Concept
Purchase and Purchaser
General definitions and principles of interpretation (§ 1-201, et seq.)
Purchase and Purchaser
Every Code rule that protects a person who takes property from someone else rests on the same three inquiries: whether the taker is a purchaser, whether the taker acted in good faith, and what the taker knew or was told. This section takes them in that order, beginning with the definitions that decide who counts as a taker at all.
Section 1-201(b)(29) defines purchase as taking by sale, lease, discount, negotiation, mortgage, pledge, lien, security interest, issue or reissue, gift, or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property, and § 1-201(b)(30) makes a purchaser any person that takes by purchase.1 Everyday speech reserves the word for buying with money, so a reader who silently substitutes buyer for purchaser will misread every provision that uses it. The Code's term is far wider, and the width is deliberate.
The list looks miscellaneous until its closing phrase explains it: every item is a voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. Sale, discount, and negotiation are ways of acquiring goods or paper for a price. Mortgage, pledge, lien, and security interest are the ways a lender takes rights in property to secure a loan. Lease and gift are takings that transfer less than full ownership or involve no price at all. The breadth follows the purpose of good-faith protection, which shields a taker who gave something up in reliance on the apparent ownership of the person across the table. A lender that advances money against goods relies on that appearance as heavily as a buyer who pays for them, and a buyers-only definition would let an earlier claimant take the lender's collateral on facts that would have protected a buyer. The Code therefore places the lender beside the buyer. An Article 9 claimant falls within purchaser and so qualifies for good-faith-purchaser status, which is why a seller defrauded by an impostor or by a buyer who misrepresented his solvency may reclaim the goods from that buyer but not from a good-faith purchaser for value, a secured lender included.2
Purchaser is one link in a chain of definitions. In West v. Roberts, a Colorado court built the concept of a good faith purchaser for value from four of them: good faith, purchaser, purchase, and value, which means consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.3 Each link is a separate gate, and purchaser status is only one of them. A donee takes by gift, which appears on the list, so a donee is a purchaser. A donee gives no consideration, however, and so fails the value gate: a gift recipient can be a purchaser without being a purchaser for value. A student who merges the two gates will either protect the donee or deny that the donee is a purchaser at all.
Purchaser status also differs from buyer-in-ordinary-course status, which is much narrower. The definition of buyer in ordinary course of business excludes a person that acquires goods as security for, or in total or partial satisfaction of, a money debt, and it reaches only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover them from the seller under Article 2.4 A secured lender is therefore a purchaser that cannot be a buyer in ordinary course. West draws the consequence for § 2-403: subsections (2), (3), and (4) apply to merchant transactions and protect persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory, while subsection (1) applies to non-merchant transactions.5 The entrustment rules written for buyers in ordinary course are thus closed to a lender, whose claim rests on its status as a good faith purchaser for value. The right-to-recover alternative also lets a buyer qualify before delivery. One court held that retail purchasers became buyers in ordinary course of business when the vehicle was identified to their contract, a timing question that a later section takes up.6
The word voluntary governs the whole list, and it explains how a definition that names liens still leaves out the creditor who levies.7 A lien granted by agreement, such as the lien in a pledge or mortgage, is a voluntary transaction creating an interest in property. A judicial lien arises when a creditor sues, wins a judgment, and has the sheriff seize the debtor's property, and the debtor's consent plays no part in any of those steps. The Code protects takers who gave something up on the strength of how a transaction looked. A levying creditor extended its credit before the goods reached the debtor, so it relied on nothing about those goods and stands in the debtor's shoes with whatever rights the debtor has.
On an exam, ask first whether the taker is a purchaser. The test is only whether the taker acquired an interest in property by a voluntary transaction. Good faith, value, and buyer-in-ordinary-course status come afterward, and each has its own elements.
Good Faith
Section 1-201(b)(20) defines good faith as honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing, except as Article 5 provides otherwise.10 The two elements ask different questions. Honesty in fact looks inward: did this person actually believe the transaction proper, and act on that belief without deceit? The second element supplies an outside measure, asking whether the conduct matched what reasonable participants in commerce regard as fair dealing, whatever the person privately thought. Letters of credit follow Article 5's own meaning, and every other transaction runs through these two elements, including the purchase by a buyer in ordinary course, whose definition opens with a good-faith requirement.11
Older decisions apply a narrower text. Before the revision, the general definition required only honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.12 The commercial-standards element reached merchants through a separate definition in Article 2, which defined good faith for a merchant as honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade.13 Mattek v. Malofsky sets the two definitions side by side. The revised definition folds both elements into one sentence that governs every person, so a merchant case from the earlier period now shows a standard that applies across the board. Decisions from that period cite § 1-201(19) for the general definition, and the current location is § 1-201(b)(20).
Each element covers a weakness in the other. A test limited to honesty in fact would reward willful blindness, since a buyer who avoids learning of a problem can later swear truthfully that nothing seemed wrong. The commercial-standards element answers that weakness by tying good faith to what a prudent participant in the same market would do. It cannot mean only whatever the trade happens to practice, because a lax habit shared by many dealers would then shield the very conduct the rule exists to reach. In Davis v. Carroll, a court applying New York law refused to let a buyer who made only trivial inquiries defend by pointing to trade practice, and it described a heightened duty of due diligence that arises where there are warning signs about problems in a sale.14
The duty to verify grows with the warning signs. In Porter v. Wertz, as the Davis court recounts it, a gallery bought a painting with no effort to verify whether the seller owned it or had the owner's authority to sell it, although a catalogue of the master's works included the disputed painting. That fact alone might not have put the gallery on notice that the seller lacked the right to sell, but it could have raised a doubt calling for further verification before the purchase was completed.15 The same reasoning decided Atlas Auto Rental Corp. v. Weisberg, where a buyer lost the $300 he paid for a two-year-old station wagon. The court said that simple prudence would have put anyone in an honest transaction on guard, and it held that the standards of honesty in fact and reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing had not been met.16 Some purchases do pass the test: in Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc. the court found no showing that the buyer of a truck had acted other than in good faith.
Good faith is a state of mind, so courts infer it from the circumstances of the purchase. Whether a purchaser qualifies as a buyer in ordinary course is treated as a mixed question of fact. The circumstances surrounding the purchase are relevant, and a merchant purchaser must meet a higher standard with regard to imputed knowledge.17 Appellate courts treat the question as one of fact as well: Foy v. First National Bank of Elkhart held that whether a buyer is in the ordinary course of business is a question of fact for purposes of appellate review.18
The usual error is to stop at step two. A buyer's sincere belief answers only the first element, and the decisions above show that a dealer who was honest yet failed to look when the sale gave reason to look has not acted in good faith. The next subsection turns from how a person dealt to what the person actually knew.
Notice and Knowledge
Good faith concerns how a person dealt; notice and knowledge concern what the person was aware of at the time. Under the older numbering that appears in many cited cases, § 1-201(25) gives three ways to have notice of a fact: the person has actual knowledge of it, has received a notice or notification of it, or from all the facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question has reason to know that it exists.21 The revised Code restates these rules in § 1-202. The routes differ in kind. The first is internal, because the person is actually aware of the fact. The second is external, because a communication about the fact has reached the person, and the next subsection explains what it takes for a notice to be given and received. The third is an inference from circumstances the person already knows.
The wording of the third route rewards close reading. It draws the inference from facts and circumstances known to the person at the time in question, so the inquiry starts with what the person actually knows and asks what those facts imply. It does not ask what a further investigation would have uncovered. A person who knows only that a seller is short of cash may or may not have reason to know of a lender's lien, depending on what else the person has been told, but a lien recorded in a bank's files that the person never saw plays no part in the calculation.
A separate sentence in the definition narrows the vocabulary. A person knows or has knowledge of a fact only when the person has actual knowledge of it, and the words discover and learn refer to knowledge rather than to reason to know.22 Notice is the wide category, and knowledge is one route inside it. A person who knows a fact necessarily has notice of it, but a person can have notice through a received communication or through reason to know without ever having knowledge. The definition also leaves open how long a notice stays effective, since the time and circumstances under which a notice or notification may cease to be effective are not determined by the Act.23
The Code builds two tiers because a rule that disqualifies a person needs a yardstick suited to its purpose. Many protections for takers of goods cut off a claim that already existed, and the Code grants them to those who had no real reason to hold back. If disqualification required only that a taker might have discovered the claim, every buyer would have to hunt for hidden interests before every purchase, and the protection would shrink to whoever searched hardest. Tying disqualification to actual knowledge removes that burden, because the taker is defeated only by what the taker actually knew. The broader notice concept serves provisions that want to charge a person with what the known facts imply, and a provision that speaks of knowledge leaves reason to know out of account.
A buyer's position against an unperfected security interest shows the two tiers at work. With one exception, a security interest, even if unperfected, beats a transferee who knew of its existence when buying the collateral, and the exception covers buyers in ordinary course.24 The rule therefore turns on knowledge, which the Code defines as actual knowledge.25 A buyer who pays value, takes delivery, and never actually learns of the interest does not lose to it merely because an inquiry would have revealed it.
Knowledge is not the only route past a security interest. If the secured party consents to the disposition of the collateral free from the security interest, the transferee takes free of it. The consent may be express or implied, and whether it was given depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.26 An agreement that gives the secured party a right to proceeds should not be read as authorizing a disposition free of the security interest.27
The buyer-in-ordinary-course definition applies the same idea with a narrower object. The buyer must buy in good faith and without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods.28 That is knowledge of a specific fact, that this sale violates someone else's rights, and a general awareness that a lender holds a security interest in the seller's stock is a different fact. Suppose a shopper knows that a lender finances an electronics retailer's inventory, knows nothing about the terms of the loan or whether the lender approved the sale, and buys a stereo and takes possession. The shopper knows of the security interest without knowing that the sale violates the lender's rights, so the knowledge element does not disqualify the shopper, and the shopper qualifies if the purchase was also made in good faith. The result follows from the stakes. Lenders routinely finance retailers' inventory, and if general awareness of that financing disqualified shoppers, almost no retail buyer could qualify. Had the shopper known that the lender had forbidden the sale, the disqualifying knowledge would be present. Lack of knowledge also does not end the inquiry, because the buyer must still meet the good-faith standard covered above.
Giving and Receiving Notice
The previous subsection left one question open: how does a communication become notice when the route to notice is receiving a notice or notification? Under the older numbering that appears in many cited decisions, § 1-201(26) answers it, and it begins on the sender's side. A person notifies or gives a notice or notification to another by taking the steps reasonably required to inform the other in ordinary course, whether or not the other person actually comes to know of it.30 The test measures what the sender did. If the definition required the recipient to learn of the message, any recipient could defeat a notice by leaving the envelope unopened, and a sender could never tell when its task was finished. Tying the result to the sender's reasonable steps lets the sender complete the job by its own acts. A seller that mails a written notification, properly addressed and with postage paid, by a usual means of communication has therefore notified the buyer even if the buyer never reads it.
The word reasonable keeps the rule from becoming a mechanical mailing test. A step counts only if it would ordinarily inform the other person, so a flawlessly executed mailing to a destination the sender knows to be dead does not qualify, while an ordinary mailing to the current address does, however inattentive the recipient turns out to be.
Receipt looks at the recipient's side, and the same definition supplies two routes to it. Subject to the rule for organizations discussed below, a person receives a notice or notification when it comes to that person's attention, or when it is duly delivered in a form reasonable under the circumstances at the place of business through which the contract was made or at another place the person holds out as the place for receiving such communications.31 The first route needs no particular place or form, since a message has done its work once the person has it in mind. The second route spares the sender from proving what a recipient actually read, because delivery at a chosen place stands in for attention. The recipient picked that place, either by making the contract there or by announcing it as the place for receipt, and so carries the risk of whatever happens to the paper inside its own walls. A notice left at an executive's home, a place the company never held out for such communications, is not duly delivered, though it is received at the moment the executive reads it, because attention alone satisfies the first route.
Giving and receiving are therefore separate events with separate tests. Giving is complete on the sender's reasonable steps, while receipt is complete on attention or proper delivery, so which test applies depends on the verb a provision uses. Students most often go wrong by reading receives to require that the recipient actually read the message, and the second route shows why that reading fails.
The definition of send fills in the mechanics of the sender's step for records and notifications, and § 1-201(b)(36) gives two methods.32 The first is to deposit the item in the mail, deliver it for transmission, or transmit it by another usual means of communication, with postage or the cost of transmission provided for and addressed to any address reasonable under the circumstances.33 That method is complete when the item leaves the sender's hands correctly prepared, so nothing in it depends on arrival. The second is to cause the record or notification to be received within the time it would have been received if properly sent under the first method.34 The first method tests the process and the second tests the result. A sender who hand-delivers a document or uses an unusual courier therefore stands where a mailer stands if the item arrives when mailing would have delivered it, and falls short if it arrives later.
Decisions under the earlier text apply § 1-201(38), whose wording differs. That version spoke of a writing, record, or notice, required the item to be properly addressed, and for an instrument directed it to an address specified on it or otherwise agreed, with any reasonable address as the fallback only if none existed.35 The current text keeps the two-method structure but drops the instrument rule, asks only for an address reasonable under the circumstances, and ties the second method to the first by cross-reference.36 When a problem cites the older provision, check whether the item was an instrument, because that is the one setting where the earlier address rule asked for more.
Organizations raise a further question, because an organization acts only through individuals and cannot itself be said to have read anything. An organization is a person other than an individual, which covers a corporation or a partnership, each of which deals through employees.37 Under the older § 1-201(27), notice, knowledge, or a notice or notification received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting that transaction, and in any event from the time it would have been brought to that individual's attention if the organization had exercised due diligence.38 An organization exercises due diligence when it maintains reasonable routines for communicating significant information to the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with those routines. The text covers knowledge as well as notice, so the same attribution governs whenever a provision asks what an organization knew.
Two simpler rules would each fail. If an organization were charged with everything any employee knew, a bank would be bound by what a file clerk overheard at lunch about a customer's goods, though no one handling the customer's loan ever heard it. If the organization were charged only when the right person actually read the message, it could avoid notice entirely by routing its mail badly. The two-part timing in the rule avoids both: information counts from the moment the responsible individual has it, or from the moment that individual would have had it under reasonable routines.
The rule also limits what an individual must pass along. Due diligence does not require an individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless communicating it is part of that individual's regular duties or the individual has reason to know of the transaction and that it would be materially affected by the information.39 A bank clerk who learns of a competing claim, but has no regular duty to pass it on and no reason to know of a loan officer's transaction, therefore does not put the bank on notice for that transaction.