Concept
Substance Over Form
Subject matter of Article 9 (§ 9-109)
Substance Over Form
Article 9 applies to “a transaction, regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract.”1 The phrase “regardless of its form” tells a court how to apply the elements explained in the last two subsections. The court asks whether the deal, in substance, gives a creditor an interest in the debtor’s personal property to secure an obligation, and the heading on the document does not answer that question.2 A deal papered as a lease, a sale, or a consignment is therefore treated like a loan when it does a loan’s work.
A security interest is measured by the obligation it secures. Suppose Beth borrows $10,000 from Farmers’ Bank and grants the bank a security interest in her cattle, under an agreement with a future advance clause. When the bank later advances another $5,000, the cattle secure $15,000 in all.3 That is the question to ask of every transaction in this subsection: what obligation, if any, does the creditor’s interest in the property secure?
Classification matters to a creditor because of what Article 9 demands. Whenever the Article governs, the secured party must comply with requirements that protect its position, and most of them concern giving notice of its interest.4 A creditor can avoid that burden if it persuades a court that its deal falls outside the Article. Earlier law shows why courts resisted hidden interests: some invalidated conditional sales because they created secret liens that gave no notice of an interest in the property, states adopted conditional-sales statutes, and the Uniform Conditional Sales Act required a notice filing.5 If labels controlled, each creditor could choose its own exemption, and Article 9 could not serve as the unified national system on which creditors are meant to rely.6
The parties’ wish to stay outside Article 9 does not change the result. A security interest arises by contract whatever the parties call the transaction, their desires and subjective intentions do not decide the issue, and a court looks through the form to the substance to see whether the contract “creates an interest in property to secure an obligation.”7 Courts likewise refuse to be controlled by the nomenclature the parties apply to their relationship.8 The classification also settles which rules follow the deal. One court, having found a transaction within Article 9, added that because Article 9 governed the transaction, it also governed termination of the security interest.9 A transaction excluded from the Article leaves the question to other law, which decides whether an interest in the property may arise to secure payment or performance of an obligation.10
Three disguises recur in practice: the lease, the sale, and the consignment. The lease comes first, because a genuine lessor keeps ownership of the goods and a true lease falls outside Article 9.11
Disguised Leases
A deal called a lease invites the argument that Article 9 does not apply, so the first question is why a supplier would want the label. Suppose A wants $24,000 worth of computers from B and will pay for them in twelve monthly payments of $2,000. As a credit sale, the deal would call for a security agreement and a financing statement. If the parties instead call it a twelve-month “lease” with a $1 option to buy at the end, B can argue that it is a lessor and not a secured creditor, and so did not have to file.12 Nothing is inherently illegal in structuring a transaction as a lease rather than a sale, but allowing creative lawyers to escape Article 9 by artful language would defeat its purpose.13
How a court classifies the deal changes the rights of nearly everyone with an interest in the goods, which is why the lease label is among the most litigated issues in the scope of Article 9.14 A lease of goods is the right to use and possess goods for a period of time.15 If the deal is a true lease, the lessor is not a secured creditor and need not file.16 If it is instead a sale with a retained security interest, Article 2 governs the quality of the goods, and Article 9 governs collection of the debt and the rights of third parties to the goods, including the rights of the lessee’s creditors against the seller. The seller must then give public notice of its claim to preserve a priority position that has a chance of beating those creditors.17 A lessor unsure of the outcome may hedge: Article 9 lets it file a financing statement, with appropriate changes in terminology, without affecting the question of how the transaction is classified.18
The statute gives courts a test for the clearest cases and leaves the rest to the facts. Under § 1-203(a), whether a transaction is a lease or a sale “is determined by the facts of each case.”19 A “lease” is a transfer of the right to possession and use of goods for a period in return for consideration, and a sale, the retention or creation of a security interest, or a license of information is not a lease.20 Beyond that definition, a transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest when the lessee’s obligation for the term cannot be terminated by the lessee and one of four further conditions is also met.21
Each condition marks a point at which the lessor’s real stake in the goods has gone. Under the first two, the lessee is committed for the goods’ whole remaining economic life or to becoming owner, so nothing worth having is left to come back to the lessor. Under the last two, the lessee can renew for that life or take ownership for no or only nominal additional consideration, so the lessee will almost certainly do so. In each case the so-called rent is in substance the price of the goods. The non-terminable obligation is the threshold for a reason too: a lessee who can walk away at any time has not committed to pay for the goods, and the goods will return to the lessor.
The measurements are taken when the parties sign, so that later swings in the market or in technology cannot rewrite the deal after the fact.
The statute also lists features that look like ownership but do not by themselves create a security interest. A lease is not a security interest merely because the lessee assumes the risk of loss, pays taxes, insurance, or maintenance costs, holds an option to renew or to become owner at a price that is not nominal, or pays rent whose present value is substantially equal to or greater than the value of the goods.27 Those terms allocate costs and risks, and a true lessor can shift them to the lessee while keeping a real reversion. The usual exam error is to treat one of these features, or the bare existence of a purchase option, as decisive, when the question is whether the obligation cannot be terminated and one of the four conditions is met.
Sales Intended as Security
A transfer written as an outright sale can be a disguised security interest, and § 9-109(a)(1) reaches it for the same reason it reaches the disguised lease.29 A transfer is absolute in form when its face passes the property to the transferee with no conditions, as a bill of sale does. Commercial parties can invent forms without limit, and a scope rule keyed to particular forms would invite the next one, so the statute asks what the transfer does. The court looks through the form to the substance to see whether the contract “creates an interest in property to secure an obligation.”30
The basic test of a secured transaction in personal property is whether the parties intended that a security interest exist, and absent that intention Article 9 normally does not apply.31 The intention that counts is that the property will stand behind an obligation, read from what the deal does; a wish to avoid Article 9 counts for nothing.32 Sales of accounts, chattel paper, payment intangibles, and promissory notes are the exception, since Article 9 applies to most of them without regard to intent, and a “sale” of accounts is treated as the creation of a security interest.33 The next section takes up those sales.
Mortgage law supplies the model for everything else. An absolute deed has long been treated as a mortgage when the parties intended that result, and Article 9 carries the same idea over to personal property.34
A debtor who signed a bill of sale can prove its real purpose. Article 9 does not reject the deeply rooted doctrine that a bill of sale, although absolute in form, may be shown to have been given as security, and under Article 9, as under prior law, a debtor may show by parol evidence that a transfer purporting to be absolute was in fact given for security.35 Article 2 reaches the same result from the sales side: where a transaction in goods takes the form of a contract to sell or a present sale yet is intended to operate only as a secured transaction, Article 2 “does not apply.”36
Title does not organize this analysis. Article 9 adopts neither a “title theory” nor a “lien theory” of security interests, and its rights, obligations, and remedies do not depend on whether title sits with the debtor or with the secured party.37 Title may matter under other law, such as a tax statute, but within Article 9 it is largely irrelevant.38 A seller who expressly keeps title until the buyer pays the price therefore has a security interest in the goods for the price, an arrangement pre-Code law often called a conditional sale.39 Because filing or possession by the secured party is required no matter who holds title, a conditional sale is covered by the Article 9 filing requirements.40 The retained-title seller returns later among the interests arising under other Articles.
The cash sale and a financing deal can carry the same label and the same delivery of possession. What separates them is whether the transferred property stands behind an obligation. The usual exam error is to stop at the word “sale,” or at the passing of title, when the question is what the transfer does.
Disguised Consignments
A consignment is the third form that can hide a financing, and § 9-109(a)(1) reaches it by the same functional test.42 In a consignment, the supplier and the retailer agree that title to the inventory stays with the supplier and that the retailer acts as the supplier’s agent in selling the goods.43 From the outside, a true consignment and a sale on credit are hard to tell apart: in each, the supplier’s goods sit in the retailer’s store and the retailer is free to sell them.44
The difference lies in what the retailer owes. In the standard consignment, the retailer has a duty to sell or return the goods and no duty to pay for those that go unsold.45 When the consignor’s interest instead secures an obligation, the transaction is a consignment in form only, and it is within Article 9 as the creation of a security interest.46 The risk of non-sale has then moved to the retailer, who is in substance a buyer on credit, and the supplier’s hold on the goods secures payment of the price.
Because the line is so hard to draw, Article 9 does not leave the true consignment outside. A consignment can be used to circumvent Article 9 and raises problems similar to those of a secured transaction, so Article 9 governs consignment transactions.47 The 1999 revision expanded the scope of Article 9 to cover many true consignments for sale for this reason: it is very difficult to tell whether a transaction is a true consignment or a disguised security interest.48
The label matters less than one might expect for the consignor’s basic duty and more for its enforcement rights. A consignor in either case must protect its interest by filing a financing statement and is treated like a secured creditor for perfection and priority.49 A consignor whose interest secures an obligation must also follow the same restrictive rules on repossession and resale that bind other secured creditors. The ordinary consignor of diamonds, with a duty of sale or return and no duty to pay for unsold stones, may get its goods back by whatever method state law outside Article 9 permits.50
Article 9 defines “consignment” as a transaction that does not create an interest securing an obligation and that has all of five further characteristics, so a consignment in form that is a disguised security interest is not a “consignment” as Article 9 uses the word.51 Two paths therefore lead a consignment into Article 9. A deal that secures an obligation enters through paragraph (a)(1) as a disguised security interest, and a genuine consignment that meets the definition enters through paragraph (a)(4), which reaches “a consignment.”52 The usual exam error is to stop once a court finds a “true” consignment and to treat the goods as outside Article 9. A true consignment that meets the definition is inside the Article under paragraph (a)(4).