Concept
Nonpossessory Interests in Tangibles
Perfection of security interests in multiple state transactions (§ 9-301)
Nonpossessory Interests in Tangibles
For a nonpossessory security interest, the debtor’s location usually decides which state’s law applies: the general rule for about 99% of all filing is that one perfects by filing where the debtor is located.1 Section 9-301 departs from that default in three subsections. Subsection (2) covers possessory security interests, subsection (3) covers fixture filings, timber to be cut, and the effect and priority of interests in certain tangible collateral, and subsection (4) covers as-extracted collateral.2 In each, the place where the collateral sits takes over some or all of the work the debtor’s location would otherwise do.
Subsection (3) opens by naming its subject: while negotiable tangible documents, goods, instruments, or tangible money is located in a jurisdiction, that jurisdiction’s local law governs the matters its clauses list, except as paragraph (4) provides.3 Each item can be held in the hand, so each has a physical location to serve as the connecting factor. Clause (A) governs perfection by fixture filing, and clause (B) governs perfection in timber to be cut; each gets its own section below. Clause (C) works differently. It divorces perfection from what follows perfection: the law where the collateral is located decides the effect of perfection or nonperfection and priority, while the law of the debtor’s location still decides where to file.4
Both states have enacted revised Article 9, so their perfection and priority rules should match. In most cases, then, the only live question is where to file, and the answer is Illinois.5 The split matters when a state’s priority rule departs from the norm, as the assumed Georgia rule does in the Virginia example under possessory security interests below.
Some commentary still lists tangible chattel paper among the collateral in subsection (3), but the opening clause as it now reads names only negotiable tangible documents, goods, instruments, and tangible money.7 A newer provision, Section 9-306A, addresses perfection and priority for chattel paper, so a chattel-paper problem starts there rather than in Section 9-301.8
Possessory Security Interests
When the secured party holds the collateral, Section 9-301(2) moves all three choice-of-law questions to the collateral’s location. While collateral is located in a jurisdiction, that jurisdiction’s local law governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a possessory security interest in it.9 Subsection (1) gives those same three questions to the debtor’s location,10 so subsection (2) reassigns them, and it does so for possessory security interests of all kinds.11
The reassignment costs the secured party nothing, because the situs nexus poses no risk to a creditor who keeps the collateral in hand.12 A pawnbroker holding a pledged watch is the familiar example. The rule also has little work to do. Most secured parties never take possession, so the rule applies infrequently,13 and because every state has adopted Revised Article 9, what suffices to perfect by possession in one state differs little from what suffices in another.14
Once the lender relies on a filing, the ordinary location rules take over: an individual debtor is located at the principal residence, and an organization is located at its place of business or, if it has several, at its chief executive office.15
Possession alone triggers the exception. Subsection (2) turns on how the secured party perfected, not on what kind of collateral is involved, so if perfection depends on filing or control, or if the security interest attaches automatically, subsection (2) does not apply, however many states the collateral touches.16 A bankruptcy fight over a Virginia corporation’s collateral shows how narrowly the exception runs.17 Because the corporation is a registered organization, it is located in its state of organization, Virginia.18
The first step is the one that costs points on an exam. A fact pattern that scatters goods across two or three states invites the answer that the collateral’s state governs, and that answer is available only after the facts show that the secured party holds the collateral. Where the debtor keeps the goods and the secured party relies on a filing, the interest is nonpossessory and the default rule governs.19
Fixture Filings
The first clause of Section 9-301(3) sends perfection by fixture filing to the law of the place where the goods are located: while goods are located in a jurisdiction, that jurisdiction’s local law governs “perfection of a security interest in the goods by filing a fixture filing.”21 Fixtures belong to the group of Article 9 collateral that bears a close relationship to real property, along with timber to be cut and minerals, and the Code requires perfection in the state where a fixture is located.22 A fixture filing is the filing made for goods attached to land, so the clause directs it to the law of the state where the land lies.
The default would send the same financing statement somewhere else. Under the debtor-location rule, an Illinois corporation files in Illinois, its state of organization.23 The fixture clause overrides that result only for a fixture filing.
Students often read the clause as covering any goods that happen to be fixtures, and that reading names the wrong state. The clause reaches only perfection “by filing a fixture filing,” so the exception turns on how the secured party perfected, not on what the goods have become.24 A lender that covers the same boiler with an ordinary financing statement has made no fixture filing, and the debtor-location rule still says where that filing belongs.25 The logic parallels the possessory exception: the method of perfection, not the kind of collateral, selects the subsection.
The goods’ location also decides what perfection is worth. Under clause (C), the law of the place where the goods sit governs the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of a nonpossessory security interest in them,26 so a fixture filing in Georgia gives one state’s law the answer to both questions: where to file and how a contest with competing claimants comes out.27 Even the second lender’s ordinary filing, made in Illinois, answers to Georgia’s priority rules.
Timber to Be Cut
Clause (B) of Section 9-301(3) gives standing trees the same treatment: the local law of the jurisdiction where the timber is located governs “perfection of a security interest in timber to be cut.”29 The Code requires perfection in the state where the timber is located,30 even though the debtor-location default would send an ordinary financing statement to the debtor’s state.31 Timber to be cut, like fixtures and as-extracted collateral, is one of the listed exceptions to the debtor-location rule for nonpossessory interests.32 The reason matches the one for fixtures: timber bears a close relationship to real property.33
The word cut limits the rule. Clause (B) covers timber to be cut, not timber that has been cut, so it stops applying at the felling. Logs in a mill yard are ordinary goods, and Section 9-301(1)’s general rule, which looks to the debtor’s location, governs perfection by filing.34 A student who reads clause (B) as covering timber at every stage will file for felled logs in the wrong state.
That sequence explains the Official Comment’s advice: “To ensure continued perfection, a secured party should file in both the jurisdiction in which the timber to be cut is located and in the state where the debtor is located.”35 The governing law changes at the cutting, and a filing in the wrong place perfects nothing, so a second financing statement made at the outset keeps the interest perfected through the cutting and afterward.
Before the trees come down, the timber’s location also decides the effect of perfection or nonperfection and the priority of the security interest, so a single state’s law answers both where to file and how a contest with competing claimants ends.36 Subsection (4) builds a parallel rule for oil, gas, and minerals and keys it to the wellhead or minehead.
As-Extracted Collateral
Section 9-301(4) is the last exception that ties governing law to a physical place: the local law of the jurisdiction in which the wellhead or minehead is located governs perfection, the effect of perfection or nonperfection, and the priority of a security interest in as-extracted collateral.38 The wellhead is where oil or gas comes out of the ground, and the minehead is the corresponding point for other minerals. The rule sends all three questions to the state where extraction takes place and leaves the debtor’s location out of the analysis. It also reaches accounts that result from the sale of minerals at the wellhead or minehead, so a lender financed against a wellhead sale looks to the same state as a lender financed against the oil itself.39 Minerals, oil, and gas, like fixtures and timber to be cut, bear a close relationship to real property.40
The definition draws the category’s boundary. Oil, gas, or other minerals are as-extracted collateral only if the security interest is created by a debtor having an interest in the minerals before extraction and attaches to the minerals as extracted. Accounts qualify only if they arise from a wellhead or minehead sale of minerals in which the debtor had an interest before extraction.41 The test looks to the debtor’s relationship to the minerals while they are still in the ground. A debtor that first deals with the oil after extraction holds no such interest, and its creditors fall under the debtor-location rule.
re SemCrude, L.P applied the definition and stressed the debtor’s pre-extraction interest.42 The court read the local laws of Texas and Kansas at issue in the case as applying only in two situations: when the debtor is located in Texas or Kansas, or when the debtor is so closely involved at the wellhead that it has a preexisting interest in the oil, which makes the oil as-extracted collateral.43 A state statute that perfects a producer’s interest, in other words, does not by itself displace the choice-of-law rules.
The same barrels of oil can thus be as-extracted collateral in one transaction and subject to the debtor-location rule in another. The category is applied by asking about the debtor and the timing of its interest, and the physical nature of the collateral does not settle the question.44
The second step is where points are lost. A fact pattern that mentions oil and a well invites the answer that the wellhead state governs, but that answer is available only after the facts show that the debtor held an interest in the minerals before extraction. Where that interest is missing, the default rule of Section 9-301(1) applies, and the debtor’s location decides where to file.45