Concept
More Probative Than Other Evidence
Residual hearsay exception and notice
More Probative Than Other Evidence
A reliable statement is still not enough under the residual exception. Rule 807(a)(2) adds a second condition: the statement must be “more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts.”1 Probative value is the strength with which an item of evidence tends to prove the fact it is offered to prove, so the rule sets up a contest. The judge identifies the point the hearsay is meant to establish, lines up the other proof the proponent could produce on that point, and asks whether the hearsay beats all of it. A trustworthy statement that is no stronger than a witness the proponent could simply call loses.
The two conditions answer different questions. Rule 807(a)(1) asks whether the statement is reliable; Rule 807(a)(2) asks whether the factfinder needs it. Many courts read the second condition as a general necessity requirement, and it operates as a rough “best evidence” rule: where the declarant's live testimony is available and the out-of-court statement is not superior, the exception cannot be used.2 Without that limit, a proponent could trade live testimony or a better document for a convenient out-of-court account whenever the account looked reliable, and the exception would swallow the rule against hearsay.
Two limits keep the comparison from being overstated. The hearsay need not be essential, because the rule asks for comparative superiority, and some courts treat it as a way to weigh the need for the statement against the cost of obtaining other evidence.3 Nor must the declarant be unavailable, since the residual exception may be invoked whether the declarant is available or not.4 The second limit is the phrase “through reasonable efforts.” A test that measured the statement against every conceivable item of proof would defeat nearly every proponent, because some better evidence can almost always be imagined. Courts instead describe the requirement as one of diligence.5 The first subsection takes up the declarant's availability, the most common source of better evidence. The second takes up the other proof a proponent might reasonably be expected to obtain.
Availability of the Declarant
Nothing in Rule 807 makes the declarant's unavailability a condition of admission. The residual exception may be invoked whether the declarant is available or unavailable.6 A live declarant nonetheless stays in the analysis, because a witness who can come to court and describe the event is the most obvious other evidence the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts. Although Rule 807 does not require unavailability, “the availability (or unavailability) of live testimony is a relevant consideration in the application of Rule 807.”7 Availability is therefore an input to the comparison, not an element of the exception.
The usual result follows from what each version of the evidence contains. If the declarant is available to testify, the hearsay is generally inadmissible under Rule 807, because it is not “more probative” than the trial testimony the declarant could give.8 A declarant who is competent and remembers the event can give the same account from the witness stand, where the opponent can test it by cross-examination, while the hearsay offers the account untested. The exception therefore works as a rough best-evidence requirement and cannot be used when live testimony is available and the statement is not superior to it.9
The letter may well satisfy Rule 807(a)(1), because the circumstances of its making are favorable. It fails under Rule 807(a)(2), which is why the two conditions must be analyzed separately: a trustworthy statement still loses when better proof of the same point is within easy reach.
Availability does not always defeat the exception, because live testimony is sometimes the weaker proof. The comparison looks at the quality of what each source can supply on the point, and a witness who can physically appear may still be unable to supply it. A child who would be unlikely to communicate on the stand is the standard example, and there the earlier statement can be more probative than the testimony the child would give.10 The child's reluctance to speak does not admit the statement by itself, since the judge must still find it trustworthy.
Memory loss leads to the same comparison by a different route. In Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., a driver blurted out an account of a crash. He was the only person who knew exactly what had happened, and by the time of trial he had amnesia.11 The court compared the blurted-out statement to an excited utterance or spontaneous statement, cited the catch-all, and suggested the evidence might fall within it.12 Because the court only suggested the point, the case is better used for its facts than as a holding. A driver with no memory of the crash cannot give a live account, so the earlier statement competes with nothing the driver could say on the stand. The neighbor's letter would stand differently if a stroke had since erased the neighbor's memory of that night, because the live version would then offer less than the writing.
Step two shows that unavailability is not a separate element of Rule 807. It is one way the comparison can come out, because evidence the proponent cannot obtain through reasonable efforts is not part of the competing proof. An exam stem that mentions a declarant who is alive and in town is signaling the comparison and does not decide the answer. A student who treats unavailability as required has imported a requirement the rule omits, and a student who treats availability as irrelevant has skipped the comparison the text commands. The same comparison also reaches proof other than the declarant's own testimony, which the next subsection takes up.
Other Evidence Reasonably Obtainable
The comparison reaches every source of proof on the same point, not only the declarant's own testimony. The competing evidence may be the declarant's deposition, her appearance as a witness, or testimonial or documentary evidence from other sources.16 The rule's phrase, “any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts,” is accordingly broad.17 A statement is needed only when the factfinder would otherwise be left with weaker proof. Because hearsay reaches the jury untested by cross-examination, even a reliable statement ranks below first-hand proof that lies within the proponent's reach.
A former prisoner suing prison guards over a fight in which he was injured shows the comparison defeating a sound statement. The plaintiff offers a fellow prisoner's written account of what the guards did during the fight. Even if the writing is sufficiently trustworthy, it is likely to be excluded, because other prisoners with personal knowledge of the event can testify and their testimony is reasonably available.18 The writing says no more than those witnesses could say from the stand, and it lacks what their live testimony would carry, which is an oath in the courtroom and cross-examination by the guards' lawyer. The example also shows why the two conditions are analyzed separately: a statement can pass the first with ease and still fail the second.
The courthouse-fire illustration comes out the other way, and time is the reason. The insurer offers a 1945 newspaper article to prove that a fire occurred during the courthouse's construction. Sixty years later, witnesses to the fire would be hard to find, and any who were located would have dim memories.19 Both problems weaken the alternatives. Proof the insurer cannot obtain through reasonable efforts is not competing proof, and a witness who remembers little is weak proof on the point. Together with the article's other features, these facts strongly suggest it meets the criteria of Rule 807.20 Many people could have seen the prison fight and the courthouse fire alike. What separates the two cases is whether those people can still be reached and still remember.
How hard a proponent must look is a question of degree. The judge takes into account the inconvenience, time, and expense of securing evidence from an alternative source, and the weight of those costs depends on how central the hearsay is to the main issues in the case.21 Courts describe the requirement in two ways, as a means of weighing the need for the statement against the cost of alternative evidence and as a demand for diligence.22 A cost-sensitive standard is the only workable one. A test requiring the proponent to rule out every conceivable witness would defeat almost every proponent, while a test that ignored cost would let a proponent rest on hearsay whenever the live witness was merely a nuisance to find.
The restaurant illustration shows the cost question deciding a close case. Whether the article and notes satisfy the condition depends on what the two writings say about the defendant restaurant and on whether information is available from the restaurant's current and former employees.23 Employees the proponent can reach through reasonable efforts are competing proof, and each one weakens the claim that the writings are the best evidence on the point. If no employee can be found, the writings look stronger.
The third step does the real work, because it is where cost and diligence enter and where the prison-fight and courthouse-fire results part ways. Reliability and need are separate screens. An exam stem that describes a trustworthy writing alongside other people who saw the same event is testing this condition, and the writing stays out. The mirror-image mistake treats the mere existence of another witness as a bar, when a witness who cannot be found with reasonable effort, or who would remember little, is not better evidence.