Concept
Credit Ratings and Close Cases
Market reports and similar commercial publications
Credit Ratings and Close Cases
Credit ratings test the market report exception at its edge. Rule 803(17) reaches "[m]arket quotations, lists, directories, or other compilations that are generally relied on by the public or by persons in particular occupations," and a credit report seems to fit that sentence.1 A rating service reports a business's payment history and financial standing to subscribers, and lenders and suppliers consult those reports before extending credit. The reliance condition looks satisfied. Yet the accepted view is hesitant: credit ratings fall within the literal wording of the exception and are widely relied on by lenders, but whether the exception really reaches them is harder to say.2 A document can match the words of a rule and still strain the reason behind it.
The strain shows up in what the rule asks of a publication. Its reliability must be established, which demonstrates that professionals in the field view it as trustworthy, and either party's expert or judicial notice can establish authoritativeness.3 Credit reports make that showing awkward because they overinclude unchecked information.4 A lender may rely on a service for its convenience and comprehensiveness without anyone having tested each entry. Heavy reliance then tells a court less about accuracy, and courts are less sure that the reason for trusting such compilations applies.
The reported examples show courts working through that doubt case by case. They do not declare credit reports always in or always out. In United States v. Beecroft, a Ninth Circuit decision from 1979, the court admitted a Dun & Bradstreet report under the business-records exception as proof of information available to the defendant.5 A Kansas decision from 1969, Phillip Van Heusen, Inc. v. Korn, sorted such reports by the party they were offered against. It held Dun & Bradstreet reports inadmissible against third parties but admissible against the person whose own statements appear in them.6
The two decisions turn on different variables. Beecroft changed the exception and the purpose; Van Heusen looked at the target of the evidence. Each choice answers the unchecked-content problem. Against the person whose own words the report records, the worry has little force, because the report repeats what that person said. Against an outsider, the report asserts facts about someone else on the strength of sources nobody tested. A purpose such as showing what information was available may also escape the problem, because the point is what could have been learned, not whether each entry was accurate.
One credit report can be tested three ways in a single collection suit, and the answers can differ.
The report is identical in all three scenes, so the outcome follows from what it is offered to prove and against whom. Two instincts mislead. The first treats lender reliance as the end of the analysis. Reliance is one condition of the rule, but when the contents are largely unverified it does not settle admissibility. The second treats the weak rationale as a bar. Credit reports are not inadmissible in every case, as the admissions above show. The business-records route in Beecroft adds a practical point: a document can be tested under more than one exception, so a failure under Rule 803(17) leaves the other doors open.