Concept
The Federal Rule
Learned treatises
The Federal Rule
Rule 803(18) lets a lawyer prove a point with a statement from a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet, but only when the statement reaches the jury through an expert.1 The judge first decides under Rule 104(a) whether professionals in the field consider the published material reliable. If they do, statements in it are admissible for their truth when used in the direct or cross-examination of an expert witness.2 Two actors therefore control the exception: a testifying expert, through whom the passage must come, and the judge, who decides whether the work deserves trust.
The federal rule departs sharply from the common law. At common law, a learned text mainly served to attack an expert: the cross-examiner could show that an author, also an expert in the witness's field, held professional views that contradicted the witness's.3 Rule 803(18) goes much further.4 Publications of the kind it covers are no longer confined, as they were under many older decisions, to credibility,5 and a qualifying treatise or periodical may be used not only to challenge the expert's opinion but as substantive proof that its statement is true.6
Consider an expert who testifies on direct that a whiplash injury always shows itself within several weeks of a blow. The cross-examiner may read, or have the expert read, passages from a standard text or professional periodical that indicate a longer period.7 Under the old approach, those passages would only suggest that the witness was wrong. Under the federal rule, once the work qualifies, the jury may accept the longer period as true.
Because the statement is evidence in its own right, a qualifying treatise or article can serve as an unsworn expert, often with better credentials than the witness on the stand.8 That power matters most to a party who needs expert proof to survive a directed verdict. Maggipinto v. Reichman, a 1979 Third Circuit decision, is the authority the treatise cites for using a treatise to forestall a directed verdict against a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action.9 The plaintiff in such a case needs the help, because expert testimony supporting the claim is an indispensable requirement for establishing a right of action in malpractice cases.10
Only one thing changed between the first attempt and the second: a qualified witness now stands between the passage and the jury. That witness can say whether the passage is sound and how it bears on this patient, and the rule is built to produce that exchange. By admitting the work only to the extent it is called to an expert's attention on cross-examination or relied on by an expert on direct, the rule ensures that the trier of fact has the benefit of the expert's view of the passage's validity and, just as importantly, of how the passage bears on the issues in the case.11
The judge decides whether the work is a reliable authority, and the measure is professional regard: do professionals in the field consider the published material reliable?12 The proponent, the party offering the passage, must persuade the judge with foundation evidence before invoking the exception.13 A similar yardstick appears in one list of factors for assessing findings, which asks, where the findings rest on expert opinion, whether the facts or data behind that opinion are reasonably relied on by experts in the field.14
Foundation is only half the matter, because the rule also controls how the passage reaches the jury. An admitted statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.15 The limit answers a specific danger: the rule bars exhibits to avoid the risk that the jury will rely too heavily on these items.16
The rule thus has two foundation conditions and one limit on presentation. First, the statement must be called to an expert's attention on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination.17 Second, the publication must be established as a reliable authority by the expert's admission or testimony, by another expert's testimony, or by judicial notice.18 The sections below take each in turn.
Steps two and three are separate conditions, and a problem can satisfy one without the other. An expert may rely on a book whose reliability no one has yet established, and a book may be famous for its reliability while no expert has been connected to the passage at all. In either case the exception stays unavailable until the missing condition is supplied.
These conditions describe the federal rule, and some states differ. California, for one, still does not permit substantive use of a treatise unless another hearsay exception also applies. Some states also restrict impeachment use by requiring that the expert have referred to, considered, or relied on the publication; calling it to the expert's attention is not enough.19 Unless a problem says otherwise, apply the federal rule.