Concept
Confrontation Clause Limits
Statements against interest
Confrontation Clause Limits
Rule 804(b)(3) admits a statement that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would have made only if believing it true, because when made it was so contrary to the declarant's proprietary or pecuniary interest, or so likely to invalidate his claim against someone else or expose him to civil or criminal liability.1 That test answers a hearsay objection and nothing more. When the prosecution offers an unavailable accomplice's statement against the accused, the Sixth Amendment poses a second, independent question, and Williamson v. United States kept the two apart. Having read the exception to reach only genuinely self-inculpatory remarks, the Court declined to decide whether the statements were also barred by the Confrontation Clause, including whether the exception is "firmly rooted" for constitutional purposes.2 It added that genuine self-inculpation is itself one of the "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness" that supports admission under the Clause.3 That remark came before Crawford v. Washington, and Crawford changed the constitutional inquiry.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees an accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."4 Under Crawford, decided in 2004, the question for hearsay is whether the statement is "testimonial" in nature. A testimonial statement is inadmissible unless the declarant is available for cross-examination or, if unavailable, the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine him. Statements to police officers during interrogations about criminal activity are testimonial.5
That shift explains how the Clause can defeat a statement that fits the exception. The exception relies on the declarant's self-interest to vouch for what he said. The Clause relies on the accused's chance to test his accuser. A statement can satisfy the first and fail the second, and the Clause therefore removes statements the exception would admit. It never works in the other direction: a nontestimonial statement that fails the exception stays out as hearsay.
The overlay bites hardest on custodial accomplice statements. A statement made during police interrogation, or the grand jury testimony of another participant in the crime, is testimonial, so it is inadmissible against the accused when he had no chance to cross-examine the declarant.6 Crawford thus eliminated some of the most problematic applications of the exception.7 Ellen's statements in the Harvey illustration show both gates closing at once. She spoke to a law enforcement official after agreeing to testify against Harvey, so she may have been currying favor and shifting most of the blame to him, which fails the Williamson analysis.8 Her statements also violate the Clause, because a statement to law enforcement that implicates the accused is testimonial.9
The two failures are not a coincidence. A codefendant's arrest statements have traditionally been viewed with special suspicion, and a co-criminal may implicate the accused to share or alleviate his own blame or to win prosecutorial or custodial favor.10 Those motives outweigh the against-interest aspect of the parts naming the other person, at least in an official custodial setting, and Crawford makes use of such a statement against the non-maker unconstitutional.11 Sorting a confession remark by remark is a hearsay task. The constitutional question turns on the circumstances in which the statement was made, and those do not change when a court trims individual remarks. Unavailability also does different work at each gate. It opens the hearsay exception, but the Clause still demands a prior opportunity to cross-examine.12
Statements to private listeners fall on the other side of the line. Statements made to private individuals, particularly in an informal setting, generally are not testimonial and so lie outside the concern of the Clause.13 The recognized nontestimonial examples include a declaration against penal interest implicating both the declarant and the defendant, made informally to a friend or loved one, and a letter to a friend admitting criminal activity by the writer and the defendant.14 A statement of that kind is not a statement to law enforcement, and nothing about it invites the Clause. The informality that keeps it outside the Clause also helps it under the exception, since a speaker with no prosecutor to please is not currying favor.
Once the statement is nontestimonial, the exception carries the whole load. A federal court applying Davis reasoned that only testimonial statements make the declarant a "witness" within the meaning of the Clause, so for a nontestimonial statement Rule 804(b)(3) determines admissibility, subject to Rule 403's balancing test.15 The Clause then permits admission even if the statement lacks indicia of reliability, and the only pertinent question is whether it meets the requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence.16 In a criminal case, one of those requirements is that a statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability be supported by corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate its trustworthiness.17
Failure at either gate keeps the statement out against the accused. A statement that fails the exception is excluded however nontestimonial it is, because escaping the Clause does not satisfy the hearsay rule.18 The Clause also speaks of witnesses "against" the accused, so a third party's confession that the defendant offers to clear himself raises no confrontation question. Only the exception and its corroboration requirement govern.19