Concept
Other Defined Terms
General definitions and principles of interpretation (§ 1-201, et seq.)
Other Defined Terms
Most of § 1-201(b) works by compression: a single defined word carries a list of conditions into every rule that uses it. Buyer in ordinary course of business shows the method. The phrase packs together good faith, lack of knowledge that the sale violates another person's rights, a purchase in the ordinary course from a seller in the business of selling goods of that kind, and a requirement that the buyer take possession of the goods or hold a right to recover them from the seller under Article 2. It also carves out sellers who are pawnbrokers and goods acquired in a bulk transfer or as security for, or in satisfaction of, a money debt.1 A rule that protects such a buyer can use the phrase alone, and every condition travels with it. Sign works the same way for signature requirements. A signature is anything done with present intent to authenticate or adopt a record, whether the signer executes or adopts a tangible symbol or attaches to the record, or logically associates with it, an electronic symbol, sound, or process.2 Security interest compresses the idea of an interest in personal property or fixtures that secures payment or performance of an obligation, and it extends to the interests of consignors and of buyers of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes in transactions subject to Article 9.3
The shorter definitions that follow serve the same economy, though few have drawn the case law that surrounds those three. A rule that spelled out its terms each time would run long, and drafters in different articles would phrase the same idea differently and invite arguments that the variation changed the result. One defined word, used the same way throughout, prevents both problems. The cost falls on the reader. Words like person, creditor, and burden feel familiar, so a student reaches for the everyday meaning and moves on, and an answer built on that meaning often misses what the defined term covers. As earlier sections of this chapter explained, the defined meaning is the starting point, subject to the context qualifier and to any definition another article supplies for itself.
The terms below share little as doctrine, so this section groups them by function. Conspicuousness governs how a term must be displayed before it can work against the party who did not write it. Documents of title supply the vocabulary for records that stand for goods in storage or transit. Person, creditor, and insolvency identify who is covered by the Code's rules and when a party counts as insolvent. The procedural terms (burden, remedy, action, fault) name ideas that other provisions assume without defining again. Conspicuousness comes first.
Conspicuous Terms
Section 1-201(b)(10) calls a term conspicuous when it is so written, displayed, or presented that, based on the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person against whom it is to operate ought to have noticed it, and it makes whether a term is conspicuous a decision for the court.4 Three features carry the doctrine. The test looks to presentation, meaning how the term is set out on the page or screen, and not to what the term says. Its yardstick is a reasonable person in the position of the party the term works against, so that party's own reading habits do not settle the matter. Its method is the totality of the circumstances, which directs the court to weigh the whole presentation rather than hunt for one formatting feature.
The requirement answers an imbalance in how forms get made. The drafter chooses where each term sits, how large it prints, and what surrounds it, while the recipient takes the form as written and rarely studies every line. If any presentation sufficed, a drafter could bury its harshest term where a hurried reader would pass it by and then point to the accepted form as proof of assent. Tying a term's effect to its presentation closes that opening, and it puts the duty on the party who can meet it at the least cost. Fine print can also carry a great deal. Commentary on negotiable instruments quotes sample note language for a maker's right to prepay, a holder's right to declare the whole unpaid balance due whenever it deems itself insecure, and a holder's option to extend the due date.5 A single sentence of that kind changes what a party owes and when, and conspicuousness asks whether the reader had a fair chance to see it.
Earlier text of the definition used the same reasonable-person core, without the totality phrase, and then listed examples of conspicuous terms. One was a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to surrounding text of the same or lesser size. The other was language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the language.6 A drafter could meet the definition by following either format. The current text keeps the reasonable-person test, adds the totality phrase, and drops the list.7
The list gave way for a reason. It tied the answer to typography, while the person who must notice a term changes with the transaction. A list also invites a drafter to satisfy the checklist and stop, even where something else about the page defeats the purpose the checklist served. The totality test closes that argument.
Formatting alone settles nothing under the current text, in either direction. The same capital-letter heading can come out differently in different documents: in a form printed entirely in capitals it stands out from nothing, and a court weighing the whole presentation may find that a reasonable person would not have noticed it. An exam answer that asks only whether a term appears in capitals applies the superseded checklist. The better answer asks whether the term's appearance and placement, taken together, ought to have caught the eye of a reasonable person in the position of the party it operates against, and it remembers that the judge, not a jury, makes the call.
Documents of Title
Goods in transit or in storage sit in the hands of a carrier or a warehouse, and their owner often wants to sell or borrow against them without moving them. Section 1-201(b)(16) identifies the paper that makes that possible by defining a document of title as a record that passes two tests.10 The first test is commercial: in the regular course of business or financing, the record is treated as adequately evidencing that the person in possession or control of it is entitled to receive, control, hold, and dispose of the record and the goods it covers.11 The second test looks to who stands behind the paper. The record must purport to be issued by or addressed to a bailee, a person holding goods for another, and it must cover goods in the bailee's possession that are either identified or fungible portions of an identified mass.12 The term includes a bill of lading, transport document, dock warrant, dock receipt, warehouse receipt, and order for delivery of goods, and a document may be tangible, with its information inscribed on a tangible medium, or electronic, with its information stored in an electronic medium.13
The two tests work together. The first lets commerce treat the paper as the goods' representative, so a person who holds or controls the paper can deal in the goods by dealing in the paper. The second explains why the paper deserves that reliance: a document is worth something only if some bailee has the goods and the record points to them. The phrase identified goods or fungible portions of an identified mass matches what a bailee can actually deliver, which is a particular item or an interchangeable share of a larger stock. A record qualifies because of how commerce treats it and who issued it, whatever heading it carries, and an order for delivery can pass the second test because it is addressed to the bailee that holds the goods.
The two most familiar documents of title differ by what their issuers do for a living. A bill of lading evidences the receipt of goods for shipment and is issued by a person engaged in the business of directly or indirectly transporting or forwarding goods.14 A warehouse receipt is issued by a person engaged in the business of storing goods for hire.15 A carrier that gives a shipper a receipt for goods accepted for shipment has issued a bill of lading, and a storage company that gives a depositor a receipt for goods kept in its building has issued a warehouse receipt. The bill-of-lading definition adds that the term does not include a warehouse receipt, so one receipt falls on one side of the line only.16 To classify a problem document, ask whether its issuer moves goods or stores them.
Fungible goods explain how an undifferentiated mass can stand behind a receipt. Goods are fungible when any unit, by nature or usage of trade, is the equivalent of any other like unit, and also when the parties by agreement treat them as equivalent.17 Wheat of a single grade is the familiar example. A depositor of 2,000 bushels needs the same quantity and quality back, not the same kernels, so the warehouse can satisfy the receipt from any part of the mass without tagging particular grain.
The word holder names the person in the position of entitlement under negotiable paper, and the definition has three branches matched to three kinds of paper. The first reaches the person in possession of a negotiable instrument that is payable either to bearer or to an identified person who is the person in possession.18 The second reaches the person in possession of a negotiable tangible document of title if the goods are deliverable either to bearer or to the order of the person in possession.19 The third reaches the person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title, other than control held under § 7-106(g).20 Bearer names paper that runs to whoever holds it: a person in control of a negotiable electronic document of title, or a person in possession of a negotiable instrument, negotiable tangible document of title, or certificated security that is payable to bearer or indorsed in blank.21 The definitions use possession for paper and control for electronic records, which fits a stored file that cannot be physically held.
Delivery follows the same pairing. With respect to an electronic document of title, delivery means voluntary transfer of control, and with respect to an instrument, a tangible document of title, or an authoritative tangible copy of a record evidencing chattel paper, it means voluntary transfer of possession.22 The word voluntary separates delivery from holder status. The holder definition looks to possession and to what the paper says, while delivery adds that the owner chose to hand the paper over, so a taker who came by the paper without the owner's consent may satisfy one definition and fail the other. Which definition a provision uses therefore decides whether the route by which the taker got the paper matters.
Negotiability marks the limit of the holder definition. Its tangible-document branch reaches only negotiable documents, and Article 9 likewise lists tangible negotiable documents of title, not documents of title generally, alongside goods and instruments among the collateral a secured party may perfect by possession.23 A lender whose collateral sits in a warehouse can therefore perfect by taking possession of the negotiable receipt. An answer that treats possession of any warehouse receipt as holder status skips the negotiability requirement and the deliverable-to condition.
A second rule builds on the definition of fungible goods. A buyer in ordinary course of business of fungible goods sold and delivered by a warehouse that also buys and sells such goods takes the goods free of any claim under a warehouse receipt, even a negotiable receipt that has been duly negotiated; the rule appears in § 7-205.24 In the standard illustration, an owner deposits grain with a warehouse that both stores and sells grain, the warehouse issues a negotiable receipt, and the owner duly negotiates it to a transferee. The warehouse then sells and delivers part of the grain to a buyer in ordinary course and becomes insolvent. The buyer keeps the grain, because the rule applies the principle that an entruster to a merchant loses to a buyer in ordinary course of business, and the receipt holder's claim is to a share of the grain that remains.25
Two features of those facts produce the result. The owner placed grain with a warehouse that sells grain, so the owner stands where an entruster stands who leaves goods with a dealer, and the transferee who took the owner's rights through the receipt carries the same risk. The grain is also fungible, so the bushels the buyer carries away are indistinguishable from the rest of the mass. If the warehouse only stored grain for others, a buyer from it would not buy from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind, would not be a buyer in ordinary course, and could not use the rule.26
The fifth step decides most problems that involve people rather than paper. Possession alone does not make a holder, since the paper must be negotiable and the goods must be deliverable to bearer or to the possessor's order, and delivery asks the separate question whether the transfer was voluntary.
Persons, Creditors, and Insolvency
Every Code rule assumes an answer to who counts as a participant, and § 1-201(b)(27) supplies it: a person is an individual, corporation, business trust, estate, trust, partnership, limited liability company, association, joint venture, government, governmental subdivision, agency, or instrumentality, or any other legal or commercial entity.30 The term also includes a protected series of an entity, however denominated, when law outside the Code establishes it and limits, at least on specified conditions, the ability of a creditor of the entity or of any other protected series to satisfy a claim from the series' assets.31 The list ends with an open phrase so that a new form of business entity falls within the existing rules automatically. The breadth shows in definitions you have already met: a buyer in ordinary course of business is a person that buys goods in good faith and in the ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of that kind, so a partnership or a corporation can stand on either side of the sale.32
Within that class, § 1-201(b)(25) sets apart the organization, which is any person other than an individual.33 A corporation, a partnership, a trust, and a government are organizations; a human being is not. Some provisions treat individuals and entities differently, and the consumer definition is one of them.
Section 1-201(b)(11) defines a consumer as an individual who enters into a transaction primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.34 Two requirements sit inside that sentence. The first is that the party be an individual, which excludes every organization however it uses the goods. The second concerns purpose, and the word primarily directs you to the main reason the party entered this transaction, so a purchase with mixed uses is classified by its principal use. One individual may be a householder in one purchase and a business owner in the next, so consumer status attaches to the transaction. The purpose test sorts parties by what the deal was for, not by who they are.
The label changes outcomes under other provisions. Article 9 does not apply to an assignment of an interest in a deposit account in a consumer transaction unless that deposit account is proceeds of other collateral, so a party's classification under Article 1 can decide whether Article 9 reaches that assignment at all.35
Section 1-201(b)(13) defines creditor to include a general creditor, a secured creditor, a lien creditor, and any representative of creditors, among them an assignee for the benefit of creditors, a trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver in equity, and an executor or administrator of an insolvent debtor's or assignor's estate.36 The first three categories sort claimants by what they hold against the debtor's assets: a general creditor is owed money and holds no right in particular property, a secured creditor holds a security interest, and a lien creditor holds a lien. The fourth category does the most important work. A trustee in bankruptcy, a receiver, or an assignee for the benefit of creditors acts for the creditors as a group rather than on a claim of its own, yet each is included by name. Without that inclusion, a rule that favors or defers to creditors would invite the argument that the person who actually enforces their claims stands outside it.
Whether a party is a secured creditor matters because its consent has legal effect. If the secured party that holds a security interest consents to the disposition of the collateral free of that interest, the transferee takes the collateral free of it.37 The consent may be express or implied and depends on the facts and circumstances, and an agreement that gives the secured party a right to proceeds should not be read as authorizing a disposition free of the security interest.38
Section 1-201(b)(23) defines insolvent through alternative formulations, and a party that meets any one of them is insolvent for the Code's purposes.39 The formulations are:
- having generally ceased to pay debts in the ordinary course of business, other than as a result of a bona fide dispute;40
- being unable to pay debts as they become due; or
- being insolvent within the meaning of federal bankruptcy law.41
Each alternative asks a different question. The first looks at conduct, and the words generally and ordinary course point to a pattern across a party's debts, not to one late payment. The second looks at capacity, so a party that cannot pay what falls due qualifies without waiting for a pattern of missed payments to develop. The third borrows the federal bankruptcy definition, whose content belongs to bankruptcy law and is not developed here. The bona fide dispute exception in the first alternative keeps a genuine contest over a claim from reading as financial failure. Without it, any buyer who questioned one invoice while paying every other bill could be called insolvent, and a counterparty could invoke an insolvency-triggered rule against a healthy business.
Insolvent describes a party's condition, and § 1-201(b)(22) defines a separate term for a formal process: an insolvency proceeding includes an assignment for the benefit of creditors or other proceeding intended to liquidate or rehabilitate the estate of the person involved.42 The two definitions fit together, because the assignee for the benefit of creditors, the trustee in bankruptcy, and the receiver in equity named in the creditor definition are representatives who act in proceedings of this kind. A party can be insolvent long before any proceeding begins, so check which of the two ideas a rule names.
Burden and Remedy Terms
Section 1-201(b)(8) defines the burden of establishing a fact as the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the existence of the fact is more probable than its nonexistence.47 That is the familiar civil standard of preponderance of the evidence, and the comparison inside the definition gives it content. A party carrying the burden must move the trier past the midpoint, so a trier who finds the evidence evenly balanced decides against that party. Because the standard is written once, a provision in any article can place the burden of establishing a fact on a party without describing what the burden demands.
The definition fixes the measure of the burden, and other provisions and the courts assign it. re Gateway Ethanol, LLC shows one assignment at work. Dougherty, which was not a party to the lease and had not negotiated it, contended that its rights and obligations under the agreement were those of a purchaser and owner rather than a lessee, and the parties agreed that Dougherty, as the party contending that the agreement was not what it purported to be, had the burden of proof.48 The court found two points significant. Recharacterization as a secured sale would benefit only Dougherty, not the debtor or the other creditors of the estate. And Dougherty had benefitted from the lease characterization before reversing its position, apparently for its own financial gain, since its needs regarding its debt-to-equity ratio were the reason the transaction became a lease rather than the sale first contemplated.49
The allocation tracks who gains from departing from the stated form. In Gateway Ethanol the party that wanted the transaction treated differently was the only one the change would benefit, and requiring it to persuade the trier keeps a party from disowning the form it profited from without proof. That party must establish, by the more-probable-than-not standard, the facts on which the recharacterization turns.
The other terms in this group supply the vocabulary of enforcement, and they interlock. An aggrieved party is a party entitled to pursue a remedy,50 and a remedy is any remedial right to which an aggrieved party is entitled, with or without resort to a tribunal. Each definition refers to the other, so neither creates an entitlement. A substantive provision of some article must say that a party may act in response to a breach, and these definitions then supply the labels. The phrase with or without resort to a tribunal keeps remedy from meaning only court relief. A seller that the Code entitles to withhold undelivered goods from a buyer who has not paid exercises a remedial right without asking a judge, and a provision that speaks of the aggrieved party's remedies reaches that step as well as a lawsuit. The Code also provides that right includes remedy,51 so a provision that speaks of a party's rights reaches the means of enforcing them too, and a party cannot argue that the substantive entitlement survives while the remedy falls outside the rule.
The procedural terms follow the same logic. Action, in the sense of a judicial proceeding, includes recoupment, counterclaim, set-off, suit in equity, and any other proceeding in which rights are determined.52 A counterclaim is a claim the defendant asserts against the plaintiff within the plaintiff's suit, recoupment is a claim from the same transaction that reduces what the plaintiff can recover, and a set-off is a claim from a separate dealing that offsets the plaintiff's recovery. Because the definition reaches all of them, a provision that regulates an action cannot be avoided by recasting the claim under a different procedural name. A companion definition treats a defendant as including a person in the position of defendant in a counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim,53 so the party who sued first becomes a defendant for Code purposes when a counterclaim is filed against it, and a rule that addresses defendants applies by the role the party occupies.
Fault is a default, breach, or wrongful act or omission.54 The words default and breach reach contractual nonperformance, and the phrase wrongful act or omission reaches conduct that is wrongful apart from any contract, so a provision keyed to fault is not confined to breach of contract. The text describes conduct and says nothing of state of mind, so a provision that wants fault to depend on intent or carelessness has to say so itself. These terms rarely decide a case alone. They are building blocks that other articles use without redefining, and an answer applying a remedial provision should first confirm who the aggrieved party is, what remedial right the provision gives, and who bears the burden of establishing the facts on which that right depends.