Concept
Proving Forfeiture
Forfeiture by wrongdoing
Proving Forfeiture
Rule 804(b)(6) admits a statement offered against a party who wrongfully caused, or acquiesced in wrongfully causing, the declarant's unavailability, intending that result, and every part of that description can be disputed.1 A defendant accused of silencing a witness will usually deny it, so a factual dispute must be settled before the statement comes in. The judge settles it. Forfeiture is a condition of admissibility, which makes it a preliminary question under Rule 104(a), and the judge, not the jury, decides it.2 The judge must find three things: that the party engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing, that the wrongdoing was intended to make the declarant unavailable as a witness, and that it did make the declarant unavailable.3 The government must prove each by a preponderance of the evidence.4
The question belongs to the judge because it controls what the jury will hear. Jurors who resolved it would hear the claim that the defendant had a witness killed while still deciding whether to consider the witness's statement at all, and they would hear that claim whether or not anyone had proved it. The usual procedure avoids that exposure. The court holds a hearing outside the jury's presence and takes evidence on why the declarant is unavailable.5
The standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence: each finding must be more likely true than not. Rule 104(a) sets that standard for preliminary facts generally, and it governs these findings too.6 In Davis v. Washington, the Supreme Court took no position on the standard the Constitution requires, but it observed that federal courts applying Rule 804(b)(6) have generally held the government to a preponderance.7 The lower courts have applied that standard consistently, and it is the appropriate one.8 The Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Thevis, required clear and convincing evidence of the predicate facts.9 The lower burden suits the problem. A party who silences a witness works to leave no trace, and a heavier burden would give the best-concealed wrongdoing the best chance of preserving the hearsay objection.
Of the three findings, intent confines the exception most tightly. The exception reaches only cases in which the party intended, at least in part, to make the declarant unavailable as a witness against him, and without that intent Rule 804(b)(6) has no application.10 Proof that the party's conduct was wrongful, or even that it removed the declarant, therefore falls short unless the evidence also connects the conduct to the aim of keeping the declarant off the stand.
At the hearing, the judge is not bound by the rules of evidence except those governing privilege.11 That freedom extends to hearsay. Davis, drawing on a state-court decision, noted that when a forfeiture hearing is required, hearsay, including the unavailable witness's own out-of-court statements, may be considered.12 The reason lies in the structure of the inquiry. The hearing asks whether certain evidence is admissible, so confining the judge to admissible evidence would apply the hearsay rule in order to decide whether the hearsay rule applies. Evidence that a party intimidated or killed a witness also tends to arrive secondhand, as what the witness told a relative before dying or what an associate reported about a threat. Privilege alone keeps its force.
A separate hearing is not always necessary. A district court need not hold an independent evidentiary hearing when it can make the requisite findings from evidence presented in the course of the trial.13 If the government's trial evidence of threats, payments, or the killing already lets the judge find wrongdoing, intent, and causation, a second round of testimony would repeat what the court has heard. A contested record that the trial evidence leaves unsettled is the case that calls for a hearing outside the jury's presence.
The forfeiture ruling decides admissibility and nothing more, even when the facts the judge finds overlap with facts the jury will decide. The rule contemplates that a determination that may overlap with a jury issue will still be decided by the trial judge without jury involvement.14 The overlap is greatest when the defendant is on trial for killing the very witness whose statement is offered. Concurring in part in Giles v. California, Justice Souter observed that without an intent requirement, the only thing separating the admissibility ruling from the liability determination would be the distinct functions of judge and jury: the judge would find by a preponderance that the defendant killed, and so would admit the testimonial statement, while the jury could so find only on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.15 That separation, he added, is not enough alone, because equity demands more before the right to confrontation is forfeited, and showing intent to prevent the witness from testifying supplies it.16
An exam answer that treats the judge's forfeiture finding as a verdict confuses two questions that carry different burdens and are answered by different decision-makers. The judge asks whether the facts that make the statement admissible are more likely true than not; the jury asks whether the elements of the crime are proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Keeping the two apart lets an answer find forfeiture and still ask whether the jury will convict.