Concept
Opportunity to Develop Testimony
Former testimony; depositions
Opportunity to Develop Testimony
Former testimony is hearsay that earns admission because someone could test it when it was given. Rule 804(b)(1)(B) states the condition: the testimony must now be offered against a party who had (or, in a civil case, whose predecessor in interest had) an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.1 The sworn-testimony requirement concerns the earlier statement. This condition concerns the party now facing the transcript, and it asks what that party could have done when the witness spoke. To develop testimony is to draw out its helpful details, test its accuracy, or qualify it through questions. The three listed forms of examination cover the ways a lawyer does that: direct examination of a witness the party called, cross-examination of a witness the other side called, and redirect examination to answer what cross-examination exposed.
This condition carries the fairness of the exception. The ordinary hearsay objection is that the opponent never had a chance to question the declarant, and an unavailable declarant cannot be questioned now. The Rule lets an earlier chance stand in for the present one. Where no adversary could have tested the account, the transcript arrives with an oath but without the testing that gives an oath its force. The committee that amended the Rule explained the limit: it is generally unfair to make the party against whom hearsay is offered answerable for how another party handled the witness, and the sole exception is a predecessor in interest in a civil action or proceeding who had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness.2 In a criminal case, then, the chance must have been the defendant's own. Who qualifies as a civil predecessor in interest is taken up under The Opposing Party, where the common-law notion of privity proves to be of limited value.3
Two consequences follow, and the subsections below take them in turn. First, the Rule measures the chance the party had and not the use it made of it, so a party that attended the earlier proceeding and asked nothing cannot claim the testimony went untested. Second, the chance must have been a meaningful one in the circumstances when the testimony was given, which leaves the adequacy of the earlier examination open to dispute. Both operate beside similar motive, the question whether the party had comparable reasons to use the chance, which the next major section addresses.
Opportunity, Not Performance
The operative noun in Rule 804(b)(1)(B) is opportunity. The Rule does not ask whether the party put questions to the witness, how many, or how skillfully. A party that attended the earlier hearing with a lawyer, was invited to question the witness, and declined therefore meets the transcript on the same footing as a party that cross-examined for an hour. The testimony went untested only because the party chose not to test it.
Courts apply the Rule that way. They have held that the opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing in a criminal case suffices even though few defendants, for a number of reasons, fully exercise it.4 In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court allowed preliminary hearing testimony of an unavailable witness against a criminal defendant despite the arguably differing motive to cross-examine at that stage, and the practice is now common.5 The risk of passing up the chance falls on the party that passes it up. Counsel who declines to cross-examine, or cross-examines only partway, at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a deposition assumes the risk that the witness will not be available at trial. When the opponent takes a deposition, counsel who refrains from laying bare the full story of a client or a favorable witness assumes the risk that the deponent will be unavailable at trial, so that the one-sided deposition becomes admissible.6
The Seventh Circuit drew the same line in United States v. Feldman. Quoting an earlier statement of the principle, it saw no unfairness, where the party now facing the testimony is the one against whom it was offered before, in requiring that party “to accept his own prior conduct of cross-examination or decision not to cross-examine.” The inquiry therefore “focuses not on the extent of cross-examination at the former proceeding,” but on whether the party's handling of the testimony was “meaningful in light of the circumstances which prevail[ed] when the former testimony [was] offered.”7 The incentive logic is plain. If admissibility depended on how hard the party had questioned, a party facing a damaging transcript could stay quiet at the hearing and, once the witness died, complain that nobody had tested the account.
Silence at the earlier proceeding does not show that the party lacked a similar motive. In United States v. DiNapoli, the Second Circuit rejected any implication in its earlier decision in United States v. Serna that lack of similar motive may be established simply because questioning available at the prior proceeding was not undertaken. In Serna, the government had opposed admitting a co-defendant's trial transcript on the ground that the prosecutor lacked, at that trial, a motive to cross-examine similar to his motive at Serna's.8 Justice Stevens made the same point in dissent in United States v. Salerno. A party that decides, for tactical reasons or otherwise, not to cross-examine rigorously or at all still had a similar motive and chose not to act on it, and the Rules require that party to accept the consequences, including the chance that the testimony will be introduced against it in a later proceeding.9
A party that called the witness never cross-examined anyone, yet its direct and redirect examination counts. The advisory committee recognized that the opportunity to engage in “direct and redirect examination of one's own witness [is] the equivalent of cross-examining an opponent's witness,” as Justice Stevens recounted in Salerno, where the testimony was offered against the party that had previously offered it.10 The equivalence rests on what the party controlled. It chose the witness and the questions and had every chance to draw out or soften the testimony, so holding it to the result imposes no unfairness. The point generalizes: the earlier opportunity need not technically be a cross-examination so long as it was in an appropriately challenging posture, and the Rule is phrased so that any kind of examination may qualify in proper circumstances.11
Do not import the cross-examination requirement from the rule for prior statements of a witness who is testifying. That rule works because the declarant is on the stand and available for cross-examination now about the earlier statement.12 Former testimony comes in when the declarant cannot be cross-examined now, so the Rule accepts an earlier chance in place of a present one. A fact pattern reporting that counsel “did not cross-examine” at the earlier proceeding therefore describes a risk the defense accepted and does not show a missing element. The element is missing only if the facts show that the party was absent, unrepresented, or otherwise without a chance to question the witness.
Adequacy of the Opportunity
A chance to examine that exists only on paper gives the party nothing to use. The opportunity must therefore have been such as to make the cross-examination actually conducted, or the decision not to cross-examine, meaningful in light of the circumstances prevailing when the testimony was given.14 Feldman applied the advisory committee's formulation in the same terms, asking whether the party's handling of the testimony was meaningful in those circumstances and not how much examination took place.15 Adequacy thus asks whether the chance to question the witness was real. Similar motive, taken up in the next major section, asks whether the party had reason to use it.
The standard follows from what the opportunity is for. When the witness cannot be questioned again, the earlier chance is the only thing standing in for cross-examination, so the transcript is fair to the opponent only if that chance could actually test the account. A witness who cannot follow a question, a judge who forbids the central line of inquiry, or an examiner with no real role in the proceeding leaves the testimony untested in everything but name. Against that stands a concern about hindsight. Nearly every earlier proceeding looks narrower than the trial that follows it, and a party's claim that it would have questioned harder had it known what was coming would defeat almost every transcript. The doctrine must therefore separate proceedings that limited what the party could do from proceedings the party merely took less seriously.
The preliminary hearing is the usual battleground, because it is where an opportunity is most often doubted. Its function is the limited one of deciding whether probable cause exists to hold the accused, and it explores the merits far less searchingly than a trial does.16 Defense counsel knows that attacks on the witness's powers of observation or on bias are unlikely to change the result there and may prefer to save them for trial. Cross-examining also has a price, since it previews the defense strategy for the witness and the prosecutor.17 Discovery, finally, is frequently incomplete or nonexistent at that stage, so counsel may lack the material for a thorough examination.18
Courts nonetheless usually admit the testimony. Decisions hold the opportunity to cross-examine at a preliminary hearing sufficient even though few defendants fully exercise it.19 The question is whether the defendant had a full and fair opportunity to conduct a meaningful cross-examination, and the answer comes from what the defendant could have done in the circumstances surrounding the hearing.20 A lawyer who was free to question the witness at length and saved impeachment for trial has therefore had an adequate opportunity. The hearing's narrow purpose explains why counsel held back, but counsel made the choice, and the party that makes it bears the risk that the witness will be unavailable later. If tactical reasons defeated adequacy, every preliminary hearing transcript would fall, because every defense lawyer could say the best questions were being saved.
People v. Brock marks the other side of the line, and the comparison is useful because both situations involved a preliminary hearing. In Brock, a murder prosecution in California, a woman dying of terminal cancer testified at the preliminary hearing in her hospital room. Her precarious condition and her inability to follow and respond to questions undermined the defense cross-examination, and the court held that this precluded use of the former testimony exception.21 The hearing's limited purpose was not the difficulty. The defense lawyer had no tactical choice to regret, because questions put to a witness who cannot follow them produce nothing that cross-examination can use. In the earlier example counsel could have questioned and held back. In Brock counsel could ask but could not meaningfully examine.
A hospital-room hearing is one of several ways the chance to question can be emptied out. A party that has a right to counsel in the case where the testimony is offered cannot be held to testimony taken while counsel was denied, and improper judicial interference with the examination can also make the opportunity inadequate.22 Restrictions on the questioning itself have that effect only when they are very substantial, and some courts require that they render the testimony inherently unreliable. A general finding that counsel at the earlier hearing performed poorly does not automatically require exclusion, because the court must still look at the cross-examination actually conducted, and the fact that the party was less able to impeach the witness then than it would be now ordinarily does not bar use. The graded approach exists because sustained objections, trimmed questions, and missing impeachment material are ordinary incidents of examination. Excluding testimony for any such imperfection would exclude nearly all former testimony, so only interference that guts the examination takes away its role.
A proceeding can also give the opponent no real role at all. A federal court of appeals considered a defendant who offered a co-participant's plea colloquy, the exchange at the hearing where the co-participant pleaded guilty, after the co-participant invoked the Fifth Amendment at trial.23 A plea proceeding is conducted by the judge, who must make sure the plea is knowing, voluntary, and grounded on a proper factual basis, and on the rare occasion when the prosecutor addresses the defendant the questions are usually formulaic and perfunctory. The government's part in that setting did not include the type of examination Rule 804(b)(1) contemplates, so the court upheld exclusion. It added that the government had no reason to cross-examine the co-participant about the points the defendant now wanted to prove. The court's two reasons run together there: the government's limited role speaks to adequacy, and its lack of reason to press speaks to motive.
Feldman supplies the case in which the party against whom the testimony was offered had no notice that the occasion would matter. The government offered the deposition of a witness named Sanburg, taken in a civil suit, in a later criminal prosecution of the defendants.24 The government argued that the questions of the trustee at the deposition counted as cross-examination, and the Seventh Circuit disagreed. The trustee seemed more interested in the movement of the company's assets than in discrediting Sanburg, which would have been of utmost importance to the defendants, and the trustee's questions lacked the scrutiny and focus a criminal defendant's questions would have had. No one at the deposition had the stake needed to stand as a predecessor in interest to the criminal defendants, and those who did have the stake had no reason to suspect they should be there, so the deposition failed Rule 804(b)(1).25 The court treated a naked opportunity to cross-examine as not enough without an incentive to use it.26 Because the case was criminal, the defendants themselves had to have had the chance, and a questioner with a different mission could not supply it.27
The plea colloquy and Feldman show how closely adequacy runs beside motive, and many opinions blur the two. Keeping them apart still helps, because the Rule requires both. Adequacy asks whether the party could meaningfully question the witness given the witness's condition, the procedure, the party's notice, and the party's role. Motive asks whether the party had comparable reasons to examine on the issue now in dispute. A stem that stresses a short hearing, little discovery, and a lawyer who chose not to press the witness describes a limited but adequate opportunity. A stem that stresses a witness who could not respond, a judge who barred the subject, or a questioner with a different agenda describes an inadequate one.