Concept
What Counts as a Publication
Learned treatises
What Counts as a Publication
Rule 803(18) reaches only a statement contained in a “treatise, periodical, or pamphlet,” so every condition taught above presupposes a writing of that kind.1 The category is wider than the medical textbook that has served as our running picture. The rule names three kinds of publication and ties none of them to a subject, and courts have applied it broadly, to standards and manuals published by government agencies and by industry or professional organizations as well as to scholarly works.2
The reliability condition keeps that breadth from becoming a loophole. The proponent must establish that the particular publication is a reliable authority, which demonstrates that professionals in the field view it as trustworthy,3 and the rule lets the showing come from the expert’s admission or testimony, from another expert’s testimony, or from judicial notice.4 The exception exists because, once a work’s authority has been established, the factfinder should have the benefit of expert learning on the subject even though the work is hearsay.5 A writing that no one can vouch for in this way gains nothing from having been published.
Four settings test the edges of the category. The journal article comes first, where the question is how much a showing about a journal proves about one article inside it. Codes and technical standards come next, then videos and other electronic media, and the unit ends with a kind of writing that the rule cannot reach at all: a judge’s findings of fact.
Periodicals and Articles
A scholarly journal falls squarely within the rule, which names the “periodical” in its opening line.6 The difficulty lies in the second condition, which requires that “the publication” be established as a reliable authority.7 An article is a publication printed inside another publication. When an expert testifies that a journal is a standard authority, has the expert vouched for the article in the cross-examiner’s hand, or only for the journal that carries it?
Courts have given two answers, each with its own emphasis. Meschino v. North American Drager, Inc. sounds the cautious note: physicians engaged in research may write dozens of papers during a lifetime, and “[m]ere publication cannot make them automatically reliable authority.”8 The competing view starts from the premise that the authoritativeness inquiry is governed by a “liberal” standard, so that “good sense would seem to compel recognizing some periodicals — provided there is a basis for doing so — as sufficiently esteemed to justify a presumption in favor of admitting the articles accepted for publication therein.”9
Musorofiti v. Vlcek shows the second view at work. The trial court there did not abuse its discretion in admitting an article on testimony that the journal “was widely read, recognized and accepted in the dental profession as authoritative,” and the Connecticut Supreme Court later agreed generally with the Appellate Court’s approach.10 The two views fit together once each is read for what it requires. A showing about the journal does not automatically carry every article in it. A presumption favoring the articles arises only when the record gives some basis for treating the periodical as esteemed, as testimony about wide readership and acceptance did in Musorofiti. A cross-examiner who wants certainty therefore has the expert identify the article itself as authoritative, and treats testimony about the journal as a fallback that counts for more the more the record says about the journal. Either way, the judge must be persuaded by the foundation evidence before the rule may be invoked.11
Filippelli v. Saint Mary’s Hospital shows the question arising at trial, with one caution: the court was applying Connecticut’s counterpart to Rule 803(18). That rule asks first whether the work is recognized as a standard authority in the field by the witness, another expert, or judicial notice, and second whether it was brought to the witness’s attention on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct.12 The plaintiff’s expert, Krasnick, testified that the Journal of the American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgery was a standard authority. When the defendants’ expert, Bazos, testified about diagnosing and treating compartment syndrome, the plaintiff tried on cross-examination to use portions of an article from that journal against him, and the defendants objected that Krasnick had vouched for the journal but never for the article.13
The Appellate Court observed that both Krasnick and Bazos had testified that there is no standard authority on diagnosing compartment syndrome, and that their knowledge came from the whole of the orthopedic literature and from their education, training, and experience.14 That testimony cuts against the plaintiff. A journal’s standing can carry over to an article only on the assumption that the journal’s scrutiny reached the article, and experts who disclaim any authoritative source on the narrow question leave that assumption without support. The Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the expert must testify that the particular article is a standard authority or whether it suffices that the expert identifies the journal, and it agreed generally with Musorofiti.15 It decided the appeal on a narrower ground, though: even if the plaintiff had met the foundation requirements, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in limiting use of the article on cross-examination.16
Qualifying an article does not hand the proponent unrestricted use of it. The trial court in Filippelli let the plaintiff question Bazos about statements in the article but denied a request to read the statements into the record. After cross-examination it redacted the portions on which Bazos had not been questioned and admitted the redacted article as a full exhibit.17 Connecticut differs from the federal rule in allowing qualifying material to go to the jury as an exhibit, and its court explained that the dangers behind the federal rule can be minimized by the trial court’s judicious exercise of discretion over which items are admitted as full exhibits.18 The judge who decides the foundation also controls how much of the article reaches the jury. Under the federal rule the control takes a simpler form: a qualifying statement may be read into evidence but not received as an exhibit.19
The Erb’s palsy litigation in Costantino v. Herzog shows the same question from the cross-examiner’s side. Defense counsel introduced an article by Robert Gherman, an obstetrics professor, published in the American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, while cross-examining the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Nathanson. Dr. Nathanson refused to concede the authoritativeness of the journal, yet the trial judge allowed counsel to read portions of the article suggesting that some cases of Erb’s palsy may be related to events before delivery.20 The refusal did not necessarily close the foundation, because the rule also allows reliability to be established through another expert’s testimony or by judicial notice.21
When an exam stem has the sponsoring expert praise the journal and stop there, it is testing whether the praise reaches the article. Praise alone leaves the foundation open. The showing improves when the record explains why the journal deserves a presumption, and it worsens when the experts disclaim any standard authority on the narrow question. Even a qualifying article may be limited by the trial judge in how it is used.
Codes and Technical Standards
A safety code or technical standard is a publication of the kind the rule contemplates. Courts have historically applied Rule 803(18) to standards and manuals published by government agencies and by industry or professional organizations, and they have demanded the same showing of reliability, which demonstrates that professionals in the field view the publication as trustworthy.23 A code gets no easier path to the jury than a textbook, and no harder one.
The Fifth Circuit’s decision in Alexander shows both the category and its limits. Safety codes have traditionally been treated as coming within the exception. Because they are inherently trustworthy, and because of the expense and difficulty of assembling at trial those who compiled them, such codes may also be admitted under the residual exception, Rule 803(24), though that route carries a prior-notice requirement.24 The plaintiff, Alexander, still lost his appeal. The court rejected his argument that the failure to admit the code as an exhibit required reversal, for two reasons: he had not urged admission under the residual exception at trial, and no substantial right was affected because the relevant sections had already been read and shown to the jury.25
Test reports travel the same route. In Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., the plaintiffs’ counsel used Calspan reports to cross-examine one of Chrysler’s experts. Counsel asked whether, since the expert had calculated some data from the reports, they were reliable in that regard, and he answered, “Well, I have no reason to doubt their test data reflected in [the] reports.” The court treated that answer as an inferential concession of authoritativeness, observed that Chrysler had not objected to the use of the Calspan report, and held that the plaintiffs’ use of the reports on cross-examination was not precluded by Rule 803(18).26
The foundation requirement runs document by document. In one Fifth Circuit decision, neither the expert on the stand, Dr. Comstock, nor any other witness testified that a NIOSH manual was a reliable authority, so the trial court correctly barred the plaintiffs from cross-examining Dr. Comstock with statements from the manual. The court added that the plaintiffs could have used statements in the original articles by obtaining copies and having Dr. Comstock or one of their own experts identify the articles as authoritative.27
Read together, the decisions show that the type of document matters little and the foundation matters a great deal. Alexander involved a code that sets requirements, Dawson involved reports that record test results, and the NIOSH decision involved a manual that no witness had vouched for. Dawson’s reports reached the jury through cross-examination of the opposing expert, whose answer supplied the reliability showing, and the manual stayed out because no witness supplied one.
The engineer’s agreement reached the standard itself, and it would not carry over to a document that merely describes the standard, just as the NIOSH ruling separated a manual from the original articles behind it. A cross-examiner holding only the summary can cure the problem by putting the standard itself to the expert.
A stem that describes an official-looking document invites the conclusion that it comes in because a government agency or standards body issued it. Origin settles neither condition. Sponsorship still requires that a testifying expert have been confronted with the passage or have relied on it,28 and reliability still requires an expert’s admission or testimony, another expert’s testimony, or judicial notice about the document actually offered.29
Videos and Electronic Media
The rule’s words, “treatise, periodical, or pamphlet,” call to mind paper, and the objection that a recording is none of the three has real textual force.31 Two answers have emerged. The first is definitional. Under the Restyled Rules of Evidence, effective December 1, 2011, any reference to written material in the Rules “includes electronically stored information,” so a video presentation or a website, if found authoritative and relevant, can be admitted under the learned treatise exception.32 The second is functional, and a Texas appellate court supplied it.
Loven v. State conceded the textual point. A videotape, the court said, is not a periodical or a pamphlet and is not a treatise in the narrow sense, and the rule’s express language does not extend to it. The court nevertheless read the rule contextually, to promote the growth and development of the law of evidence, and held that videotapes are “nothing more than a contemporary variant of a published treatise, periodical or pamphlet” and may qualify as learned treatises.33 Loven applied the Texas criminal evidence rule, so its reasoning persuades a federal court without binding it. The textual argument has persuaded other courts, and Simmons v. Yurchak is a decision on that side of the line.
The foundation in Loven shows what a recording must still prove. The court found the testimony of Dr. Moriarty sufficient to establish the videotape as a reliable authority on a subject of medicine, and its own viewing led to the same conclusion: the tape was produced by an organization one would expect to have expert knowledge of epilepsy and was narrated by an authority in the field.34 Each fact answers the question subsection (B) asks. A producer and narrator with standing make it plausible that professionals trust the work, and the testifying expert supplies the vouching the rule requires.
The clip fails for the reasons the epilepsy tape succeeded. The tape came with an institutional producer, a narrator with standing, and an expert’s confirmation, and each furnished some reason to believe its content. The hobbyist’s clip comes with none of them, and the reliability condition asks for exactly that kind of outside assurance about the particular publication offered.35
The limit on exhibits applies to recordings as well. In Loven the trial court received the videotape as an exhibit, which the appellate court called clearly erroneous because learned treatises “may be read into evidence but may not be received as exhibits.” The error was harmless, however: nothing in the record indicated that the jurors had a video cassette recorder with which to review the tape during deliberations, so they could not have misapplied it.36 A recording that jurors could replay in the jury room would present the danger behind the rule’s last sentence, that jurors with access to a treatise or similar work will try to interpret and apply it without the benefit of expert guidance.37 The video is played for the jury while the expert is available to comment on it, and it stays out of the jury room.
When an exam question offers a video, website, or other electronic source as a learned treatise, answer the textual objection by pointing to the function of the exception, then run the same two foundation conditions that apply to a book. Qualifying under the rule also does not guarantee admission, because Rule 403 still applies, as a later section explains.
Judicial Opinions Excluded
A judge’s findings of fact in an earlier lawsuit fall outside the exception. Rule 803(18) reaches a treatise, periodical, or pamphlet,39 and it requires that the publication be established as a reliable authority by an expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s testimony, or by judicial notice.40 Findings made to decide one case do not carry the reliability that those publications carry, and relabeling them cannot supply it.
Evans v. Lorillard Tobacco Co. tested the point, with one caution: the court was applying a state counterpart to Rule 803(18), which likewise requires a reliable authority. The plaintiff’s lawyer wanted to confront a witness with findings a federal judge had made in a separate case, Philip Morris, about Lorillard’s marketing practices. To spare the jury the prejudice of learning that a federal judge had made the findings, the trial judge suggested phrasing them as the conclusions of a hypothetical expert.41
The device failed. A judge’s findings of fact must be based on the evidence presented in a specific case, so they lack the indicia of reliability of statements in a published treatise, periodical, or pamphlet, and a judge does not become a reliable authority on cigarette marketing by making findings on the subject.42 The technique had two defects, and they are worth separating. The first concerns the source. A published work earns its place because professionals in the field view it as trustworthy,43 while a judge’s findings resolve one dispute on the record the parties in that case assembled. Questions about the trustworthiness of findings made by a court or other official body usually turn on matters such as how much of a record supports the findings and whether they rest on findings by other bodies, which is a different inquiry from the one the learned-treatise exception makes.44
The second defect concerns the label. Attributing the findings to an unnamed expert hides the source from the jury but leaves the source what it was, and it removes the one fact a witness would need in order to test reliability. A witness can say whether professionals recognize a published work as authoritative, but cannot say that about the unidentified conclusions of an expert who does not exist. If that phrasing were enough, a cross-examiner could put any assertion before the jury by attributing it to an imaginary specialist, and the foundation requirement would have nothing left to screen.
The proposition is identical in both suits, which isolates what moved the answer: whether the source is a work whose standing an expert or the court can vouch for. A stem that stresses how careful and detailed a judge’s findings were is inviting the argument that thoroughness equals authority. Thoroughness does not supply the foundation, because subsection (B) asks whether the publication is established as a reliable authority, and a judge’s findings are not.45
Exclusion is only half the lesson, because an error does not always require a new trial. The Evans court found the improper use of the findings inconsequential on its record: the witness’s opinion was unaffected, and the jury was unlikely to be swayed by the hypothetical views of an unidentified expert. Loven shows the same separation on a different error, since receiving a videotape as an exhibit was clearly erroneous yet harmless.46 An answer should state the admissibility ruling first and then address prejudice.