A related difficulty arises when one organization offers records it holds but another prepared. Mere possession or custody does not qualify the holder’s employees to lay the foundation, and reliance on another’s records, though an important part of establishing trustworthiness, is not enough without more. The foundation may still be laid where the holder independently checked the records, integrated them into its own operation in a way that establishes trustworthiness, or can establish accuracy by other means.57
The alternative route is a written certification. The custodian or another qualified person certifies in writing, instead of appearing, what the in-person witness would say: that the record complies with all the requirements of the exception. The offering party may choose a certification or a live witness.58 The route matters because an affidavit alone does not suffice in other settings. In Tongil Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Corp., a judgment resting on business records was reversed because a qualified person had filed an affidavit without testifying.
The shortcut comes with protections that let the opponent test the foundation before trial. The proponent must give advance written notice of the intention to use the certification, and the record must be made available for advance inspection, to afford the opponent a full opportunity to test the adequacy of the foundation.59 The same source raises an open question: whether such certificates can present a Confrontation Clause problem in certain circumstances.
A certification changes how the foundation is proved and leaves untouched what must be proved. Because it stands in for the witness, it must say what the witness would say, so a signer who knows nothing about how the records are made and kept gives the court nothing to rely on. Even a flawless foundation does not end the inquiry, because the opponent may still show a lack of trustworthiness under condition (E).60
An exam stem will usually pair a document with a witness or a certificate and leave the foundation for you to assess. The question is what the witness knows. Knowledge of how the enterprise makes and keeps its records qualifies, while a logo, a clerk’s knowledge of the event alone, or mere possession of another organization’s records does not. A certificate replaces live testimony only if it carries the same showing and arrives with notice and an opportunity to inspect.