Concept
The Failed 2001 Revision
General Rules (§ 1-301, et seq.)
The Failed 2001 Revision
The reasonable-relation condition on the parties' choice in § 1-301(a) is back in the Code after a failed attempt to remove it, and that attempt accounts for much of the confusion in older sources.1 The Code's choice-of-law section began in 1952 as § 1-105, which marked out the Code's territorial reach and allowed party autonomy for contracts within its scope. Seven relatively minor amendments followed before 2001. In 2001 the section was revised in a major way and renumbered § 1-301. State legislatures found the revision unpopular, and by 2008 only the U.S. Virgin Islands had adopted it. In 2008 it was withdrawn and replaced with a new § 1-301 that essentially restored the text of old § 1-105, with only minor changes.2 Cases decided under § 1-105 therefore remain useful authority on the current text, and a student must be able to tell which version a given source describes.3
The 2001 drafters worked against a trend toward greater party autonomy. Section 1-105 was a bit more restrictive of that autonomy than § 187 of the Second Restatement, and the general tendency in recent decades has been to promote greater freedom in selecting governing law. In the 2001 revision of Article 1, the American Law Institute accordingly proposed a new § 1-301 to replace § 1-105.4
The proposal would have given the parties far more freedom. It would not have required the chosen state to bear a reasonable relationship to the parties or the dispute. It would have refused enforcement only if applying the chosen law was contrary to a fundamental policy of a state whose law would otherwise govern the dispute; if it was not, the clause would have been enforced even though the chosen state bore no reasonable relation to the transaction.5 The revised section also distinguished consumer contracts from business-to-business contracts, and international contracts from interstate ones, and it imposed different limits on party autonomy for each category.6 The parties' agreement appeared in subsection (c) and was generally effective whether or not the transaction bore a relation to the law of the chosen state. If a party was a consumer, however, the agreement was effective only if the transaction had a reasonable relationship to the chosen state, and it faced a further restriction as well.7
The proposal reached even purely local deals. It would have empowered parties to a strictly local transaction to evade local law on the validity of certain contracts, so long as the local law was not deemed to embody a fundamental policy of the state. One treatise calls this about as far as any body of law has gone in letting parties essentially "make their own law" by a choice-of-law agreement, and observes that it fits the UCC's original aim of bringing commercial law into accord with the customs and practices of the commercial community, somewhat like the old law merchant.8
Changing one fact shows how the consumer rule worked. If the buyer were a consumer, the 2001 proposal itself would have required a reasonable relationship to the chosen state, so the clause would fail under both texts.9 Only the business-to-business setting separates them.
The rejection was nearly complete. Apart from the Virgin Islands, even the states and territories that adopted revised Article 1 balked at proposed § 1-301, and either refused to adopt it or replaced its language with that of old § 1-105. In 2008 the American Law Institute substituted the substance of former § 1-105 for its own proposal, and proposed § 1-301 will apparently not take effect in any state.10
The renumbering leaves one trap. The states that rejected the proposal still designate their current choice-of-law provision as § 1-301, but its content is equivalent to old § 1-105, so the section number alone does not tell you which text is meant.11 Some treatments add to the confusion. One describes § 1-301 as giving the parties unlimited freedom to choose the applicable law, unlike its pre-2001 predecessor.12 That description fits the 2001 proposal, which dropped the relation requirement. It does not fit the text most jurisdictions enacted, which conditions the parties' choice on a reasonable relation.13 Place a source by what it says:
- A reference to § 1-105 describes the pre-2001 provision, whose substance returned in 2008.14
- A § 1-301 that lets the parties choose without a reasonable-relation requirement, subject to a fundamental-policy limit and with separate consumer rules, describes the 2001 proposal, which only the Virgin Islands adopted.15
- A § 1-301 that conditions the parties' choice on a reasonable relation in subsection (a), applies the Code to transactions with an appropriate relation to the forum in subsection (b), and preserves exceptions in subsection (c) is the 2008 text, which is the operative one.16
When a description of § 1-301 conflicts with the enacted language, trust the language.
Forum UCC as Substantive Law
When the parties have made no effective choice, the second sentence of § 1-301(b) speaks to the forum court: "In the absence of an agreement effective under subsection (a), and except as provided in subsection (c), [the Uniform Commercial Code] applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to this state."18 The sentence addresses the judge of the forum, so "this state" means the state whose court is hearing the case. It governs when the contract contains no law-choosing clause,19 and by its terms it governs whenever an agreement is not effective under subsection (a), as when the clause names a state that lacks the reasonable relation that subsection requires.20 Subsection (c) takes precedence, and a later section takes up its exceptions.
The sentence is ambiguous, and courts have read it in two ways. The first reading directs the court to the substantive law of the forum, meaning the forum's own enactment of the Code. The second directs the court to the forum's choice-of-law rules, which can lead to the substantive law of another place.21 This section takes up the first reading; the next takes up the second, which most courts follow.
Under the first reading, a court asks only whether the forum has an appropriate relation to the transaction. If it does, the court applies the forum's own UCC.22 Many courts have read the provision this way, among them the Massachusetts court in Skinner (1963), and the reading is consistent with the official comments accompanying the Code.23 Suppose a buyer sues in State M on a sale of goods under a contract with no choice-of-law clause. The M court applies M's UCC, because the sale bears an appropriate relation to M and that is all the sentence is taken to require.
The argument for this reading rests on the Code's own ambition. The UCC deems itself a work of international scope and vision and seeks to be applied wherever possible. If subsection (b) sends the court directly to the forum's substantive law, which includes the UCC, the court cannot land on the law of some other place that may not have adopted the Code.24
The only limit the reading imposes is the word "appropriate," which the Code does not define. It arguably means "reasonable," which would require a forum connection at least adequate to permit the choice of forum law under due process principles.25 A court in a state with no real connection to the sale therefore gets no Code from the sentence, which speaks only to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to the forum.26
The cost of the reading is a premium on choice of forum. Because the forum's Code governs once the forum has an appropriate relation, a plaintiff who sues in such a forum in effect forces the court to choose forum law.27
The hypothetical shows both the appeal and the cost of the reading. The court's task is easy, and the Code applied is always the forum's; but the identical sale can be governed by different law depending on where a party files. Present this reading on an exam as one of two approaches to the default rule, not as the rule, because most courts treat subsection (b) as an invitation to apply the forum's choice-of-law rules.28
Forum Choice-of-Law Rules
Most courts treat the second sentence of § 1-301(b) as no more than an invitation to apply the forum's usual choice-of-law rules, and they decline to read it as a mandate to go directly to the substantive provisions of the forum's UCC. They read the similar language of its predecessor the same way.30 The text's ambiguity explains the choice: instead of pointing clearly in any direction, the sentence says only that the Code applies to transactions bearing an appropriate relation to the forum, and it seems to spin in place.31 A court that must fill that gap uses the choice-of-law rules it applies in every multistate case.
Because the court applies ordinary choice-of-law principles, the answer can be the substantive law of another state.32 In the absence of agreement, the governing law as between the parties will often be that of the place of contracting or the place of performance. The law of the place where collateral is located will likely apply when the question is the effect of an act affecting the collateral, such as the propriety of repossession or of the secured party's sale after repossession.33
The federal district court in Golden (D.S.D. 1984) read the provision as an invitation to use the forum's ordinary choice-of-law rules.34 The Fourth Circuit in Merritt (1988) named the test. It held the most significant relationship test appropriate because that test best promotes the UCC's policies of uniformity and predictability.35 That reasoning meets the forum-UCC argument on its own ground, because courts that resort to general choice-of-law rules do so on the premise that those rules offer the very uniformity others find in the direct route to the forum's Code.36 The method does not guarantee agreement. The Merritt judges divided 2-1 on which of the two states involved had the most significant relationship.37
The two courts in that scene face the same facts and the same statute, and they reach different law because they read one sentence differently. The second court's likely choice of O follows the usual pattern for disputes over repossession and sale after default.38 The first court never asks whether O has a stronger claim, because the only relationship it examines is the forum's. Apply the majority approach unless the problem says the forum follows the direct reading.
The split persists because the drafters could not cure it. An attempt to make the section more definite in the 2001 revision was a resounding flop, with only the U.S. Virgin Islands adopting the new language, and the drafters went back to the old wording.39 The enacted text still carries the unclear second sentence, so both readings continue to coexist. They differ in what they reward. The direct reading puts a premium on choice of forum, because a plaintiff who sues in that forum in effect forces the court to choose forum law, UCC included. The choice-of-law reading at least enables the court to implement the purposes that underlie choice-of-law rules, so the plaintiff's filing decision does not settle the matter.40
Weighing contacts is the method of the default rule, not of the whole Code. The Code also contains location rules that place a party by a defined fact, such as registration or the site of the chief executive office. A rule locating registered organizations, for example, applies only to an organization registered in a "State." A corporation organized under Panamanian law with its chief executive office in Florida is not a registered organization for that purpose, so it is located under the preceding rules, which place it in Florida.45