Concept
Partial Exclusions
Excluded transactions (§ 9-109)
Partial Exclusions
Section 9-109(c) begins "This article does not apply to the extent that," and four conditions follow.1 Each names a different body of law that can override Article 9: a federal statute, regulation, or treaty that preempts the article; a special statute of the enacting state governing security interests created by that state's governmental units; the matching statute of another state or a foreign country; and the letter-of-credit rule that a transferee beneficiary's rights are independent and superior under Section 5-114.2 A transaction that otherwise falls within Article 9 may meet one of these conditions. The question is then how much of the transaction the competing law takes.
The words "to the extent" answer it. Overriding law is seldom complete: a federal act may supply only a statutory skeleton, and many courts have accepted the drafters' invitation to flesh that skeleton out by analogy to Article 9.3 If the exclusion removed the whole transaction from Article 9, the gaps would have no governing law. Because it reaches only the ground the other law actually covers, Article 9 keeps governing everything left over. The analysis under (c) therefore has two layers: read the competing law to see what it says, then apply Article 9 to whatever it leaves untouched.
Subsection (d) lists other transactions to which Article 9 does not apply, and the sections that follow take them up.4 The four conditions in (c) work differently. Each takes only as much of a transaction as the competing law actually reaches. That may be none of it, part of it, or, where federal law occupies the field, all of it.5 The three parts below follow the statute's order: federal preemption, governmental debtors, and letter-of-credit transferees.
Federal Preemption
The first partial exclusion applies when "a statute, regulation, or treaty of the United States preempts this article."6 Article 9 is state law, and valid federal law can displace state law, so subsection (c)(1) tells you to run the constitutional preemption analysis before assuming Article 9 governs. The opening words "to the extent" carry into this item: Article 9 yields only as far as the federal law actually reaches.7
The commonest error is to treat any federal law on the same subject as an automatic exclusion. The mere existence of a federal statute, regulation, or treaty does not mean Article 9 is preempted. In the 1999 text the exclusion applies only where federal law preempts, not where federal law merely deals with a subject that Article 9 also covers.8 Whether preemption occurs depends on the constitutional principles that govern federal displacement of state law. Under them, the federal law may not preempt Article 9 at all, may preempt it in part, or may occupy the field and preempt it entirely.9 Whatever is not preempted stays in Article 9 and continues to govern.
A ship mortgage presents the opposite case, because federal law addresses the lien itself. The federal Ship Mortgage Act provides for mortgages in ships and for foreclosure of those mortgages, so a lender holding an interest in a ship must ask how far the Act displaces Article 9.10 The answer comes from applying preemption doctrine to the Act, and the portions of Article 9 that survive that analysis govern a transaction in which an interest in a ship is granted to secure a debt.11 The labeling law is silent about liens, while the Ship Mortgage Act regulates them directly. That difference is why the first scenario raises no preemption question and the second raises a real one.
Intellectual property shows how unsettled the result can be when federal law supplies only part of the answer. More than half a century after the Code was widely adopted, the law on perfecting security interests in intellectual property remains confused. The leading cases are Otto Fabric (patents), Peregrine Entertainment (copyrights), and In re Roman Cleanser (trademarks). Under Otto Fabric, a UCC filing suffices to perfect a security interest in patents against a lien creditor, including a bankruptcy trustee.12
Some collateral calls for a federal check every time, because federal law may be preemptive there: ships, aircraft titles, patents and copyrights, railroad equipment, and some interstate commercial vehicles.13 These matters must be researched at the federal level as well as the state level. On an exam, flag the federal law whenever one of these assets appears and ask whether it displaces Article 9 on the issue tested. If the federal statute in the facts does not preempt Article 9 on that issue, Article 9 governs in full.
Governmental Debtors
When a state or one of its agencies grants a security interest, Article 9 may have to share the field with the government's own rules. Section 9-109(c)(2) provides that Article 9 does not apply to the extent that "another statute of this State expressly governs the creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by this State or a governmental unit of this State."15 A legislature that has written special rules for encumbering its own property has made a choice about public borrowing, and a uniform statute drafted for private debtors should not quietly override that choice.
Subsection (c)(3) applies the same idea when the governmental debtor belongs to another jurisdiction. It reaches a statute of another State, a foreign country, or a governmental unit of either, "other than a statute generally applicable to security interests," that expressly governs creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement of a security interest created by that State, country, or unit.16 The two paragraphs divide by whose law is in play. Under (c)(2), the court yields to its own legislature's special statute for its own government's debtors. Under (c)(3), the enacting state's Article 9 defers to the other jurisdiction's special statute, but only to the extent that statute contains rules specific to security interests created by that governmental unit.17 Both paragraphs carry the lead-in's "to the extent" limit.
In both paragraphs the displacing statute must expressly govern one of the four listed topics: creation, perfection, priority, or enforcement. A statute about an agency's budget or powers says nothing about how a security interest in its accounts is created, perfected, ranked, or enforced, so it displaces nothing. The government's status as debtor excludes nothing by itself; the special statute does the work. The topics are also separate. A statute that addresses one of them displaces Article 9 on that topic, and Article 9 applies to any aspect the other law does not cover.18
The default is therefore Article 9. A security interest granted by a governmental unit is governed by Article 9 unless the relevant state law provides another mechanism for creating, attaching, perfecting, or enforcing it. The other law controls the aspects it covers, and Article 9 applies to the rest.19 That fallback keeps a financing from being governed, in the gaps of a special statute, by no law at all.
The comments to Section 9-109 illustrate (c)(3) with a New Jersey state commission whose claim is heard in a New York court. If New Jersey law grants special rights to the commission as a debtor, the New York court, applying its own version of Section 9-109(c), applies New Jersey law, though one must look at New Jersey law to be sure it has such special rules.20 The court will not defer to New Jersey's own Article 9, however. That enactment is a statute generally applicable to security interests, which the parenthetical in (c)(3) leaves out. Deference runs only to rules specific to security interests created by the particular governmental unit, and a general statute reflects no special judgment about the government as a borrower.21 Citing (c)(3) merely because the debtor is another state's agency or a foreign sovereign is therefore a mistake unless a special statute of that jurisdiction expressly governs one of the four topics.
Letter-of-Credit Transferees
Section 9-109(c)(4), the last of the four partial exclusions, provides that Article 9 does not apply to the extent that "the rights of a transferee beneficiary or nominated person under a letter of credit are independent and superior under Section 5-114."23 The provision makes sense once you separate two things a beneficiary can pass along.
The first is the right to draw. Only the beneficiary may rightfully demand payment from the issuing bank, but if the letter's terms allow it, the beneficiary may transfer that right to draw to another person under Section 5-112.24 A person who receives the right this way is a transferee beneficiary, and subsection (c)(4) protects that person: Article 9 does not apply to the extent the transferee beneficiary's rights are independent and superior under Section 5-114.25
The second is the claim to the money. An assignment of the proceeds of a letter of credit is a different transfer from a transfer of the right to draw, and Section 5-114 deals with it.26 Article 9 yields only "to the extent" the transferee beneficiary's rights are superior to the assignee's, so the proceeds assignee's interest stays within Article 9 except as the transferee beneficiary's rights displace it.27 Article 9 treats the claim to proceeds as its own type of collateral, a letter-of-credit right, so a lender can take a security interest in it.
The two transfers look alike, since each starts with the beneficiary and each concerns the same bank's payment. An exam will usually hand one beneficiary two transferees, so the first task is to sort what each one received.
Article 9 steps back for C for a structural reason. Article 5 already says who may draw and how a transferee beneficiary ranks against an assignee of the proceeds, so running C's right through Article 9's priority rules would add a second regime to a question the first already settles. D's interest in the proceeds remains an Article 9 security interest. It simply cannot outrank a transferee beneficiary.
The words "to the extent" keep the exclusion narrow, and ignoring them produces two common errors. One is to treat C and D as competing Article 9 secured parties and rank them by filing or perfection, which overlooks that Section 5-114 supplies the priority rule. The other is to conclude that the whole letter of credit is outside Article 9 and that D therefore holds no Article 9 interest, which overlooks that Article 9 yields only as far as the transferee beneficiary's superior rights reach.28