Concept
Use Against Criminal Defendants
Residual hearsay exception and notice
Use Against Criminal Defendants
Rule 807 settles only whether the hearsay rule keeps a statement out. When the government offers the statement against a person on trial, the Sixth Amendment adds a second test, because it guarantees the accused the right "to be confronted with the witnesses against him."1 Hearsay exceptions let a declarant's statement come in for the truth of what she asserted, yet in most cases the accused cannot cross-examine her about its reliability.2 No exception overrides that guarantee. A judge who finds sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness under Rule 807(a)(1) has answered one question and left the other open.3 The statement must pass both gates.
Crawford v. Washington, a 2004 decision, gave the confrontation guarantee its modern shape. The Court put aside the reliability framework of its earlier decision in Roberts and began from a different premise: the core concern of the Clause is to keep unexamined, ex parte declarations that are testimonial in character out of a trial against the accused, unless the accused has had an opportunity for cross-examination.4 A testimonial statement cannot be introduced against the accused if the declarant is unavailable at trial and the accused never had a prior opportunity to cross-examine, and it does not matter whether the statement fits a hearsay exception.5 For Rule 807 the consequence is direct, because trustworthiness appears no longer to be a factor in Confrontation Clause analysis.6 The residual exception rests on a judge's finding of trustworthiness. That finding is the very substitute for cross-examination that Crawford refuses to accept, so a favorable Rule 807 ruling cannot admit a testimonial statement against the accused.
The working question is therefore whether the statement is testimonial. The Court did not define the term precisely, but its opinion supplies markers. Testimonial statements are directed to proving a fact for a criminal prosecution, carry a degree of structure and formality, and are directed at or prepared by government officials such as police, prosecutors, judicial officers, or grand juries, so that they work as a substitute for the declarant's trial testimony.7 At a minimum the category covers prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former trial, and police interrogations.8 A casual remark or a spontaneous or excited utterance sits at the other end of the line, and the Court later held that the Clause has no application to nontestimonial hearsay at all.9 A nontestimonial statement raises no Confrontation problem however weak it may be. Its weakness is tested under Rule 807(a)(1), not under the Clause.
That division changed how the residual exception is used. Professor Myrna Raeder's study of the catch-all found that more than half of all hearsay offered under it was admitted, with prosecutors the most prolific and most successful users and criminal defendants the least successful.10 After Crawford, some of the prosecution's favorite uses, such as admitting grand jury testimony and formal statements to police by victims and witnesses against the accused, were eliminated as Confrontation Clause violations.11 Both fall within the testimonial category, so a strong showing of trustworthiness no longer rescues them.
The statements that remain available are those outside the testimonial category, and Ohio v. Clark marks that line. A three-year-old boy arrived at preschool with a bloodshot eye and red marks on his face. His teachers asked what had happened and who had done it, and he answered "Dee," the nickname of the man who was caring for him while his mother was away. The teachers then reported suspected abuse to a hotline. The trial court found the boy incompetent to testify, so he never took the stand, but it admitted the teachers' account under Ohio Rule of Evidence 807 after finding that the statements bore sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness. That rule is a state provision allowing reliable hearsay from child abuse victims, not the federal residual exception, and the Supreme Court's holding concerns the Confrontation Clause only. The Court held that neither the child nor his teachers had the primary purpose of assisting in the prosecution, so the statements did not implicate the Clause and were admissible even though the boy could not be cross-examined. Set beside a formal police statement, the classroom exchange shows that the Clause turns on who was listening and why, and the reliability of the words has no bearing on it.
Treat an exam stem that describes a formal statement to police and then dwells on how detailed and credible it was as a signal for the fifth step. The emphasis on reliability is the distractor. A stem that describes a young child answering a teacher's worried question points the other way, to the fourth step, where Rule 807 alone decides admissibility.