Concept
Expert Sponsorship
Learned treatises
Expert Sponsorship
Rule 803(18) lets a learned work reach the jury only through a testifying expert. Subsection (A) requires that “the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct examination.”1 A lawyer who owns a respected textbook cannot read from it to the jury, however authoritative the book may be, because the exception makes the expert on the stand the gateway. Until a testifying expert has been confronted with the passage or has relied on it, the statement is ordinary hearsay.
The gateway exists so that the materials are used only under the guidance of an expert who can assist the fact finder and explain how to apply them. The bar on receiving the passage as an exhibit furthers the same policy by keeping the book out of the jury room.2 An expert on the stand can interpret or comment on the passage, so the trier of fact hears the expert’s view of whether the passage is valid and how it bears on the issues in the case.3 Ordinary exhibits show a comparable pattern. In one illustrative exchange, counsel offering a gun answered a chain-of-custody objection by pointing to a lieutenant’s testimony, based on his mark and personal recollection, that this was the weapon he found at the scene.4 In each setting a witness stands behind the item.
The two sponsorship routes track the two stages of expert examination. On cross-examination the rule asks only that the passage be called to the expert’s attention, and on direct it asks that the expert have relied on the passage. Either route satisfies only the first foundation requirement. The work must still be established as a reliable authority, which the sections after these two take up.
Called to the Expert’s Attention on Cross-Examination
On cross-examination the rule requires a single event: the statement must be “called to the attention of an expert witness.”5 A testifying expert, while on the stand, has the passage put to the expert. The expert need not have read the book before trial, relied on it, or agreed with it. That is a real change from the common-law limits described earlier, under which a cross-examiner could not use a treatise unless the expert had relied on it or conceded that it was reliable, and Rule 803(18) rejects both limits.6 An expert who will not vouch for the book therefore does not end the matter. The proponent can ask to introduce the work subject to her own witness later testifying to its reliability, and to the extent the work is indisputably reliable, the court may take judicial notice of that.7
Under the old limits the cross-examiner depended on the expert’s reliance or concession. Rule 803(18) removes that dependence, so the examiner chooses which passage to put forward, subject to the separate showing that the work is reliable. What the rule still demands is that the confrontation occur before a qualified witness. The expert must have the opportunity to interpret or comment on the passage read to the jury, so that the trier of fact receives the expert’s view of its validity and of how it bears on the case.8
A whiplash cross-examination shows the route at work. Suppose an expert testifies on direct that a “whiplash” injury always manifests within several weeks after a blow. Once the text is shown to be reliable, the cross-examiner may read, or have the expert read, passages from a standard text or professional periodical indicating a longer period. Under the Federal Rules the passage serves both to challenge the expert and as substantive proof that the statement in the reference work is true.9 Because the expert is on the stand, the expert answers it. The expert may say the text is out of date or describes a different kind of injury, and that answer joins the passage in the evidence the jury weighs. Disagreement does not keep the passage out, since the sponsorship condition asks only that the statement be called to the expert’s attention. The expert’s criticism goes to weight.
A reported decision follows the same sequence. In the Dawsons’ suit against Chrysler, the Dawsons’ counsel cross-examined one of Chrysler’s experts about Calspan reports. Counsel asked, “since you calculated some data from them, they’re reliable in that regard, aren’t they,” and the expert answered: “Well, I have no reason to doubt their test data reflected in [the] reports.” The court treated that answer as an inferential concession of authoritativeness, observed that Chrysler had not objected to the use of the Calspan report, and held that the Dawsons’ use of the reports on cross-examination was not precluded by Rule 803(18).10 The reliability showing in that case came from the testifying expert’s own answers, a subject for the next section. The sponsorship condition was met because the reports were put to an expert witness on cross-examination.
Opposing counsel often objects that the expert never relied on the book. That objection borrows the direct-examination condition and applies it to cross-examination, where the rule asks only that the statement be called to the expert’s attention.11 A fact pattern that stresses that the expert never read the book is testing for exactly that confusion.
The route also has a timing limit. The new substantive use of treatises is expressly conditioned on the procedural strictures that once attached to impeachment use, and the publication must have been called to the expert’s attention on cross.12 The expert must therefore be on the stand when the passage is put to the expert. After the expert has left, no one is left to confront with the passage, and the passage stays hearsay unless some testifying expert relied on it on direct.
A lawyer may also choose not to use the treatise on cross-examination at all. One technique is to pin the expert to a limited set of facts, inferences, and conclusions, let the expert leave the stand, and then offer another expert to critique the testimony.13 That plan brings a treatise in only if the second expert relies on it on direct, which is the other sponsorship route. The first expert’s departure ends any chance to call the passage to that expert’s attention.
The cost of a missing sponsor appears in Conde v. Velsicol Chemical Corp. In opposing summary judgment on medical causation, the plaintiffs offered the Epstein Article and the Infante Letter. They argued that both were admissible because Dr. Conde referred to them in his affidavit and because of the learned treatise exception.14 As to the article, the court noted that Dr. Epstein was not listed as an expert witness and would not testify at trial, and that the plaintiffs had submitted no affidavit from an expert relying upon any specific factual assertions in the article, so the article was not admissible under Rule 803(18).15 A passing reference to a document in an expert’s affidavit did not supply a sponsor. The plaintiffs lacked an expert who had relied on the article’s specific assertions. The rule asks for that sponsor and does not ask for the author.
Relied On by the Expert on Direct Examination
The second route belongs to the party whose own expert is on the stand. Subsection (A) is also satisfied when the statement is “relied on by the expert on direct examination.”17 Because the two routes are joined by “or,” either one meets the sponsorship condition, and the exception is not a device for impeaching the opposing expert alone. Rule 803(18) gives direct examiners, as well as cross-examiners, much greater latitude than the common law did.18
Many common-law jurisdictions barred an expert on direct from quoting a treatise for its truth because the passage was hearsay. Rule 803(18) rejects that limit.19 An expert who says “my opinion rests on this text” may therefore have the supporting passage read to the jury for its truth, once the work is also established as a reliable authority. Reliance is what ties the passage to that witness, and it is the reason the sponsorship condition can do its work. The witness who relied on the work can explain how it applies to the facts, and opposing counsel can ask whether the passage was read in context and whether it fits the case.20
A further limit applies to both routes: the statement may be read into evidence but may not be received as an exhibit. A court applying the Texas criminal rule, which contains the same reading-only restriction, explained that it keeps a jury from rifling through a learned treatise and drawing improper inferences from technical language that it could not properly understand without expert guidance. The same court held that the Confrontation Clause is not violated by admitting a learned treatise even without a showing that the declarant is unavailable, because a learned treatise is not inferior to live evidence from an expert witness.21
Reliance is the fact that separates the two trials. The rule distinguishes the stages of examination: on cross-examination it is enough that the statement is called to the expert’s attention, while on direct the statement must have been relied on by the expert.22 A passage does not come in merely because it is relevant to what a party’s expert says, and a work’s reputation is no substitute for a sponsor. The manual in the first trial is not lost for good, because the cross-examination route remains open if an opposing expert is confronted with it. Satisfying subsection (A) by either route settles only the first foundation requirement, and the work must still be established as a reliable authority, the subject of the sections that follow.