Concept
Confrontation Clause Overlay
Declarant unavailable as a witness
Confrontation Clause Overlay
A prosecutor can satisfy every requirement of Rule 804 and still lose the statement. Rule 804(a) defines unavailability for the evidence rules,1 and a proponent who meets one of its grounds has cleared the first step toward every exception in Rule 804(b).2 But when the prosecution offers hearsay against a criminal defendant, the Sixth Amendment adds conditions that the Rules of Evidence do not contain. Unavailability remains a gate, and it takes on a constitutional meaning beside its evidentiary one.
The Clause promises that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”3 It restrains the party that brings the charge. A civil litigant who offers hearsay is outside it, and so is an accused who offers a statement in the defense case, because neither is using the statement against a defendant. Only when the prosecution offers the statement against the accused does the analysis run on two tracks, and the statement must then pass both.4
The two tracks ask related questions in different terms. Rule 804(a) asks whether one of its listed grounds makes the declarant’s testimony unobtainable. The constitutional standard asks what the prosecution did to obtain the witness and, for one class of statements, whether the accused ever had a chance to cross-examine the declarant. The first subsection below takes up the constitutional standard of unavailability, and the second takes up the rule for testimonial statements. On an exam, a stem in which the prosecution offers an absent witness’s statement against an accused calls for the second track even after Rule 804(a) and an exception are met, and stopping at Rule 804 is the usual error.
Good-Faith Effort Standard
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court read the Sixth Amendment to establish a rule of necessity, in keeping with the Framers’ preference for face-to-face accusation. In the usual case, even one in which prior cross-examination has occurred, the prosecution must either produce the declarant whose statement it wants to use against the defendant or demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable.5
The measure of constitutional unavailability is the prosecution’s own conduct. Drawing on Barber v. Page, the Court held that a witness is not unavailable for purposes of the exception to the confrontation requirement “unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial.”6 A showing that the prosecution could not compel the witness by subpoena therefore does not end the matter. The Clause requires a good-faith effort that goes beyond that showing, and a court decides whether the government made one case by case, on the particular facts and circumstances, asking whether it tried to locate the witness and to procure attendance by process or by reasonable voluntary means.7
The standard has limits on both sides. The law does not require a futile act, so if no possibility of procuring the witness exists, as with the witness’s intervening death, good faith demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a possibility, even a remote one, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand those measures.8 The ultimate question is whether the witness is unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken before trial to locate and present that witness, and, as with other evidentiary proponents, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that predicate.9
Once the State has made that effort, the Court observed, the witness’s actual presence or absence cannot be constitutionally relevant for purposes of the unavailability exception. The same footnote notes that the hearsay exception itself has generally treated a declarant as unavailable where, through lapse of memory or a plea of the Fifth Amendment privilege, the State cannot secure live testimony.10
Roberts itself shows the standard satisfied. The prosecution tried to reach Anita Isaacs at her parents’ home, but she was not found.11 About a year before trial, a San Francisco social worker, who was dealing with a welfare application Anita had filed, put her parents in touch with her, and they reached her once by telephone. Anita later called her parents only one other time, some seven or eight months before trial, and said only that she “was traveling” outside Ohio, without revealing where she was calling from. Her mother stated that she knew of no way to reach Anita in an emergency and did not know of anybody who knew where she was.12 The trial court admitted the transcript, and the Supreme Court held that the trial court and the Supreme Court of Ohio had correctly concluded that Anita’s unavailability, in the constitutional sense, was established.13
Barber ran the other way. The Court held there that the Confrontation Clause required a state prosecutor, before using at trial the preliminary-hearing testimony of a witness incarcerated in a federal penitentiary in an adjoining state, to take appropriate steps to induce the federal authorities to produce him.14 Roberts drew the line this way: Barber was a case in which the government knew where the absent witness was, whereas Anita’s whereabouts were entirely unknown.15 Distance does not explain the different results, since both witnesses were absent from trial. What differs is what further effort could have accomplished. A request to the federal custodians had a real chance of producing Barber’s witness, while Anita’s parents had no lead to give the prosecution.
When the witness is beyond the reach of process for reasons other than imprisonment, the least that would seem to satisfy the Clause is a request to appear coupled with reimbursement for travel and subsistence expenses.16 Residence outside the trial jurisdiction proves little on its own. A witness who can be located, even in another state, is ordinarily subject to compulsory process under the Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings, so absence from the jurisdiction does not by itself make a witness unavailable.17 A prosecutor who relies on a subpoena the witness evaded, or on an out-of-state address, has shown where the inquiry starts rather than where it ends.
The Court built this unavailability requirement in cases about prior testimony. Barber established the analysis, a line of cases refined it through Roberts, and Roberts cannot fairly be read to demand a showing of unavailability for every out-of-court statement the government offers.18 Roberts is also remembered for a reliability approach that governed from 1980 until 2004. Under it, the Court’s principal way of reconciling the Clause with the hearsay exceptions was to defer to exceptions with the imprimatur of many years of judicial experience, the “firmly rooted” ones.19 Crawford ended that era for testimonial statements. The good-faith effort formulation from Roberts and Barber remains the reference point for what the prosecution must show, and the next subsection turns to what Crawford added.20
Testimonial Statements After Crawford
The second gate comes from Crawford v. Washington. There the Court held that testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial may be admitted only where the declarant is unavailable and only where the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine.22 The holding rests on history. The common law in 1791 conditioned the admissibility of an absent witness’s examination on unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine, and the Sixth Amendment therefore incorporates those limitations, since its text suggests no open-ended exceptions for the courts to develop.23 The prosecution must satisfy both conditions, and meeting one leaves the other untouched.
Crawford displaced an older approach. As the Court later recounted in Williams v. Illinois, the Court had taken the view that the Clause did not bar an out-of-court statement within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, and in Crawford it adopted a fundamentally new interpretation of the confrontation right.24 The objection to the reliability approach is structural: the evidence rule ends up wagging the dog, the accused’s constitutional right, and it is hard to assure that every statement within the exceptions is reliable.25 A Rule 804(b) exception records a judgment that a kind of statement is trustworthy enough to be heard. If that judgment could answer the constitutional objection, the accused’s right would be only as strong as the evidence rules happened to make it.
Because the rule operates independently of the hearsay exceptions, it does not matter whether a testimonial statement fits one. When hearsay is offered against a defendant in a criminal trial, the declarant is unavailable, the statement is testimonial, the defendant had no opportunity to cross-examine, and a hearsay exception applies, the Confrontation Clause makes the evidence inadmissible.26 A statement can therefore satisfy Rule 804(a), fit an exception in Rule 804(b), and still stay away from the jury. The evidence rules ask whether the declarant’s testimony can be obtained and whether the statement fits an exception, while the Clause asks whether the statement is testimonial and, if so, whether the accused ever had the chance to cross-examine the declarant.
Whether a statement is testimonial is the pivotal question after Crawford, because testimonial hearsay is the Clause’s primary object and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class.27 The same history reaches prior trial and preliminary-hearing testimony, which the Court’s cases admit only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.28 Statements at the other end of the spectrum look different. Most of the common-law hearsay exceptions covered statements that by their nature were not testimonial, such as business records and statements in furtherance of a conspiracy.29 The finer points of the definition belong to the Confrontation Clause reading.
The two conditions are tested separately. The cross-examination condition rests on the holding of Mattox v. United States, which the Court’s later cases follow: prior trial or preliminary-hearing testimony is admissible only if the defendant had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine.30 The unavailability condition is the constitutional kind described in the last subsection, measured by the prosecution’s good-faith effort.31 Failing either condition bars a testimonial statement.
| Declarant constitutionally unavailable? | Prior opportunity to cross-examine? | Result for a testimonial statement |
|---|---|---|
| Yes | Yes | The Clause is satisfied, and the hearsay rules still apply |
| Yes | No | Barred, even if a Rule 804(b) exception fits |
| No | Yes | Barred until the prosecution shows good-faith effort |
| No | No | Barred |
A defendant who deliberately makes a witness unavailable forfeits the confrontation objection as to that witness. The doctrine traces to Reynolds v. United States, but the Court has refused to widen it. It rejected a proposed exception that was not established at the founding or since, because American courts never invoked forfeiture before 1985 outside the context of deliberate witness tampering. Every commentator the Court found concluded that the intent requirement “means that the exception applies only if the defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness unavailable.”32 A defendant whose conduct merely happened to end a witness’s availability, with no aim of silencing the witness, therefore keeps the objection.
Rule 804(a) contains a mirror-image limit for proponents. A declarant cannot be found unavailable if the proponent procured or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability in order to prevent the declarant from attending or testifying.33 The provision recognizes that a party may prefer hearsay to the testimony of a declarant who is actually available, perhaps because the declarant will not communicate well on the stand or may say something inconsistent, and it denies the party the hearsay when the party acts on that incentive by making the witness unavailable.34 The two provisions face opposite parties. Rule 804(a) disables the proponent who engineered the gap, and forfeiture disables the accused who engineered it.
Steps two and four add the new work relative to Rule 804, step three restates unavailability in the Clause’s own terms, and step five is the accused’s counterpart to the closing sentence of Rule 804(a). A stem in which the prosecution offers a police interview, or prior testimony, of an absent witness against the accused calls for this second inquiry. A stem in which the accused offers the statement, or one set in a civil case, does not.