Concept
The Liberal Construction Mandate
Rules of construction and application (§ 1-101, et seq.)
Construing the Uniform Commercial Code
The Liberal Construction Mandate
Before a court applies any particular provision of the Uniform Commercial Code, it takes in one instruction about how to read all of them: the Code "must be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."1 That instruction appears in § 1-103(a), within Article 1, the Code's general provisions, and almost every state has adopted the revised Article 1.2 Adoption is what gives the directive force, though. The Code is not itself law; the law is the article as a particular state enacted it, nonuniform amendments included, so the directive a court applies is the one in its own state's statute.3
The word liberal invites a misreading. It does not tell a court to prefer the wider reading of every provision. It tells the court how to decide the width: read the text of each section in light of the purpose and policy of the rule in question and of the Act as a whole, then apply its language narrowly or broadly, as the case may be, in conformity with those purposes and policies.4 The phrase "narrowly or broadly" carries the weight. Purpose sets the width; the word liberal does not.
Courts do not work from the bare text alone. Each Code provision is followed by an Official Comment that explains how its terms are meant to apply. Legislatures generally have not enacted the Comments, so they generally lack the force of law, yet courts typically rely on them in interpreting the provisions.5
The drafters chose this method because commerce does not stand still. They recognized that the practices they meant to regulate, or to leave to a trade's own self-regulation, could change over time, and they wanted legal doctrine to change with them. So they said so explicitly: courts are to construe the provisions liberally to promote the Code's underlying purposes and policies, which include modernizing commercial law and recognizing "the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and agreement of the parties."6 A statute read as narrowly as its words allow would stay fixed at the date of drafting, and each new practice would wait on a legislature to amend the text. Liberal construction lets doctrine keep pace instead, with the stated purposes as the guide.
Case law shows the directive at work on the purpose most likely to matter in a dispute. A court applying Hawaii's enactment, which the opinion cites as § 490:1-102(1), quotes the directive and observes that only three purposes are listed, one of which is to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties.7 A court that takes that purpose seriously looks to how a trade actually deals, because the Code itself names custom and usage as a source of commercial development.
Section 1-103(a) does not leave those purposes to a court's imagination. It lists three: to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial transactions; to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and to make the law uniform among the various jurisdictions.8 Because the directive ties every reading to them, they are the next thing to learn, and the next section takes them one at a time. Subsection (b) of the same section, on supplemental principles of law and equity, follows after that.9