Concept
Similar Motive
Former testimony; depositions
Similar Motive
Rule 804(b)(1)(B) admits former testimony against a party who had, or in a civil case whose predecessor in interest had, “an opportunity and similar motive to develop it by direct, cross-, or redirect examination.”1 The previous section dealt with opportunity. This one deals with motive, and a transcript must satisfy both: a party can have unlimited access to a witness and still have had no reason to press the point that matters now.
The exception substitutes a transcript for live testimony, so the earlier proceeding must be substantially judicial and must have offered an examination that seems satisfactorily equivalent to the cross-examination that would take place now if the testimony were first presented now.2 Opportunity supplies the chance to examine. Similar motive supplies the equivalence, because an examiner who had no reason to challenge the account on the point now in dispute leaves it untested, however ample the chance.
This unit first defines what the comparison measures. It then turns to the circumstances (stakes, strategy, the type of proceeding) that can change an examiner’s reasons, and it ends with grand jury testimony, which has produced the most litigation over motive. A transcript that fails this element may still reach the jury another way: former testimony can impeach a witness as a prior inconsistent statement under Rule 801(d)(1)(A), and former testimony of the opposing party comes in under Rule 801(d)(2) without the foundation the exception demands.3 A later section takes up those routes.
Meaning of Similar Motive
Motive, as Rule 804(b)(1)(B) uses the word, is the reason an examiner had for questioning the witness as the examiner did: what the examiner hoped the testimony would accomplish, given what was in dispute. The Rule does not demand the same motive. It asks whether the party now facing the transcript, or in a civil case that party’s predecessor in interest, had a similar one, so a court holds the two proceedings side by side and compares the examiner’s reasons in the first with the party’s reasons in the second.4
The motive that counts belongs to the opposing party or, in a civil case, its predecessor. A committee note explains the limit: it is generally unfair to make a party answer for how another party handled the witness, and the sole exception is a predecessor in interest who had an opportunity and similar motive to examine the witness in a civil action or proceeding.5
The requirement has loosened from a mechanical comparison of issues. It is “not a mechanical one of identity or even of substantial identity of issues,” but asks whether the issues in the first proceeding, and so the purpose for which the testimony was offered, gave the party an adequate motive to test the testimony’s credibility on cross-examination.6 Issues still matter as evidence of motive. When a first indictment charges robbery and a second charges the murder of the person robbed, the shared transaction is usually enough.7
The Rule’s text never mentions issues or stakes. It requires only that the opportunity and motive to examine were similar in the two proceedings, which may lead to comparative scrutiny of issues or stakes as a practical matter but keeps the approach flexible.8 The issue that carries the comparison is the one the testimony addresses. Not every issue in the earlier proceeding must recur; only the particular issue on which the testimony was first offered must be substantially similar to the issue on which it is now offered, and neither the form of the proceeding, the theory of the case, nor the relief sought need match.9 The more the two issues diverge, the likelier the motive differs. Yet a number of other differing issues does not control: the only issue that matters is the one toward which the former testimony is directed.10
Similar does not mean identical. In Supermarket of Marlinton, Inc. v. Meadow Gold Dairies, Inc., defendants at a criminal trial had questioned a witness named French to show that a price-fixing conspiracy never occurred. His testimony was later offered in a civil trial, where the dairies could try to show either that no conspiracy occurred or that any conspiracy occurred without affirmative acts of concealment. The court called the motives “not identical” but substantially similar. Most price-fixing conspiracies involve affirmative acts of concealment, so showing that the conspiracy never occurred was the dominant motive in each trial.11 The dairies’ extra fallback argument did not break the similarity, because the core attack on the testimony was the same.
The freezer ruling rests on a premise that even the dissent in Salerno, discussed below, accepts. The scope of questioning is limited by the issues in a proceeding, so a party has little motive, and may not be permitted, to ask about other issues, and if those issues later become important the earlier testimony may properly be excluded.12
Two shortcuts lose points. Excluding the whole transcript because the earlier proceeding was an injunction hearing reasons from labels the Rule does not test. Admitting the whole transcript because it came from one witness at one hearing skips the issue-by-issue comparison. The sound sequence identifies the issue on which the testimony is now offered, checks that the earlier testimony addressed substantially the same issue, and asks whether the party had reasons to examine on it that resemble its reasons now.
Stakes and Context
A match on the issue does not end the motive inquiry, because an examiner’s reasons also depend on circumstances that the issue label hides. In Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., the court, drawing on Saltzburg, listed four of them: the type of proceeding in which the testimony was given, trial strategy, the potential penalties or financial stakes, and the number of issues and parties. The court then evaluated both proceedings for the similarity of issues, the purpose for which the testimony is offered, and the context in which it was given.14
Stakes matter because they set how hard a party has reason to press a witness. If the witness’s testimony was unimportant at the prior trial, or the whole suit was unimportant to the party, then using that testimony in a later case where the topic is important, or where losing costs far more, would be unfair.15 The earlier examination is a fair stand-in for today’s only if the earlier stakes gave the party reason to examine as it would now.
The two versions share a witness, an issue, and an opportunity, so the stakes alone move the answer, and the first version fails at the motive clause rather than the opportunity clause. A gap in stakes counts only if it plausibly changed how the earlier party handled the witness. Zenith acknowledged that there may be valid reasons for defending a small claim less vigorously than a large one. It found the Japan Fair Trade Commission (JFTC) proceeding hardly analogous to small claims court, however, and the respondents there appear to have defended themselves quite thoroughly.16 The earlier parties also did not need to know that later litigation would follow, and the later suit’s greater complexity did not affect their motives on the home-market price-fixing issue.17
Added issues and added parties get the same issue-by-issue, party-by-party treatment. The Zenith court limited the testimony narrowly, both in purpose and in the defendants against whom it could be used: only the six defendants who took part in the JFTC proceeding, and only on the home-market price-fixing issue. Because the testimony would be used so narrowly, the additional issues and parties in the later case had no bearing on the similarity of motive as the testimony would be offered. Additional issues on which the testimony is not offered “are of no consequence,” and the presence of other defendants could not affect the motives of the six.18 The same comparison governs criminal cases.19 See United States v. Licavoli; United States v. Atkins.
What the earlier examiners had reason to ask can matter more than the size of the stakes. In Lohrmann v. Pittsburgh Corning Corp., the cross-examination of a witness named Gaze in the Tyler, Texas, cases never developed the difference between the state of the art for plant workers handling raw asbestos and for persons working in the vicinity of asbestos products, because that distinction was irrelevant to those cases. The district judge was right to refuse the deposition.20 The earlier examiners had no reason to ask the question that mattered to the later party. Former testimony can come out the other way when the record shows the earlier defendants confronted it on the point now contested. After examining the record in another asbestos case, a court was satisfied that the defendants in the DeRocco case had a similar motive in confronting Dr. Smith’s testimony, through both appropriate objections and searching cross-examination, to Raybestos’s motive in the current litigation.21
Stakes can also decide whether anyone at the earlier proceeding stands in the party’s place. One court refused to admit a deposition against criminal defendants because no one at the deposition had the stake necessary to be treated as their predecessor in interest, and those who did have the stake had no reason to suspect that they should be there.22 The opposing-party requirement, including predecessor status, has its own section below.
Grand Jury Testimony
Grand jury testimony almost never qualifies when the prosecution offers it against the accused. The accused has no representation at the grand jury and no chance to cross-examine, so the opportunity half of the Rule is missing before motive even arises.24 No one on the accused’s side can supply that opportunity either. The predecessor-in-interest alternative applies only in civil cases,25 and the accused’s right to confront adverse witnesses is personal, so cross-examination by someone else does not satisfy it.26
The analysis reverses when the accused offers the transcript against the government. The government questioned the witness, so opportunity is settled and the dispute moves to motive.27 The accused must first show that the witness is unavailable. A declarant who has a privilege against self-incrimination may be viewed as unavailable without being called to the stand for a ruling, and a witness who cannot remember the subject matter of earlier grand jury testimony is unavailable as to that subject.28
United States v. Salerno is the leading case. Two owners of a firm, DeMatteis and Bruno, testified before a grand jury under a grant of immunity and repeatedly said that neither they nor the firm, Cedar Park, had participated in the Club. At trial the government tried to show that Cedar Park belonged to the Club through two contractors who had taken part in the scheme, intercepted conversations among the respondents, and documents suggesting that the Family had an ownership interest in Cedar Park. The owners refused to testify at trial, and the defendants offered their grand jury testimony.29
The district court excluded the transcripts, reasoning that a prosecutor’s motive in questioning a witness before the grand jury in the investigatory stages is “far different” from the motive in conducting the trial.30 The court of appeals reversed. It recognized that the government may have had no motive to impeach the witnesses before the grand jury but held that motive was irrelevant: to maintain “adversarial fairness,” the similar-motive element should “evaporate” when the government obtains immunized grand jury testimony from a witness who refuses to testify at trial.31 The argument has intuitive appeal, and the Supreme Court rejected it anyway.
Congress placed 24 exceptions in Rule 803 and five more in Rule 804, which reflects a careful judgment about what hearsay may come in, so the Court enforced the words Congress enacted. The defendants had no right to introduce the transcripts without showing a similar motive, and a court cannot alter evidentiary rules merely because litigants prefer different rules in a particular class of cases.32 The Court saw no way to read the text to mean that defendants sometimes do not have to show similar motive.33 The same requirements apply as in any other case. Salerno also makes a side point about the Rule’s phrasing: the earlier examination need not technically be cross-examination, so long as it is in an appropriately similar challenging posture.34
Salerno decided less than it might seem. The court of appeals had wrongly concluded that no showing of motive was needed, so it had not fully considered the parties’ arguments about whether the government had one, and the Supreme Court remanded rather than decide them in the first instance.35 The government argued, among other things, that it lacked a similar motive because the issues before the grand jury may differ from the issues that matter at trial.36 The defendants answered that the district court’s ruling was one of law, since it assumed a prosecutor’s motives at trial always differ from those before the grand jury, and that the transcripts showed the government thoroughly attempted to impeach the witnesses.37 The holding is therefore narrow. The accused must make a specific showing that the prosecution’s motive was similar then and now, and the lower court was left to find whether it was.38
Lower courts applying that question have split, and they have rested their results on specific facts about the prosecutor’s incentives.39 One account stresses the grand jury setting. The government faces a relatively low burden of proof at that stage and has little incentive to contest an exculpatory statement if its case is strong and a challenge would reveal still-secret information. A prosecutor may hold back because skewering the witness would give away too much of the case, which can wait for trial.40 At trial any exculpatory testimony could create a reasonable doubt, so the prosecutor has a strong motive to attack it. On this account the two motives are dissimilar in most cases, the exception being where there is some doubt whether an indictment will be obtained.41 The opposing account holds that the commitment to prosecute may already be clear and the challenge to the exculpatory testimony obvious, which yields strong motivation to challenge it before the grand jury.42
In United States v. DiNapoli, which involved the same witnesses, the en banc Second Circuit held that the similar-motive requirement was not met and that the grand jury testimony was properly excluded.43 The record showed that each witness was only briefly cross-examined before the grand jury and confronted with the contents of a publicly disclosed tape, but not with information from undisclosed witnesses or wiretaps.44 The court did not hold that a prosecutor’s silence alone proves a lack of motive. It rejected any implication in an earlier decision that lack of similar motive may be established simply because available questioning was not undertaken.45
The Salerno dissent read the same record the other way. Before the grand jury, it reasoned, the government had precisely the same interest in showing the witnesses’ testimony false as it had at trial, so when prosecutors doubted the witnesses’ veracity, as they assuredly did, they unquestionably had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony.46 The dissent conceded the one circumstance that would change its answer. If the issues before the grand jury differ from those important at trial, the government has little motive, and may not be permitted, to ask about the other issues, and the earlier testimony may properly be excluded.47 The D.C. Circuit has asked the same same-issue question. In United States v. Miller, prior grand jury testimony was admissible against the government because the government had the same motive and opportunity to question the witness before the grand jury as at trial, where the testimony was directed to the same issue, the defendants’ guilt or innocence.48 Commentary frames the test the same way: only the issue toward which the testimony is directed matters, and the greater the divergence of issues, the likelier the similar motive is lacking.49
Two instincts cost points on an exam. Admitting the transcript because it seems unfair for the government to immunize a witness and then object revives the adversarial-fairness theory that Salerno rejected. Excluding it because grand jury questioning always differs from trial questioning turns a question of fact into a categorical rule, the move the defendants attacked in Salerno as a ruling of law.50 The proponent, here the accused, must make a specific showing that the prosecution’s motive before the grand jury resembled its motive at trial, and that showing is built from the record of the earlier session.51