Concept
Absence of an Entry
Business records
Absence of an Entry
Rule 803(7) runs the business-records exception in reverse. It admits "[e]vidence that a matter is not included in a record described in paragraph (6)" when three conditions are met.1 The evidence must be offered to prove that the matter did not occur or exist; a record must have been regularly kept for a matter of that kind; and the opponent must fail to show that the possible source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.2 Where Rule 803(6) lets what a routine record says prove that something happened, this rule lets what the record leaves out prove that something did not.3 The rule borrows its machinery from Rule 803(6), because the regularity that makes entries trustworthy is the same regularity that gives a gap its meaning. Two questions remain: why the Rules needed a separate provision, and what keeps it from proving too much.
A gap in a record can be described in more than one way, and the rule exists because the descriptions pull apart. One view holds that the absence of an entry is not hearsay at all, since "no statement" is not a "statement."4 The Advisory Committee observed, however, that decisions can be found classing the evidence as hearsay that fits no exception, and it wrote the rule to set the question at rest in favor of admissibility.5 A second objection comes from how a ledger is read. A record that lists transactions A, B, and C asserts that those occurred, so offering it to prove that transaction D did not occur seems to ask the record to say something it never said. The exception defeats that objection too, and Rule 803(10) does the same for public records.6 The proponent therefore need not win the argument over whether silence is a statement. If it is a statement, the exception covers it, and if it is not, there is no hearsay to except.7
Silence proves something only when speech would have been expected. The inference runs in three steps, and each rests on regularity. If an enterprise routinely records matters of a certain kind, someone with knowledge of such a matter has the job of reporting it, so an occurrence would ordinarily have produced an entry. The record contains no entry. The matter, therefore, probably did not occur. Rule 803(7) permits exactly this inference, admitting the absence of a business record to show that an event did not occur so long as the business would normally record events of that kind.8 The reasons for trusting the entries in a routine record are the enterprise's reliance on its own books, the duty of accuracy on those who make entries, and the habits of precision that repetition builds, and they are also the reasons for trusting its gaps. Remove the routine and the inference collapses, because an empty space in a record kept haphazardly may mean only that nobody wrote anything down.
The second condition, that a record was regularly kept for a matter of that kind, supplies the first step of that inference and decides most cases.9 It looks to the category of matter. That parallels the regular-practice requirement of Rule 803(6)(C), but it asks the question about the subject of the missing entry and not about the document in hand.10 The question is whether an event of this type would ordinarily have been written down, and an enterprise's careful books on other subjects do not answer it.
The same inference worked in a criminal prosecution in United States v. Gentry. A mall employee, Gentry, told coworkers and mall security that he had bitten into a pin in M&M candy from a vending machine, and a coworker found metal embedded in the candy.11 Deputies doubted the claim, a polygraph examiner concluded that Gentry was lying, and he then confessed that he had put the pin in the candy to get attention, which led to his prosecution for making a false report of food tampering.12 On appeal Gentry challenged testimony from an employee of the manufacturer that there had been no other reports of pins in M&M candy.13 The Seventh Circuit, through Judge Easterbrook, held the testimony relevant because it implied that the pin came from Gentry and not from the factory or another tamperer, and it held that Rule 803(7) allows this use of business records to show that an event did not occur.14 The logic is the one described above. A pin that entered the candy at the factory would ordinarily be expected to draw more than one report, so a manufacturer's records showing none point toward the defendant.
The supplier and the retailer both keep orderly books, and each offers silence as proof. What separates them is whether the enterprise regularly recorded matters of that kind: payments were recorded and complaints were not. An exam stem that praises the thoroughness of a company's files is therefore a distraction, because completeness on other subjects says nothing about the one at issue. The answer turns on whether this kind of occurrence would have produced an entry.
The remaining two conditions are easier to state. The first requires that the evidence be admitted to prove that the matter did not occur or exist.15 That wording limits the exception to the one inference that regular recording actually supports, which is whether an event of a recorded kind happened. The third requires that the opponent not show that the possible source of the information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness, so the opponent carries the same burden that Rule 803(6)(E) assigns once the proponent has laid a foundation.16 The reference to the possible source of the information suits a record that is silent. With no entry to trace, the opponent points to who would have had to report the matter and why that person may have failed to do so. Evidence that posting ran months behind during the relevant weeks, for instance, would give the court a concrete reason to doubt that a gap means nonoccurrence.
The third step does the real work, because the first and second usually follow from the stem and the fourth arises only when the opponent comes forward with a specific fact. A record that fails the third step has no silence to interpret, which is why the exception rests on the same regularity that supports the entries Rule 803(6) admits.