Concept
Statements About Oneself
Statement of personal or family history
Statements About Oneself
Subdivision (A) of Rule 804(b)(4) is the easier half of the exception. It admits an unavailable declarant's statement about "the declarant's own birth, adoption, legitimacy, ancestry, marriage, divorce, relationship by blood, adoption, or marriage, or similar facts of personal or family history," and it applies "even though the declarant had no way of acquiring personal knowledge about that fact."1 The word own does the sorting. When the declarant is the person whose history the statement describes, (A) is available; when the declarant describes someone else, it is not. Because (A) sits inside Rule 804(b), the declarant must first be unavailable under Rule 804(a), and this section assumes that gate has been cleared.
The exception descends from one of the oldest in the law of hearsay, which admitted statements about family history: dates and places of birth and death, and facts of marriage, descent, and relationship. Under the traditional rule, declarations were admissible when made by the person whose family situation was at issue, and also by other members of the family.2 Subdivision (A) keeps the plainest of those cases, in which the person whose own family situation is at issue speaks for himself or herself.
The dispensation from personal knowledge matters because no one can observe his or her own birth. A declarant often reports what a relative told him, and the exception applies anyway.3 Suppose a deceased woman told a friend that her mother had told her she was born in West Virginia. She conveys what she was told, not what she saw, and the statement still fits (A) because it concerns her own birth. The traditional rule likewise did not require firsthand knowledge of the facts of birth, death, kinship, or the like.4 The exception rests on the assumption that the speaker has adequate information, even when that information arrived secondhand.5
The same line between self and others governs the foundation a proponent must lay. When a statement is offered to prove facts about people other than the speaker, courts may require independent evidence that the speaker belongs to the family or is an intimate of it. When the statement is offered to prove facts about the speaker, such as her marriage, children, or parents, other proof of the relationship is probably not required.6 The traditional rule drew the same line. It demanded independent proof of the declarant's relationship to the family, except where the declarant's own family relationships were the subject of the statement.7 When the declarant is the subject, the declarant's status already supplies the connection to the facts. Statements about other people, where the showing does matter, come up in the sections on subdivision (B).
Two limits must both be met. The fact has to be one of the kind the provision lists, or a similar fact of personal or family history, and it has to be the declarant's own. Harlan's statement met both. Marguerite's named the right kind of fact but attached it to Dev, so (A) does not reach it. She is not necessarily out of luck, because subdivision (B) admits a statement about another person's facts if the declarant was related to that person by blood, adoption, or marriage or was so intimately associated with the person's family that the declarant's information is likely to be accurate.8 A coworker is neither without more, and the next section takes up what (B) demands. Exam stems exploit this gap. They plant the word marriage or divorce in a statement about a third person and count on the student to match the fact against the list without asking whose life the statement describes.
The first step does most of the sorting. Harlan's statement passes it and clears the rest, while Marguerite's statement about Dev fails it and is redirected to (B) before the fact itself is examined. The third step is a reminder that a declarant's inability to have watched the event, as with an infant's own birth or adoption, never defeats a statement that fits (A).