Concept
Elements of Forfeiture
Forfeiture by wrongdoing
Elements of Forfeiture
Rule 804(b)(6) packs three requirements into one sentence. It admits a statement “offered against a party that wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability as a witness, and did so intending that result.”1 In United States v. Gray, the court of appeals unpacked that language into three findings that the district court must make by a preponderance of the evidence, meaning that each must be more likely true than not: the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing; the wrongdoing was intended to render the declarant unavailable as a witness; and it did, in fact, render the declarant unavailable.2
Some treatments state the same test in four parts: the party, directly or through others, must have engaged or acquiesced in conduct that was wrongful, with the intent of producing the declarant’s unavailability, which was thereby procured.3 The four-part version separates the act from its wrongfulness and otherwise matches the three-part one. Each requirement blocks a different misfire. Without wrongful conduct attributable to the party, the objection would be lost for events the party had no hand in. Without intent, a party whose conduct happened to keep a witness away would forfeit a right the party never meant to defeat. And without actual unavailability, a failed attempt would strip away an objection that still protects a real chance to cross-examine a witness who is in the courtroom.
Courts read the requirements generously in light of the rule’s purpose, finding a party’s involvement readily and relying freely on circumstantial evidence of both intent and responsibility.4 The generosity stops short of automatic admission. Showing that the party made the declarant unavailable through wrongful acts, even by killing the declarant, does not alone satisfy the rule, because the exception does not automatically admit a murder victim’s statements against the accused murderer.5
The subsections below take the findings in turn: what counts as wrongful conduct, whose wrongdoing counts against the party, why purpose matters and how courts infer it, and what it means to cause unavailability.
Wrongful Conduct
The first finding asks whether the party’s conduct was wrongful. Rule 804(b)(6) reaches a party that “wrongfully caused—or acquiesced in wrongfully causing—the declarant’s unavailability,” so conduct that merely preceded or contributed to a witness’s absence is not enough; the way the party brought the absence about must itself have been wrongful.6 Forfeiture strips the party of the right to insist that a hearsay statement stay out, and the justification is the party’s own misbehavior: it would be unfair to let a party object that the witness is not testifying when that party is the reason the witness is not testifying.7 Where the party’s conduct was proper, no misbehavior exists and the objection survives.
The text requires wrongful conduct, not criminal conduct. A Franklin court applying Franklin Rule 804(b)(6) stated that the conduct causing the unavailability must be wrongful but need not be criminal,8 and the general account of the federal rule agrees that the conduct need not rise to the level of criminal activity.9 The distinction matters because a witness can be kept out of court by pressure that no prosecutor would charge, and the factfinder loses the live witness just as surely as it does after a crime. A criminality requirement would also make the hearsay objection turn on how a given jurisdiction happens to define offenses.
The paradigm cases are familiar: a party who has a witness killed, who bribes the witness, or who convinces the witness not to come has acted wrongfully.10 Each method leaves the declarant in a condition Rule 804(a) already recognizes—death, a refusal to testify despite a court order, or an absence the proponent cannot cure by process or other reasonable means.11 That match is why the wrongdoing finding is usually easy in violence cases and becomes contestable only as the conduct moves away from the paradigms.
Courts have not confined wrongdoing to the paradigms. Gray observed that federal courts construe the elements of the exception broadly to serve its purpose, and it collected authority treating “any significant interference” with the declarant’s appearance as a witness, including the exercise of “persuasion and control” or an instruction to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, as wrongdoing.12 The breadth tracks the exception’s design. A definition limited to violence and bribery would invite a party with influence over a witness to pick a method that stays inside the gap, so the standard asks what the party did to the witness’s appearance and does not ask whether the act appears on a list of forbidden ones.
When no one induced the absence, there is nothing wrongful to forfeit. A witness who takes a job overseas, or who simply dreads the courtroom, has acted on a decision of her own, and a party who never spoke to, paid, or pressured her has done nothing for the rule to answer. The unavailability may be real, but without wrongful conduct by the party the hearsay objection stays in place.
A lawful act can supply the wrongdoing, but only through the purpose behind it. A Franklin court considered whether a defendant charged with theft had wrongfully caused his wife’s unavailability by marrying her, and it held the finding of wrongful causation erroneous.13 Such a finding, the court explained, must be rooted in facts establishing that a significant motivation for the marriage was to prevent the spouse from testifying, and here the couple had been engaged and had set a wedding date when the theft occurred, so the marriage appeared to follow the normal course of events.14 A court’s ruling that a privilege applies makes the declarant unavailable,15 so a spousal privilege can clear the unavailability threshold, and the remaining question is whether the defendant wrongfully caused it. Marriage is lawful and ordinary, so the act alone shows no wrong; it becomes wrongful only when used as a device to remove a witness. A marriage arranged within days of a witness’s statement to police, with no earlier plans, could support the finding the court demanded. The overlap with the intent finding is deliberate, and the sections on purpose take it up in detail.
One borderline question remains open. The sources identify, without resolving, the difficulty of deciding whether conversations between a witness and a party, or the party’s lawyer, about the desirability or possibility of the witness not testifying or of pleading privilege count as “wrongdoing.”16 Gray collected authority treating “persuasion and control,” or an instruction to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, as wrongdoing, which suggests that the closer a conversation comes to direction or pressure, the stronger the case for wrongdoing.17 Facts in that zone call for an answer that names both readings and argues from how far the party’s words went beyond information into pressure.
Acquiescence and Conspiracy
Rule 804(b)(6) applies to a party that “wrongfully caused” the declarant’s unavailability or “acquiesced in wrongfully causing” it, so a party who never laid a hand on the witness can still forfeit the objection.20 A party can engage in wrongdoing through others, as by ordering or paying for it, or can acquiesce by going along with it, and courts ask whether the party, directly or through others, engaged in or acquiesced in wrongful conduct.21 Acquiescence in the wrongdoing is sufficient under the rule’s terms.22
The reason for reaching beyond personal acts lies in who gains from the silence. The rule rests on the policy that a party should not profit by excluding hearsay that is necessary only because the party made it impossible to produce the declarant.23 A party gains equally whether a threat is delivered by the party or by an employee, and a party with money or subordinates can easily arrange for someone else to deliver it. If forfeiture applied only to personal acts, delegation would become the standard method: the party would keep clean hands, the witness would disappear, and the hearsay objection would remain available to exclude what the witness had said. The rule follows responsibility for the absence wherever it leads.
Acquiescence still demands participation in producing the absence. Both verbs in the rule describe what the party did to bring the absence about, so a party who merely profits from a witness’s disappearance, without having directed, funded, or agreed to it, has not caused the absence in the sense the rule uses.
The two scenes differ in the party’s involvement: in the first an order set the wrongdoing in motion, and in the second the defendant had no part in it. Acquiescence also settles only who acted. The rule still requires that the wrongdoing was intended to make the declarant unavailable, so a party who agrees to violence for some unrelated reason has not forfeited the objection merely because the victim later turns out to have been a witness.
Conspiracy supplies a second route for attributing another person’s wrongdoing to a party, and it is the route most easily overextended. If one or more members of a conspiracy successfully engage in wrongdoing intended to make a declarant unavailable, all the conspirators lose the right to object to the declarant’s statements, but only when the wrongdoing was a reasonably foreseeable object of the conspiracy and occurred during and in furtherance of it.24 United States v. Cherry, as the Gray court described it, went this far: the declarant’s statements may be admitted against a person who participated in a conspiracy to silence the declarant even though that person did not himself intimidate any witness or engage in other wrongdoing.25
Each condition does separate work. The in-furtherance condition ties the act to the conspiracy’s shared aims, and foreseeability keeps a member from answering for an act that has nothing to do with what the conspiracy set out to do. An answer that says every conspirator loses the objection whenever any conspirator silences a witness skips both conditions.
Both scenes involve one member killing a person who had given a statement about the group, and the answer turns on the link between the act and the group’s purposes. Conspiracy attributes wrongdoing that serves the venture, and a member’s private act stays the member’s own.
Purpose, Not Mere Knowledge
Rule 804(b)(6) ends with a purpose requirement: the party must have caused the unavailability “and did so intending that result.”29 The wrongdoing must have been aimed at keeping the declarant from testifying, and causing the absence does not satisfy the clause by itself. Describing the federal rule in Giles v. California, the Supreme Court called it a rule “which codifies the forfeiture doctrine” and said it applies only when the defendant engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing “intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.”30
Causing an absence and intending it are different findings. A killing causes death, and death is a recognized form of unavailability under Rule 804(a), so the unavailability gate opens whenever the party’s act ends the declarant’s life.31 The forfeiture question lies beyond that gate: did the party act for the purpose of producing the absence? The Court noted that every commentator it knew of reads the intent requirement to mean that the exception “applies only if the defendant has in mind the particular purpose of making the witness unavailable,” and it rejected the dissent’s claim that knowledge is enough to show intent as “emphatically not the modern view.”32 A party who knows that wrongful conduct will silence a witness, but acts for some other reason, falls outside the rule.
Giles arose from a murder prosecution in which the victim’s earlier statements, which inculpated the defendant, were offered against him.33 The State argued that a defendant who commits some act of wrongdoing that renders a witness unavailable forfeits his confrontation objection, whatever his reason for acting.34 The Court found no historical support for that rule. If it had a pedigree in the common law or in Reynolds v. United States, one would expect it to have been routinely invoked in murder prosecutions where the victim’s statements inculpated the defendant, and it never was.35 In cases where the evidence suggested that the defendant caused an absence but not to prevent testimony, as in the typical murder case with accusatory statements from the victim, the testimony was excluded unless it was confronted or fell within the dying-declaration exception.36
The cases that did apply forfeiture look different on exactly the point of purpose. In Reynolds, testimony suggested that the defendant had kept his wife away from home so that she could not be subpoenaed, and the trial court let the government use her testimony from the defendant’s earlier trial.37 In an English case, an agent of the defendant tried to bribe a witness, who later disappeared, and the court allowed the witness’s earlier statements before the coroner to be read.38 In each, the defendant acted because of the witness’s testimony. A defendant who kills a declarant because he did not like him, or because he was burned by him in a drug deal, has not forfeited the hearsay objection, because nothing in those motives concerns testimony.39
The dissent in Giles took the other view, and it deserves a fair statement. As the majority described it, the dissent argued that a defendant could contrive a murder without any purpose of keeping the victim away from trial, and it read the old phrase “by means or procurement” as possibly reaching an absence the defendant caused as well as one the defendant desired.40 The dissent also treated knowledge as enough to show intent.41 A knowledge standard has some appeal, because a defendant who kills a known witness gains the same advantage as one who kills to silence the witness. The majority answered that the “wrong” and the “evil Practices” to which the early statements of the principle referred was conduct designed to prevent a witness from testifying, that the absence of a forfeiture rule for that conduct would create an intolerable incentive to bribe, intimidate, or even kill witnesses, and that courts’ refusal to carry the rationale further was nothing mysterious.42
The purpose requirement does two jobs. It ties the penalty to the evil the rule targets, because forfeiting the right to challenge hearsay fits the crime of making the witness unavailable so that the adversary is forced to use hearsay.43 It also keeps the admissibility ruling from becoming a ruling on guilt. If any act that made the declarant unavailable were enough, a victim’s statements would come in at a murder trial whenever the judge concluded the defendant probably committed the killing, which is the very question the jury must decide. The Court voiced the same concern in rejecting the State’s broader rule: the notion that a judge may strip a defendant of a right the Constitution deems essential to a fair trial, on the basis of a prior judicial assessment that the defendant is guilty as charged, is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.44
A common error is to argue that a defendant forfeits the objection simply by committing the killing for which he is on trial. That argument skips the finding that carries the rule, which is whether the defendant acted to keep the victim off the stand. The narrow reading, which Giles endorsed, recognizes that a party may kill a witness in a bar fight, knowing that the witness could not then testify, without having killed for the purpose of preventing the testimony.45 The court must find purpose by a preponderance of the evidence.46 A prosecutor, whose interest in a prosecution “is not that he shall win a case, but that justice shall be done,” should be able to point to proof of it and should not rest on the gravity of the charge.47 Courts may infer purpose from circumstances, and the next section takes up how.
Inferring Intent
Because Rule 804(b)(6) reaches a party that caused the declarant’s unavailability “and did so intending that result,” the proponent must prove what the party was trying to accomplish.50 Direct proof of a state of mind is rare, and a party who silences a witness has every reason to conceal the purpose. The party need not announce it, because the intent to render a witness unavailable can be inferred from wrongful activity.51 A rule demanding direct proof would fail in the very cases it was written for, since the party with the most to gain from a witness’s silence has the most reason never to say so. Courts therefore freely accept circumstantial evidence of intent and responsibility, though they still require a showing of intent and do not treat the wrongful act of killing a witness as enough by itself.52
The most common circumstantial proof joins timing with knowledge. In Gray, the district court found that Robert Gray was killed before a scheduled court date and after the defendant was well aware of his status as a witness, and it inferred that the killing was motivated by a wish to keep him from being available at the proceedings. The court of appeals held those findings supported by the evidence and sufficient to warrant applying Rule 804(b)(6).53 Each fact carries part of the inference. A killing that precedes a court date could be coincidence, but a killing that follows the defendant’s learning that the victim will speak, and that precedes the date on which the victim would have spoken, leaves silencing as the most natural explanation for when it occurred. Knowledge works here as evidence of purpose and does not replace it, since a party who merely knows that wrongdoing will silence a witness has not necessarily acted to silence the witness. The inference is persuasive when the surrounding facts make purpose the likeliest reason for the act, and it weakens when another explanation fits the same facts equally well.
The intent the rule requires need not be the party’s only reason for acting. The same court has held that a defendant need only intend “in part” to procure the declarant’s unavailability.54 A sole-purpose requirement would invite an obvious defense, because people seldom act for a single reason and nearly every party who silences a witness could point to a second motive. The limit is that silencing must be a genuine part of the motive: the intent requirement confines the exception to cases in which the defendant intended, at least in part, to render the declarant unavailable as a witness against him, and without that intent the rule has no application.55
Domestic violence supplies a second setting in which intent is shown by inference, and the evidence often lies in the history of the relationship rather than in the days before the killing. Giles was a murder prosecution in which the state courts treated the defendant’s intent as irrelevant under their view of the forfeiture doctrine, so no one had examined it.56 The Supreme Court observed that acts of domestic violence are often intended to dissuade a victim from resorting to outside help, so that prior abuse or threats of abuse aimed at that end would be highly relevant to the intent behind a later act causing the witness’s absence, as would evidence of ongoing criminal proceedings at which the victim would have been expected to testify.57 A concurring opinion explained why the inference is natural. The classic abusive relationship is meant to isolate the victim from outside help, including law enforcement and the judicial process, so the intent element would normally be satisfied by the intent inferred from such a relationship, and it would make no sense to suppose that the abuser abandoned the dynamics of abuse the instant before killing the victim in a fit of anger.58
Two cautions keep this inference within bounds. Giles did not decide that intent was present on its facts; the Court vacated the judgment and left the state courts free to consider intent on remand.59 And the inference rests on evidence of a continuing relationship of the kind the concurrence describes, which the proponent must supply, because a proponent who offers only the killing has offered the bare wrongful act that never suffices.60
The Franklin marriage case shows what happens when the surrounding facts point away from silencing the witness. The court held that a finding of wrongful causation must be rooted in facts establishing that a significant motivation for the marriage was to prevent the spouse from testifying, and it found no such evidence, because the defendant and his wife were engaged, with a wedding date set, when the theft occurred.61 The marriage followed in the normal course, so any privilege that kept her from testifying was a consequence of the marriage and not its purpose. Timing points both ways across the cases. In Gray, the killing came after the defendant learned of the witness’s role and before the court date, which fit a plan to silence.62 In the marriage case, the plan to marry predated the crime, and nothing showed that preventing her testimony was the reason for it.63 The phrases “significant motivation” and “in part” describe one standard: a mixed motive is enough when the silencing motive is real, and an incidental benefit that merely followed from the act is not.
Causing the Unavailability
Rule 804(b)(6) reaches a statement offered against a party that wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, “the declarant’s unavailability as a witness,” and the verb in that phrase makes causation a requirement of its own, separate from wrongdoing and intent.66 Gray states it as the third of three findings the district court must make by a preponderance of the evidence: that the wrongdoing “did, in fact, render the declarant unavailable as a witness.”67 The first two findings concern what the party did and why. The third concerns what the conduct accomplished, and a court that found bad acts and a bad motive without asking whether the witness is actually missing because of them would have skipped the step that connects the party’s conduct to the evidentiary problem.
The reason for insisting on an actual effect comes from what forfeiture repairs. A hearsay objection is, at bottom, an objection that the witness is not here testifying, and the exception strips it only from a party who is the reason the witness is not here.68 When the declarant is present and able to testify, no such deprivation has occurred, cross-examination remains available, and the objection still does the job it was built for. Taking it away would punish the party without compensating for any lost testimony. The causation requirement also separates the failed attempt from the successful one. An unsuccessful effort may be wrongful, but it created no need for hearsay, and the exception’s remedy is tied to that need.
The usual mistake is to treat the party’s wrongful effort as though it were the party’s wrongful result.
The wrongful offer and the purpose behind it were complete in that scene, yet Rule 804(a) recognizes no form of unavailability that fits a witness who is in the courtroom answering questions.69 Unavailability from an unrelated cause fails from the opposite direction. A witness who dies of an illness that no party had anything to do with is unavailable, because death is one of the listed conditions,70 but no wrongdoing produced the death, so the hearsay objection survives. In the bribe scene the wrongdoing exists without the unavailability, and in the illness scene the unavailability exists without the wrongdoing. The exception requires both, joined as cause and effect.
The refusal in that scene is the condition Rule 804(a)(2) describes, and the threat is what produced it, so the causal finding is met.71 The same causal question runs through every form of unavailability that Rule 804(a) lists, which is why forfeiture builds on the criteria reviewed earlier and does not replace them. A killing produces the death that Rule 804(a)(4) recognizes, and a threat or payment can produce a refusal despite a court order or a claimed lack of memory under Rule 804(a)(2) and (3).72 A witness who has been hidden or paid to leave can produce an absence that the proponent cannot cure by process or other reasonable means, and for forfeiture the proponent need show only that the declarant’s attendance could not be procured.73 In each form the proponent must tie the party’s conduct to the particular condition, because showing that the condition exists establishes only unavailability.
Privilege is the form of unavailability in which causation is easiest to overlook, because the party’s conduct may be an ordinary lawful act. Under Rule 804(a)(1), a declarant is unavailable when the court rules that a privilege exempts the declarant from testifying about the subject matter of the statement.74 Franklin’s spousal privilege shows how conduct can produce that ruling. One spouse cannot be compelled to testify against a spouse who is a criminal defendant, only the accused may claim the privilege, and the spouses must be married when it is asserted, so an ex-spouse can be compelled to testify.75 Those features place the privilege in the defendant’s hands. A defendant who marries a witness and then invokes the privilege has supplied every link between the conduct and the court’s ruling, so the causal connection between the marriage and the unavailability exists. Whether it carries forfeiture depends on whether the marriage was wrongful and aimed at silencing the witness, which is the purpose analysis in the preceding sections. A defendant whose marriage to the witness is of long standing and has nothing to do with the case also gains the privilege, and the witness is unavailable under Rule 804(a)(1), but no wrongdoing produced the privilege, so nothing is forfeited.