Concept
Security Interest
General definitions and principles of interpretation (§ 1-201, et seq.)
Security Interest
Section 1-201(b)(35) defines a "security interest" as an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.1 Two features do the work. The interest must attach to personal property or fixtures, and its purpose must be to secure something, either a debt to be paid or a promise to be performed. A lender that holds rights in a debtor's equipment until the loan is repaid satisfies both at once.
The rest of the definition moves the boundary in three directions, and most disputes arise at those edges. First, it adds. A security interest includes any interest of a consignor, and any interest of a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note, in a transaction that is subject to Article 9.2 Neither a consignor nor a buyer of accounts is a lender in the ordinary sense, yet the Code counts their interests. Second, it subtracts. The special property interest a buyer of goods acquires when the goods are identified to a contract for sale under Section 2-401 is not a security interest, although a buyer may also acquire one by complying with Article 9. Third, it withholds the label from a seller's or lessor's right under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods, except as Section 2-505 provides. Again, a seller or lessor may also acquire a security interest by complying with Article 9.3 The definition then turns to a seller's retention or reservation of title, a topic the later subsections take up.
Taken together, the inclusions and exclusions show that the Code asks what an interest does for the person who holds it, not what the parties call it. A consignor and a buyer of accounts hold interests that count despite their labels, while the buyer's identification interest and the seller's or lessor's right to possession are excluded, subject to the exceptions described above. A transaction that arrives under an unfamiliar name, such as a consignment, a retained title, a sale of receivables, or a lease, can be tested with three questions:
- Is the interest in personal property or fixtures? The definition speaks of nothing else.
- Does it secure payment or performance of an obligation?
- Do the express inclusions or exclusions place the interest inside or outside the definition?
The subsections that follow take these questions in order. They begin with the core definition and the treatment of retained title and the buyer's interest. They continue through sales of accounts and consignments and the lease-or-security-interest problem, and then through the limits of the definition. They end with the buyer's position: when buyer status attaches, when a buyer takes free of a security interest, and how entrustment to a merchant affects the buyer.
The Core Definition
A security interest is an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation.4 That first sentence of § 1-201(b)(35) holds three elements, and a transaction creates a security interest only when all three are present: an interest, in personal property or fixtures, that stands behind an obligation. The definition's later sentences add some interests, such as those of a consignor or of a buyer of accounts, and subtract others, such as a buyer's special property interest on identification of goods.5 The subsections that follow take those adjustments one at a time. Each modifies the opening sentence, so the baseline comes first.
The unsecured lender shows what the first element adds. A lender who advances money on the borrower's reputation and promise to repay, and who takes no right in any asset, holds a claim against the borrower and no right to take any particular property on default. A security interest gives the lender that right: the right to take the pledged property when the debtor defaults.6 The law calls such a right a lien, a limited property interest that entitles its holder to possession of some of the debtor's property if the debtor fails to perform.7 The right is contingent, because possession arises only on default. It is also always a right in specific property. A lien on the borrower's boat reaches the boat and not the borrower's car, and a creditor who cannot say what asset the lien attaches to probably has no lien at all.8
The second element confines the definition to personal property and fixtures. Article 9 defines a security interest broadly, to include every interest in such property that secures an obligation.9 Its collateral categories run across goods (inventory, farm products, consumer goods, equipment) and intangibles (accounts, chattel paper, deposit accounts, instruments, investment property, and more).10 Personal property within Article 9 includes fixtures, which are goods related to real estate, but a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate falls outside the Article.11 The subsection on the limits of the definition returns to that boundary.
The third element says what the interest is for, and a lien does two jobs. If the debtor defaults, the creditor may take possession of the property and use it to satisfy the debt. If other creditors, buyers from the debtor, or a bankruptcy trustee claim the same property, the lien may give the creditor a priority position against them.12 Those two jobs are what “secures” means: the property stands behind the obligation in a way that a bare promise cannot. The word “performance” carries the idea past money debts, so the secured obligation may be a promise to do something as well as a promise to pay.
Once the three elements are met, Article 9 names each participant. Suppose A borrows money from B and grants B rights in A's boat as security for the loan.13 The Code's vocabulary then falls into place:
- The security agreement is the contract that creates the security interest and makes clear what B may repossess if A defaults.14
- The boat is the collateral, the asset in which A grants the security interest.15
- B is the secured party, the person in whose favor the security interest is created under the security agreement.16
- A is the debtor, a person with an interest in the collateral other than a security interest or other lien. Because A also owes the money, A is the obligor as well.17
The definitions of secured party and debtor are drawn so that the two roles cannot collapse into one another. B's interest in the boat is the security interest itself, and the debtor's interest must be something “other than a security interest or other lien,” so B cannot be the debtor as to the boat.18 Debtor status turns on an interest in the collateral “whether or not the person is an obligor,” which is why Article 9 keeps “debtor” and “obligor” as separate words for the case in which one person fills both roles and for the case in which two people do.19 Secured-party status likewise arises “whether or not any obligation to be secured is outstanding,” so it does not wait for the money to be advanced.20
The same vocabulary fits transactions that nobody would call loans. In the SemGroup oil dispute, producers who had sold oil to SemGroup relied on their states' nonuniform amendments to claim automatically perfected security interests in that oil.21 On that theory the oil is the collateral, the producers are the secured parties, and the owner of the oil is the debtor, even though the producers sold the oil rather than lent money. The court rejected the claim and held that the producers had no perfected security interest even if Texas or Kansas law applied.22 The three elements only get a creditor through the door of Article 9, and whether the interest prevails against other claimants is a further question about perfection.
The definition looks to what a transaction does because credit before the Code ran through a thicket of separate devices. A chattel mortgage left possession of the chattel with the debtor and was regarded as a transfer of either title or a lien. The note and the mortgage had to be recorded at the county seat to bind other creditors and later purchasers.23 Lenders also devised arrangements that claimed to be not security interests but sales, trusts, conditional sales, sales and leasebacks, or field warehousing, hoping to avoid the notice requirements. Those attempts failed, because Article 9 covers transactions that constitute security interests in personal property regardless of what they are called.24 Chattel mortgages, trust receipts, and conditional sales are now simply security interests.25 The drafters' comments say that the traditional distinctions among security devices, based largely on form, are not retained, and that the single term “security interest” replaces the descriptive terms that had accumulated at common law and under statute. A single filing system replaces the separate files each device once required.26
The old forms remain available, and the comments say so, but a heading on a document no longer decides whether Article 9 applies.27 The distinctions that survive track what the creditor actually has. Article 9 still treats a pledge, in which the secured creditor possesses the collateral, differently from other secured transactions. It also treats differently a transaction in which the secured party takes control of some forms of collateral, and one that produces a purchase-money security interest.28 Each of those features is functional, whether possession, control, or money lent to acquire the collateral, and none depends on what the document is called. The label rule therefore cuts both ways, since a heading can neither create an interest the transaction lacks nor remove one the transaction contains.
When a document's name suggests one of the old devices, work through the questions below and let the heading go.
Retained Title and Buyer's Interest
The definition of security interest in § 1-201(b)(35) draws two boundaries around sales of goods, one on the seller's side and one on the buyer's. A seller's retention or reservation of title in goods shipped or delivered to the buyer is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest, and the seller's right under Article 2 or 2A to retain or acquire possession of the goods is not itself a security interest, except as § 2-505 provides.30 On the buyer's side, the special property interest that arises when goods are identified to a contract for sale under § 2-401 is not a security interest.31 Both halves close the same way: the seller or the buyer may also acquire a security interest by complying with Article 9.32 The carve-outs therefore describe what a sale produces on its own and leave the parties free to build a true lien on top of it. The earlier uniform text packed the two rules into a single paragraph, § 1-201(37). It said that a seller's retention or reservation of title notwithstanding shipment or delivery is limited in effect to a reservation of a security interest, and that the buyer's special property on identification is not one.33
The installment sale shows the seller's half at work. The seller delivers the goods, the buyer pays part of the price and promises the rest in installments, and the contract says the seller keeps title until the last payment. Once the goods are delivered the buyer holds and uses them, so the reserved title does one job: it stands behind the unpaid price. That is the job the definition describes, an interest in personal property that secures payment of an obligation.34 The Code therefore classifies the arrangement by what it does, and it has abandoned the old distinction between a conditional sale and a security interest.35
Betty agrees to buy a car from Sam, pays over twelve months, and signs a contract saying Sam keeps title until the last payment. Sam's clause is a reservation of a security interest and nothing more. Article 9's vocabulary follows: Sam is the secured party, Betty is the debtor, and the car is collateral, the generic term for an asset in which the debtor grants a security interest.36 Sam's protection is whatever Article 9 gives a secured party who has complied with it, not an ownership claim that sits outside the Article. An answer that reasons from the clause to the conclusion that Sam owns the car and Article 9 is irrelevant has the sequence backward.
The Code applies the same logic to other transactions that carry a sale's name but do the work of security. A 'sale' of accounts is treated as the creation of a security interest even though the parties never mention one, so the buyer of the accounts becomes a secured party and the seller of them a debtor.37 A later section takes up those transactions.
Article 2 can accept this recharacterization because it does not make title the hinge of the parties' rights. Under it, legal consequences flow directly from the contract and the action taken under it, without asking when property or title passed or was to pass. The drafters did not want practical questions, such as who bears the risk of loss, to turn on the location of an intangible something whose passing no one can prove by evidence.38 With title carrying so little weight in Article 2, a clause reserving it for the seller is best read for what it does, which is to secure the price, and the Code places that function under Article 9.
Herrington Livestock Auction Co. v. Verschoor illustrates the seller's side. A seller who had reserved title in goods delivered to a buyer was treated as holding, at most, a security interest, so the reservation clause carried no weight of its own and the seller's position depended on Article 9. The same observation about the Code's choice appears in Skendzel v. Marshall, where an Indiana court remarked that the drafters of the Code abandoned the distinction between a conditional sale and a security interest.39 The remark shows how the choice is understood: a retained title is a form of security, not a separate kind of ownership. The definition itself still reaches only personal property and fixtures.40
The Code looks past other labels in the same way. Whether a lease is intended as security is determined by the facts of each case.41 A court asked to classify a document called a lease looked to its actual terms, the circumstances and conduct of the parties before and at execution, and whether the option price to buy the equipment was nominal.42 A later section develops that test.
A seller's right to retain or acquire possession differs from a reserved title. The definition says that this right, when it comes from Article 2 or 2A, is not a security interest,43 so an unpaid seller who holds goods it has not released does not need Article 9 to do so. The difference lies in what each device is. A security interest secures payment or performance of an obligation, while the possessory right arises under the sales articles themselves. The seller remains free to take a true security interest by complying with Article 9.44 Section 2-505 is the one exception the definition names, so a problem that invokes it needs separate attention.
The buyer's half of the definition rests on a different event, identification. The definition excludes the special property interest a buyer holds when particular goods are identified to a contract for sale under § 2-401.45 The exclusion tracks function. A security interest secures payment or performance of an obligation; the special property secures nothing the buyer owes, and instead reflects the buyer's stake in the particular goods the contract covers. Article 2 ties that stake to identification and does not ask when title passed.46
The carve-out covers only the interest the sale produces on its own. A buyer who wants a true security interest can obtain one by complying with Article 9.47 Article 9 reaches the so-called financing buyer, who advances money to the seller and acquires an interest in the goods to be supplied. That interest secures the supplier's duty to deliver, so a security interest can secure performance as well as payment.48
An exam answer that says a buyer of identified goods holds a security interest by reason of identification alone reverses the carve-out. An answer that says a buyer can never hold a security interest overlooks the compliance clause.
Sales of Accounts and Consignments
Most of § 1-201(b)(35) marks where the definition of security interest stops. One sentence pushes it outward, to reach two parties who do not look like lenders holding collateral: "'Security interest' includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9."50 Iowa's enactment repeats the sentence word for word and follows it with the exclusion that cross-refers to Iowa's section 554.2401.51
The extension is deliberate and, on its face, odd. A buyer who purchases one of those four assets outright owns it, and nothing the buyer holds secures an obligation. A consignor who leaves goods with a retailer has made no loan either. The Code treats both as holders of security interests anyway, so that Article 9 governs them. The effect resembles a statute declaring that, for its purposes, all horses are cows: the parties may speak only of a "sale" and never mention security, and the transaction is still treated as the creation of a security interest.52
Article 9 first brings the sales within its scope. It applies to sales of accounts, chattel paper, promissory notes, and payment intangibles, although these are sales and not the creation of an interest to secure an obligation. UCC § 9-109(a)(3).53 The buyer's interest then counts as a security interest. The buyer is a "secured party" under § 9-102(a)(73)(D), and the seller is a "debtor" under § 9-102(a)(28)(B), though the buyer is the outright owner and the seller retains no interest in the asset.54
Secured-party status brings a practical burden: Frank must perfect. Attachment alone protects him against ABC, but not against ABC's other creditors. For that protection he ordinarily files a financing statement (a UCC-1) in the office the state designates, so that anyone who searches the files under ABC's name can learn of his claim.56 If he does not file, a lien creditor, ABC's trustee in bankruptcy, or a secured creditor whose interest attached later but who perfected first can defeat him.57 Sales of promissory notes and payment intangibles are the exception, because the buyer's security interest in those is perfected automatically. UCC § 9-309.58
The sentence names four assets and no others, so each sale is measured against that list. A business that sells its customer list has sold none of the four, and Article 9 does not apply to the sale.59 Article 9 defines each of the four separately.60 The sentence also reaches a buyer only in "a transaction that is subject to Article 9," which imports that Article's scope rules and exclusions.61 Two of those exclusions illustrate the point. Article 9 does not apply to an assignment of an interest in a deposit account in a consumer transaction, unless the account is proceeds of other collateral in which there is a security interest. Nor does it apply to the creation or transfer of interests in real property, apart from fixtures and certain enforcement rights.62
Consignors enter the definition for a different reason. In a consignment, the supplier and the retailer agree that title to the inventory stays with the supplier and that the retailer will act as the supplier's agent in selling it. That is the alternative to selling the goods to the retailer on credit and taking a security interest. A consignment could be used to circumvent Article 9, and it raises problems like those of a secured transaction, so Article 9 governs it. UCC § 9-109(a)(4).63 The supplier's retained title therefore does not remove the arrangement from Article 9. The consignor's interest counts as a security interest, so the consignor is the secured party and the consignee, whose stock carries that interest, is the debtor.64
Article 9 does not govern every delivery of goods for sale, however. It governs a consignment only if the delivery meets Article 9's own definition of the word, which is narrower than the everyday idea of a consignment.65 Because a delivery must satisfy every part of that definition, the inquiry runs best as a checklist.
A delivery that meets all six makes the consignor a secured party. A delivery that misses any of them may be a consignment in ordinary speech, but it falls outside Article 9.67
The manufacturer, like any secured party, must perfect its interest to hold its position against the store's other creditors.68 The retired teacher has no filing to make, because Article 9 never reached his arrangement.
Lease or Security Interest?
The same deal can be papered as a credit sale or as a lease, and Article 9 cares which one it really is. A dealer that delivers $24,000 of computers to a buyer who pays $2,000 a month for twelve months is a seller on credit, and a seller that keeps title until paid holds, in effect, only a security interest.70 Rewrite the contract as a twelve-month lease with a $1 option to buy at the end, and the dealer can call itself a lessor whose right to retake the goods is a possessory right that the definition of security interest does not count as one.71
Nothing about that restructuring is illegal, and parties choose lease or sale form for many reasons. But Article 9 is meant to be a unified national system that creditors can rely on, and letting a lawyer escape it by artful language in one agreement would defeat its purpose.72 The Code therefore looks past the label. If a lease is a security interest in substance, the transaction is a secured transaction, the lessee is the debtor, and the goods are collateral, the generic term for any asset in which a debtor grants a security interest.73
The definitions do not settle the question by themselves. Article 2A defines a lease as a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a period in return for consideration, but a sale, the retention or creation of a security interest, and a license of information are not leases.74 That definition leaves open whether a deal written as a lease is really a security interest in disguise. Under § 1-203(a), whether a transaction is a lease or a sale “is determined by the facts of each case,” and the Code supplies factors that should or should not support an inference of lease.75
One idea underlies every version of the test
The central feature of a true lease is that the lessor reserves an economically meaningful interest in the goods at the end of the lease term. Ordinarily that means two things: at the outset the parties expect the goods to keep significant residual value when the term ends, and the lessor holds an entrepreneurial stake, either the chance of gain or the risk of loss, in that value.76 Courts state the same point as the hallmark of a lease. The lessee may use the property for a period shorter than its economic life and must return it while it still has substantial economic life, so the lessor keeps an economically meaningful residual interest.77 A lessor that has bargained all of that away holds nothing but security for the rent. Each rule below tests whether the lessor's reversion is real.
The 1987 bright-line test
The 1987 revision of the UCC dropped the reference to the parties' intent to create a lease or a security agreement, which had produced unfortunate results, and moved the focus to the economics of the transaction. It reasserted residual value as the touchstone of a true lease.78 The test has two parts. The first asks whether the lessee may terminate the agreement during its term. The second asks whether any of the residual value conditions is present. If the lessee may not terminate and any one condition is present, the characterization follows without consideration of any other fact.79
In the statutory text, a transaction creates a security interest if the consideration the lessee pays for possession and use is an obligation for the term of the lease that the lessee cannot terminate, and one of the following is true:80
- the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic life of the goods;
- the lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods or is bound to become the owner of the goods;
- the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods for no additional or nominal additional consideration;
- the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no additional or nominal additional consideration.
The four conditions are alternatives, so one is enough. When none is met, the inquiry does not end in favor of the lessor. Courts must still examine the specific facts to decide whether the economics of the transaction support treating the lease as a security interest, and the 1987 text has been no panacea, because courts continue to wrestle with the distinction.81 Opinions applying the Illinois version in force in 2006, which was identical to the 1987 uniform text, cite the test as § 1-201(37), and revised Article 1 treats the question in § 1-203, whose subsection (a) again makes the facts of each case controlling.82
The structure of the test follows the idea above. The no-termination requirement separates a commitment from a rental at will. A lessee free to stop paying and hand the goods back has committed to nothing, and the lessor still bears the risk of what the goods turn out to be worth. The four conditions are four ways in which the reversion can shrink to nothing. A term as long as the goods' remaining economic life leaves nothing worth returning. A duty to renew for that life, or to become owner, means the goods never come back. An option to renew or to buy for no or nominal added money is one the lessee will certainly exercise. In each case the lessor has given up the two things that mark ownership at the end of the term, which are the expectation that the goods will still hold significant value and the chance of gain or loss in that value.83
Nominal consideration and foresight
The last two conditions turn on whether the additional consideration is nominal. By definition it is nominal if it is less than the lessee's reasonably predictable cost of performing under the lease if the option is not exercised, and it is not nominal if the option price is stated to be the fair market value of the goods, or the renewal rent the fair market rent, determined when the option is to be performed.84 Commentators describe nominality as a proxy for a single question: is the option price so low that the lessee will certainly exercise it and, in all plausible circumstances, leave no meaningful reversion for the lessor? Answering it requires comparing the option price with the reasonably predictable costs of performance under the lease if the option is not exercised.85
Two options show the difference. In a non-cancelable lease, a $1 option to buy at the end is nominal on any measure, so the transaction is a security interest. The same lease with an option to buy at a price stated to be the goods' fair market value when the option is exercised gives the lessee no bargain. That price is not nominal, so the condition is not met, although another condition might still be. Foresight, not hindsight, controls. “Reasonably predictable” and “remaining economic life” are measured by the facts and circumstances when the transaction is entered into, and when the parties sign and become bound they have already made either a lease or a security agreement.86 An end-of-term windfall or loss may favor one side, but it does not change what the parties made.
Features that do not decide the question
Several terms that look like ownership do not, alone, turn a lease into a security interest. A transaction does not create a security interest merely because it provides that:87
- the present value of the rent the lessee must pay is substantially equal to or greater than the fair market value of the goods when the lease is made;
- the lessee assumes the risk of loss or pays taxes, insurance, fees, or maintenance costs;
- the lessee has an option to renew the lease or to become the owner;
- the lessee may renew at a fixed rent equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market rent;
- the lessee may become owner at a fixed price equal to or greater than the reasonably predictable fair market value.
Present value, the measure in the first item, is the amount as of a date certain of sums payable in the future, discounted at the rate the parties specified if it is not manifestly unreasonable, or otherwise at a commercially reasonable rate that reflects the facts when the transaction is entered into.88 The list shows what the Code treats as insufficient on its own. An option priced at or above the predictable market value, for example, leaves the lessee a real choice about whether to buy, so the lessor's reversion keeps its value.
The older text and the cases that applied it
Older enactments, which many opinions applied, posed the question in two sentences. Whether a lease is intended as security is determined by the facts of each case, but the inclusion of an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, while an agreement that the lessee, on complying with the lease, becomes or may become owner for no additional or nominal consideration does.89 Courts applying New York law read the second half as conclusive. A so-called lessee with an option to become owner for no or nominal consideration was conclusively deemed a party to a financing transaction, and the inquiry ended.90 Because the older text never defined nominal, courts adopted several tests, and an option price that met any of them was treated as nominal.91
The dispute between Rinden and Intertel shows the rule at work. Rinden's lease-purchase contract required $158 a month for 96 months and gave Rinden an option to buy the equipment for $1. The court held that Article 9 applied because the contract was a secured transaction, since a security interest is created when, on compliance with the lease, the lessee may buy the goods for nominal consideration.92 The logic is the one in the opening example. A lessee who can own the goods for a dollar after ninety-six installments has paid the price over time, and the lessor's reversion is worth nothing.
The absence of an option did not end the older inquiry either. Towe Farms, Inc. v. Central Iowa Production Credit Assoc. involved a lease of cows with no purchase option and no option to become owner for nominal consideration, and the lessee even had to replace animals that died or were lost during the term. The court said that the absence of such language is not controlling and that economic realities may show a “lease” to be a security agreement.93 One opinion applying the older text under a New York choice-of-law clause weighed four things: the terms of the lease, the circumstances and the parties' actions before and at signing, whether the option price was nominal, and whether a lessor that bargains away all of the meaningful value of the goods, leaving little or no residual value at the end of the term, can ever be a true lessor.94 The last question previews the 1987 test. Once the intent language fell away, the residual interest became the test itself.
Opinions must therefore be read against the text they applied. The same opinion noted that § 1-201(37) was identical in New York and Illinois and treated the case law of both states as relevant, while another applied the Illinois text of 2006, identical to the 1987 uniform version.95 The nominal-option reasoning of the first and the bright-line reasoning of the second belong to different versions of the Code, and the date and the enacting state's text matter.
A landlord holding a statutory lien is a different creature from a lessor of goods. Landlords usually have liens on personal property brought onto the leased premises, securing amounts due under the lease, and many liens on personal property are possessory, so they are lost if the lienholder gives possession to the debtor or someone else.96 Those liens arise by statute and vary from state to state. The question in this section is whether the parties' own lease-form agreement is in substance a security interest.
Three answers to a disguised-lease problem go wrong in predictable ways. One stops at the contract's title. One treats the lessee's payment of taxes and insurance as proof of a sale, although the Code lists those terms as insufficient alone. One finds no nominal option and declares the lease true, skipping the other three residual value conditions and the examination of the economics.
Limits of the Definition
A security interest is an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation.100 Each phrase of that sentence screens out deals that look like secured lending. A transaction can show every outward sign of a secured loan, with a creditor, a debt, and an asset the creditor expects to look to on default, and still fall outside the category. The asset may be the wrong kind of property, it may not be property at all, the arrangement may be too unusual for the Article, or the Code may give the interest a different name. Article 9 is a comprehensive scheme for security interests in personal property and fixtures, and the definition marks its border.101 Four limits follow, and each has its own reason.
Real estate security is outside the definition because the definition reaches only personal property and fixtures. Article 9 covers fixtures, which are goods related to real estate, but it does not apply to a real estate security interest such as a mortgage or deed of trust.102 Its scope provision also excludes the creation or transfer of interests in real property, including a lease and rents under a lease. The exceptions are fixtures and certain enforcement rights when the secured party holds lien interests in both real and personal property.103 A lender that takes a mortgage on land holds something other than an Article 9 security interest, however closely the loan resembles other secured lending.
Fixtures test that line, because a fixture is attached to land and is still personal property. Take a furnace installed in a building. Under real estate principles, if the owner sold the building after installation, the furnace would pass to the buyer under the deed. Under personal property principles, installation does not strip the furnace of its status as personal property that can be the subject of a separate contract. The furnace is a fixture because it keeps its personal property nature after affixation, even though the real estate owner could alienate its rights in the furnace under real estate law.104 A Michigan court drew the matching line for mortgage liens in fixtures and held that they are not Article 9 security interests. The Michigan legislature had directed that when an Article 9 security interest in a fixture competes with a mortgage lien in the same fixture, the rules in Mich. Comp. Laws § 440.9334 reconcile the conflict. The court held that this is as far as Revised Article 9 reaches mortgage liens in fixtures. It has no bearing on how such a lien is created or how it relates to the rights of a bankruptcy trustee as a hypothetical lien creditor.105 A priority rule that ranks a mortgagee against an Article 9 secured party therefore does not turn the mortgage into a security interest.
The second limit is a threshold question that Article 9 leaves to other law. The definition covers an interest in personal property, so a creditor claiming a security interest in an asset must first be able to say that the asset is property. Article 9 does not determine whether an asset qualifies as property. That depends on the statutes, regulations, and applicable court decisions that govern the asset.106 Article 9 regulates interests in property that a debtor holds and can grant. It leaves to the law that creates an asset the decision whether anyone holds a property right in it.
The third limit protects the definition from its own breadth. Read literally, the definition might seem to sweep in any distinctive claim a creditor can assert against a debtor's assets, and Article 9 does not accept that reading. Suppose one creditor agrees to subordinate its claim to another's. It might be argued that the elevated creditor acquires a security interest, but that would be wrong.107 Suppose instead that a debtor promises one creditor that it will create no security interests in its personal property until that creditor is paid. Such a negative pledge might seem to create a security interest under the Code's broad language, yet idiosyncratic and unusual deals of this kind fall outside Article 9.108 Collateral is an asset belonging to the debtor in which the debtor grants a security interest,109 and a negative pledge promises restraint without itself granting the creditor an interest in an asset. Professor Gilmore explained the reason. The Article was drafted to regulate certain well-known and institutionalized types of financing transactions, and he argued that interests like the negative pledge may still be valid but are not within Article 9. Beyond the institutionalized transactions lies a no-man's land in which courts work out solutions case by case.110
This exclusion is narrow, and it is a poor way around Article 9. Section 9-109 and its predecessors have generated relatively little litigation, and even the most deviant secured transactions have generally fallen under the Article's umbrella. Successive amendments brought nearly all of them in. Accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes are now clearly included, as are securitizations of loans and sales of loan participations. Deposit accounts, originally excluded, now serve as original collateral.111 A lender that holds a right in an identified asset to secure a debt has the core of a security interest however odd the documents look. The exclusion reaches only arrangements, like the negative pledge, that lack that core.
The fourth limit comes from the Code's own vocabulary. The Code defines an agricultural lien separately from a security interest and treats the two separately. A bank and CCC made that point in an Iowa dispute. They observed that the Iowa proceeds provision, § 554.9315(1)(b), allows only a security interest, not an agricultural lien, to attach to proceeds, and that the Iowa UCC defines and treats the two terms separately in that section and others.112 Their argument shows why classification matters: a provision written for security interests does not automatically reach an agricultural lien. Article 9's scope provision keeps the two in separate items. One covers a transaction that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract, and another covers an agricultural lien.113
Treating the two terms separately does not remove the agricultural lien from Article 9. The scope provision lists the agricultural lien alongside consensual security interests, sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes, and consignments, as a transaction to which the Article applies.114 The agricultural lien therefore sits outside the definition of security interest but inside the Article, while a real estate mortgage sits outside both. Keeping those positions apart prevents the error of declaring Article 9 irrelevant to a farm supplier's lien merely because the lien is not a security interest.
When Buyer Status Attaches
The definition of buyer in ordinary course of business describes who qualifies: a person who buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates another person's rights in them, and in the ordinary course from a seller in the business of selling goods of that kind.116 Good faith means “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”117 The definition does not say when a buyer under a sale contract that is still being performed acquires the status.
That silence matters because the status shields a buyer from a security interest in the goods bought. Professor Gilmore, one of the Code's drafters, read the Code as protecting buyers against such interests at an earlier stage than the earlier trust receipts statute (UTRA) did.118 Between signing and delivery, a seller's lender may move against the inventory before the goods reach the buyer, and a buyer who lacks the status at that moment faces the lender unprotected. Courts have had to supply the moment, and several, on similar but not identical facts, have chosen dates ranging from the initial contract through identification.119 Four candidate triggers recur, and the later the trigger, the longer the buyer stays exposed to the seller's lender:
- The contract date, when the parties commit to the sale, perhaps before the buyer has received anything.
- The identification date, when the particular goods are designated to the contract and the buyer acquires a special property and an insurable interest in them.120
- The title date, when ownership passes to the buyer, the trigger Wisconsin once used and then abandoned.121
- The delivery date, when the buyer takes the goods, which courts and commentators have criticized as the dispositive date.122
The purchasers in Daniel v. Bank of Hayward signed a contract for a van not yet built and made a down payment. The dealer financed its inventory through the Bank. When the dealer signed an individual note for a vehicle, the Bank paid the manufacturer, which sent the manufacturer's statement of origin (MSO) to the Bank to hold. Because the MSO is necessary to obtain title to a motor vehicle, the Bank effectively controlled delivery of title to the retail purchaser and ensured that it would be paid, a procedure the court called unusual.123 The Bank took over the dealer's inventory before the purchasers received the van, and the dispute was whether they had become buyers in ordinary course in time.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the purchasers became buyers in ordinary course of business when the van was identified to the contract. It overruled its earlier decision in Chrysler, which had tied buyer status to passage of title, to the extent the two decisions conflicted.124
The court gave three reasons for moving the trigger earlier. Reliance on title runs against the thrust of the Code, whose drafters tried to keep technical title rules from playing a central role.125 The Bank's hold on the MSO shows the practical danger, because under a title trigger the lender that controlled delivery of title would also control when the buyer's status arose. Next, the phrase “in ordinary course” defers to commercial practice: a court looks to the substance of the transaction, to the customary manner in which the seller's business makes sales, and to the buyer's expectations under the contract.126 Finally, the inventory financer is better placed than the average retail buyer to guard against the risk that a dealer's sale will go unperformed.127
The hypothetical tracks how narrowly the court wrote. The purchasers urged identification and did not ask the court to adopt the contract date, so the court left open whether the contract date alone confers status.128 It rested its holding on the circumstances of the transaction and on industry practice, and other courts have chosen other dates on other facts.129 Courts also treat whether a buyer was in the ordinary course as a question of fact, a particularistic finding that does not call for the uniformity of a rule of law.130 The answer in any state therefore depends on its own decisions and on the record, and an answer that asks only whether title has passed repeats the reasoning Wisconsin abandoned.
A buyer in Rosa's position faces a second requirement. Under the current definition, only a buyer that takes possession of the goods or has a right to recover them from the seller under Article 2 may be a buyer in ordinary course.131 Professor Gilmore noted that the original definition so closely follows UTRA's that its omission of UTRA's delivery requirement looks deliberate.132 The current text likewise does not demand delivery: a buyer who has not received the goods may still qualify if Article 2 gives the buyer a right to recover them from the seller. A court applying the current text therefore asks two questions: whether the buyer's position had matured, under that state's decisions, before the lender acted, and whether the buyer holds possession or an Article 2 right to recover the goods.
re Havens Steel Co. tested both questions on paid-for goods. The bankruptcy court found that Austin was a buyer in ordinary course of business as to $154,485.12 of steel in its own possession and $384,017.08 of steel that Austin had paid for but that sat at the debtor's Ottawa plant.133 As to the Ottawa steel, the court held that Austin had constructive possession, and that constructive possession satisfied § 1-201's requirement that a buyer in ordinary course have possession.134 Austin's interest therefore beat that of the competing claimant, Commerce, in $538,502.20 of the $732,283.56 of steel at issue, and Commerce had to turn that amount over from the segregated account where it held the money.135
The timing question also presupposes a sale. A contract labeled a lease, under which the lessee pays $158.00 a month for 96 months and may then buy the equipment for $1.00, is a secured transaction governed by Article 9, because a lessee's option to buy for nominal consideration creates a security interest.136 Such a transaction is a financing, not a sale awaiting delivery.
Taking Free of Security Interests
Article 9 gives a buyer in ordinary course of business a valuable protection in § 9-320(a). Except for a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations, the buyer takes free of a security interest created by the buyer's seller, even if the security interest is perfected and the buyer knows of its existence.138 The predecessor, § 9-307(1), stated the same rule, and a court applying it read it together with the Code's definition of a buyer in ordinary course and its definition of good faith as honesty in fact.139 Two conditions carry the rule: the buyer must fit the definition, and the interest must have been created by the buyer's own seller. Each has its own reason and its own limits, and a carve-out for farm products sits on top of both.
The definition supplies the first condition. A buyer in ordinary course buys goods in good faith, without knowledge that the sale violates the rights of another person in the goods, and in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. The buyer must take possession of the goods or have a right to recover them from the seller under Article 2. A person who acquires goods in a transfer in bulk, or as security for or in satisfaction of a money debt, is not a buyer in ordinary course.140
A buyer in ordinary course is not the only transferee who can take free of a security interest. If the secured party consents to the disposition free of its interest, the transferee takes free under § 9-315(a)(1). The consent may be express or implied, and whether it exists depends on the facts and circumstances of the case.141 An agreement giving the secured party a right to proceeds should not be read as authorizing a disposition free of the interest.142 Section 9-320(a) matters because it frees the buyer without any showing of consent.
The statute's phrase even if the buyer knows of its existence seems to clash with the definition's requirement that the buyer lack knowledge that the sale violates another person's rights. The two fit together once we ask what the buyer knows. A lender with a security interest in inventory normally intends its debtor to sell that inventory free and clear, so a buyer can know of the interest and still believe the sale is proper.143 Comment 3 to § 9-320 puts the result this way: “Reading the definition together with the rule of law results in the buyer's taking free if the buyer merely knows that a security interest covers the goods but taking subject if the buyer knows, in addition, that the sale violates a term in an agreement with the secured party.”144
The second condition confines the rule to a security interest created by the buyer's seller. A buyer can meet every element of the definition and still lose on this ground, because the protection does not reach a lien granted by someone further up the chain.
In re Sunrise R.V., Inc. applied the same limit. A dealer sold a used motor home to a good-faith purchaser while the vehicle was still subject to a security interest granted by the previous owner, who had traded it in to the dealer. The court correctly held that the predecessor of § 9-320 frees a buyer in ordinary course only from interests created by the seller, here the dealer. The secured party had not entrusted the motor home to the dealer, so § 2-403 did not apply, and the purchaser took subject to the interest.148 The result worsens if the purchaser bought on credit and granted its own lender a security interest. That lender's interest, even if it is a purchase-money interest, would generally rank behind the one the prior owner granted, which is the double-debtor problem that § 9-325 addresses.149
Two narrow routes remain for a buyer caught on the wrong side of this limit. Comment 6 to § 9-320 recognizes that a secured party may waive its interest or be precluded from asserting it against the buyer under § 1-103. Example 2 to Comment 3 recognizes that § 2-403 can cut off the secured party's rights if it acquiesced in a dealer's possession of its collateral.150 That second route is entrustment, and the next section takes it up.
The farm-products exclusion removes a whole category of goods from § 9-320(a). It usually matters only when the secured party's interest is perfected, since a buyer may take free of an unperfected interest under § 9-317(b). It also does not apply when the farmer processes the crop into something else and sells the resulting product.151
Congress responded to criticism of that exclusion with preemptive legislation in the Food Security Act of 1985.152 Under 7 U.S.C. § 1631(d), notwithstanding any other law, a buyer in ordinary course of business who buys a farm product from a seller engaged in farming operations takes free of a security interest created by the seller, even if the interest is perfected and the buyer knows it exists.153 The statute gives creditors a short list of exceptions, and a creditor that fits one keeps its interest against the buyer.154
An answer about a farmer's sale should therefore begin with the federal statute and treat the exclusion in § 9-320(a) as the reason state law alone would leave the buyer exposed.
A buyer in ordinary course or a lessee in ordinary course that takes free of a security interest created by the seller or lessor under Article 9 also takes free of a security interest that secures an advance made after the sale or lease. A later advance therefore cannot revive the lien against that buyer. Presumably a licensee in ordinary course has the same protection, but the comment does not say so.156
Entrustment to Merchants
An owner who leaves goods with a merchant can lose them to a buyer who purchases from that merchant. Section 2-403(2) provides that any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives the merchant power to transfer all of the entruster’s rights to a buyer in ordinary course of business.159 Three parties appear in that sentence: the entruster, who is the owner and hands over the goods; the merchant, who receives them; and the buyer, who must satisfy the Article 1 definition of buyer in ordinary course of business.160 The definition works as a gate. A buyer who passes it takes the entruster’s rights, while a buyer who fails it cannot invoke subsection (2), which protects persons who buy in ordinary course out of inventory.161
The rule reverses a common-law baseline that favored owners. Under the common law, a bailee, who holds goods that belong to someone else, did not have title and could not pass good title to a good-faith purchaser.162 Courts and then the UCC recognized that commerce works best when buyers can be sure of keeping what they buy from merchants, and they stepped in to protect those buyers.163 The assurance matters because no buyer can check a seller’s title without slowing the sale, and a buyer expects to get good title when buying a shiny new car from a General Motors dealer.164 The rule exists to enhance the reliability of commercial sales, and for that reason the particular purpose of the entrustment is irrelevant so long as the recipient is a merchant who deals in goods of that kind.165
Subsection (3) gives entrusting a wide reach. It includes any delivery and any acquiescence in retention of possession, regardless of any condition the parties expressed between themselves and regardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or the possessor’s disposition of the goods was larcenous under the criminal law.166 A person who takes a diamond necklace to a jeweler solely for appraisal has therefore entrusted it. If the jeweler sells the necklace to a customer who happened to see it in the shop, the customer keeps it, and the owner’s only remedy is damages against the jeweler.167 A buyer who pays for goods but leaves them in a dealer’s hands stands on the same footing: the buyer has acquiesced in the dealer’s retention of possession, and a later buyer in ordinary course cuts off the first buyer’s interest.168
The owner who loses goods this way is not without recourse. The owner’s claims against the merchant for conversion and for breach of the warranty of title survive; what the entrustment rule extinguishes is the owner’s action against the purchaser.169 The burden therefore falls on the entruster, who must be cautious not to acquiesce in the delivery and retention of possession to one clothed with the power to sell.170
The recipient must be a merchant who deals in goods of that kind, a narrower class than the merchants defined in § 2-104. Section 2-104 turns on a person’s skill or knowledge; § 2-403 asks about appearances, because a buyer’s protection rests on what the buyer could see. A buyer expects good title from a new-car dealer. A buyer who purchases from a warehouseman trying to recover storage costs knows the seller is dealing with somebody else’s goods, and a buyer is expected to know that a broker deals in goods that are not the broker’s own.171 The Second Circuit in Zaretsky v. William Goldberg Diamond Corp. read “dealing in goods of that kind” to mean the regular sale of the kind of goods at issue. Consigning a diamond to a jewelry designer who does not regularly sell diamonds therefore authorizes no sale, and a textile finisher is not a merchant retailing textiles.172 In Lindholm v. Brant this element was undisputed. The plaintiff’s letter authorizing the Guggenheim to release the painting Red Elvis to an art dealer was an entrustment, and the dealer, a merchant in works of art, had power to transfer all of the plaintiff’s rights to a buyer in ordinary course.173 The fight in that case moved to the buyer.
The buyer’s side of the rule has its own screen. A buyer in ordinary course must buy in good faith and without knowledge that the sale violates another person’s rights in the goods, and must buy in the ordinary course from a person, other than a pawnbroker, in the business of selling goods of that kind. A sale is in the ordinary course if it comports with the usual or customary practices of the seller’s kind of business or with the seller’s own practices. The buyer may pay cash, exchange other property, or take the goods on secured or unsecured credit, but must take possession or have a right to recover the goods from the seller under Article 2, and a person who acquires goods in a bulk transfer or as security for or in satisfaction of a money debt does not qualify.174 Two refinements follow. The purchaser must give new value, as Davis v. Carroll holds, and “ordinary course” means a sale free of surrounding circumstances suggesting anything other than a transfer of ownership rights, which is to say free of red flags that undermine the purchaser’s good faith.175 One court, reading the official comments, concluded that subsections (2), (3), and (4) apply to merchant transactions and protect those who buy in ordinary course out of inventory, while subsection (1) governs non-merchant transactions.176
Porter v. Wertz shows a buyer who falls outside that protection. Von Maker was assuring Porter that he would return a Utrillo painting and a book or pay $30,000, but he had already used the real Peter Wertz to sell the painting to Feigen for $20,000, having made its availability known to Feigen through Sloan and Lipinsky, persons in the art world.177 The appellate court agreed with the trial court that the statutory estoppel of § 2-403(2) was not available to Feigen as a defense. It noted that a buyer outside the ordinary-course definition may still be a good-faith purchaser for value who enjoys the protection of precode estoppel under § 1-103, but it rejected the trial court’s conclusion that Feigen’s equitable estoppel defense barred Porter’s recovery.178
Lindholm turned on the same screen. The court found the sale from the dealer to the defendant unlike the vast majority of art transactions, because the defendant had good reason to be concerned that the plaintiff might have claims to the painting, and it relied on decisions holding that, in such circumstances, a handshake and an exchange of invoice does not suffice to confer status as a buyer in the ordinary course.179 New York decisions take the same view of lax trade practice. A buyer who conducts only trivial due diligence cannot insist that failing to look into a merchant’s authority to sell a painting was consistent with the practice of the trade, because otherwise lackadaisical standards in the art business would shield misconduct or fraud-conducive indifference. A merchant may be required under the Code to take additional steps to verify the true owner of a piece of artwork, and that heightened duty arises where there are warning signs about problems in a sale.180 Entrustment is thus a double-sided trap for the unwary: the entrustor must avoid acquiescing in delivery and retention of possession to someone clothed with the power to sell, and the purchaser must buy in ordinary course to avoid losing out to the entrustor.181
Entrustment sits beside narrower Code rules, and courts keep the fences between them. Sections 2-403(1) and (2) could play havoc with the more precise rules of §§ 2A-305 and 9-320, so a court applies § 2A-305 whenever the seller is a lessee and § 9-320 whenever the buyer’s competitor is a perfected secured creditor.182 The same principle of protecting those who buy in ordinary course out of inventory runs through §§ 2-403, 2A-305, 7-205, and 9-320, and § 9-320(a) covers a secured party that entrusts inventory to a merchant.183 Because a transaction labeled a lease may be a security interest in substance, a court may have to classify the arrangement before it can choose the fence. Whether a lease is intended as security is determined by the facts of each case: an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease one intended for security, but an agreement that the lessee will become, or has the option to become, the owner for no additional or only nominal consideration does (see Heinrich v. Titus-Will Sales, Inc.).184
One dealer-financing arrangement, which the court called unusual, shows a lender protecting itself without relying on the dealer. When the dealership signed an individual note, the bank paid GM, and GM sent the manufacturer’s statement of origin (MSO) to the bank, which kept it. Because the MSO is necessary to obtain title to a motor vehicle, the bank effectively controlled delivery of title to the retail purchaser and ensured itself of being paid.185