Concept
Treatises and Hearsay
Learned treatises
Learned Treatises Exception
Treatises and Hearsay
A party who reads a sentence from a medical text to prove what it says is offering hearsay, and Rule 803(18) is the exception that can admit it. The rule reaches a statement in a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet when two conditions are met. An expert witness must have had the statement called to his or her attention on cross-examination, or relied on it on direct examination. And the publication must be established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice. A statement that qualifies may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.1
These conditions answer a problem, and the problem is easier to see before the conditions are applied. The two subsections that follow explain why a passage from a text is hearsay and how courts treated learned texts before the federal rule. With that background, each condition can be learned as a reasoned response and not as a list to memorize.
Why Treatises Are Hearsay
A passage from a learned writing is hearsay when a party offers it to prove what it says. The author is the declarant: the words were written outside the courtroom, and the party who reads them to the jury wants the jurors to believe them. Treatises, books, and articles on specialized subjects fit that description,2 and Rule 803(18) does work only because the evidence would otherwise be barred.3
The first offer needs Rule 803(18), even though a treatise is a more dependable kind of hearsay than most. Wigmore argued for an exception on that ground. A treatise author has no bias in any particular case, and the author knows that others in the field will read and evaluate the work, which creates strong pressure to be accurate.4 The advisory committee's note to Rule 803(18) makes the same point: treatises are written primarily for professionals and are subject to scrutiny and exposure for inaccuracy, with the reputation of the writer at stake.5 One court describes the result as a high standard of accuracy, because the author writes impartially for professionals and is likely driven by a strong desire to state the full truth accurately.6
Wigmore also observed that admitting such sources directly changes less than it first appears, because much expert testimony already consists of information the experts obtained from them.7 The rule's sponsorship condition keeps the exception tied to that practice by requiring an expert to be shown the statement on cross-examination or to rely on it on direct.8
Two dangers survive those checks. First, the author cannot be cross-examined. Wigmore treated that as the one arguably meritorious objection and concluded that the need for the evidence and the other assurances of accuracy outweighed it.9 Second, jurors who rifle through a treatise may draw improper inferences from technical language they cannot properly understand without expert guidance.10 The rule's text answers both. A proponent who fails to lay a foundation that the work is authoritative loses the passage, because the court then has no basis to view it as trustworthy.11 And a statement read aloud but not received as an exhibit never reaches the jury room, where jurors could study the text on their own.12
The Common Law Approach
Before the federal rules, most courts would not adopt a broad hearsay exception for treatises and other professional literature. A cross-examiner could still confront an expert with a passage from a respected work, but the passage bore only on the witness's competence or the accuracy of the opinion, never on whether the statement in the text was true.14 The difference between those two uses looks slight on paper and decides cases.
The passage can serve one purpose and not the other because each asks something different of it. To impeach, the cross-examiner needs only the fact that a respected author disagrees with the expert, and the suggestion that the expert may be wrong works whether or not the author is right. To prove causation, the passage must be true, and that is the use the hearsay rule blocks when the author is absent. The impeachment value is real. A witness who is unfamiliar with an authoritative text in the field casts doubt on his claimed expertise, and a witness who admits the text is authoritative but never consulted it raises doubt about how painstakingly he analyzed the case-specific facts.15 Under the federal rule the same cross-examination ends differently. The statement was called to the expert's attention, and the expert's admission establishes the work as a reliable authority, so the jury may also consider the passage as proof of what it says.16
Courts also disagreed about which texts a cross-examiner could use even for impeachment. Four positions emerged, running from narrowest to broadest.17
- The expert relied on that particular text.
- The expert admitted relying on authorities in general, though not on the particular text.
- The expert acknowledged the text as a recognized authority, whether or not he relied on it.
- The cross-examiner established the text's general authority, or the court judicially noticed it, whatever the expert said.
Each step widens the cross-examiner's access. The narrowest position lets the cross-examiner confront the expert only with material the expert has adopted. The broadest lets the cross-examiner test an expert who avoids the literature or refuses to endorse anything, so long as the work's standing is shown independently. In all four, the passage remained impeachment material.
Wigmore weighed four other objections to an exception and found none compelling. Professional knowledge shifts rapidly, so printed material may be out of date. A trier of fact may be confused by material written for professionally trained readers. Sections taken out of context create a danger of unfair use. And most expertise is skill, not the academic knowledge put in writing, so a personally appearing witness is likely the better source.18
Rule 803(18) weighs these concerns differently. It rejects two common-law limits: that an expert on direct could not quote a treatise for its truth, and that a cross-examiner could not impeach with a treatise unless the expert relied on it or conceded it was reliable. The rule gives both direct and cross-examiners much greater latitude.19 It keeps safeguards, though. The judge must be persuaded by foundational evidence that the work is a reliable authority before the proponent may invoke the rule.20 A reliability screen of this kind asks what stands behind a source, including the record on which its findings rest and whether experts in the field reasonably rely on the underlying facts or data.21 And the passage is read aloud, not received as an exhibit, so the jury does not discover for itself out-of-context passages that no one examined or challenged in open court.22
The common-law position has not vanished. Only a few jurisdictions recognized a learned-treatise hearsay exception at common law, but state provisions patterned after Rule 803(18) are now so widespread that the exception is the majority view. Many jurisdictions go further and allow impeachment with texts that fall outside the exception.23 Other states, California among them, still do not permit substantive use unless another hearsay exception applies. Some also restrict impeachment use, requiring that the expert have referred to, considered, or relied on the publication, so that merely calling it to the expert's attention is not enough.24