Concept
What Is Not an Account
Is the collateral an account?
What Is Not an Account
Section 9-102(a)(2) ends its definition of account with seven exclusions, each of which removes a right that would otherwise qualify: chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights and letters of credit, rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold (other than card rights), and rights to payment evidenced by an instrument.1 The exclusions work on rights that already match one of the eight listed sources. A right to the price of property sold has a qualifying source, yet it leaves the account category once a negotiable note evidences it.
Classification matters because the Code’s rules for creating, perfecting, and enforcing a security interest, and for ranking it against competing interests, depend on the type of collateral.2 A security agreement is effective between the debtor and the secured party according to its terms unless the Code provides otherwise;3 the label decides which Code rules then reach the collateral.
The four exclusions treated here fall into two pairs. Instruments and chattel paper turn on paper that a creditor can hold, and possession of a note gives its holder what possession of an invoice cannot. Deposit accounts and commercial tort claims turn instead on who owes the money and what gives rise to the right. Investment property, letters of credit and letter-of-credit rights, and the exclusion for money or funds advanced or sold are taken up in later sections.
A yes to any question removes the right from the account category, and the question that produced the yes names the collateral type. The first two questions can interact: a note grouped with a security agreement on specific goods is chattel paper, not an instrument.4
Instruments
The last exclusion in Section 9-102(a)(2) removes any right to payment evidenced by an instrument.5 For Article 9, an instrument is a negotiable instrument under Article 3 (a promissory note, draft, check, or the like) or any other right to the payment of money that, in the ordinary course of business, is transferred by delivery with indorsement or assignment.6 A promissory note is the subset of instruments that contains a promise to pay, not an order to pay, and it may be negotiable or not.7 The operative word in the exclusion is “evidenced.” A credit sale resting on the buyer’s bare promise produces an account. The same sale, once the buyer signs a qualifying note for the price, produces an instrument, and the seller’s right is no longer an account even though the price, the buyer, and the goods have not changed.
The paper changes what a creditor can do. Only the holder of a note can enforce it, and to be a holder one must possess it, so a secured party that possesses the note leaves no one else able to enforce it; perfection by possession therefore protects the secured party better than filing does.8 An invoice gives no such grip, because possession of a writing that evidences an account is only possession of evidence, and a security interest in an intangible generally cannot be perfected by possession.9 An interest in an account is perfected instead by filing, or automatically when the assignment does not transfer a significant part of the assignor’s outstanding accounts.10 Perfection of an interest in an instrument traditionally required possession; the 1999 Code added filing as a second method.11
A parallel carve-out appears in the definition of account debtor, which omits persons obligated to pay a negotiable instrument.12 Greer, having signed the note, is an obligor on the note and not an account debtor.
Negotiability is not required. A signed paper promising to “pay to B” $1,000 lacks the order or bearer language that Article 3 demands, so it is not a negotiable instrument. It is still an instrument under Article 9 if paper of that kind is customarily transferred by delivery with indorsement by B, and it is then also a promissory note.13 The test looks to how the paper moves in commerce, not to the label the parties chose.
The writing must also be tangible. Article 9 defines a writing as printing, typewriting, or another intentional reduction to tangible form, and an instrument may not be electronic.14 A promise authenticated only in an electronic record therefore cannot be an instrument, even if it says “to the order of.” The requirement fits the way instruments work: the holder is the person in possession, and the secured party protects itself by holding the paper.15 An electronic record offers no object to hold.
A student who sees “to the order of” and answers “instrument” has skipped the question whether the promise was reduced to tangible form. The 2022 amendments give electronic promises their own home. When a controllable electronic record provides that the party owing the money undertakes to pay whoever has control of the record under Section 12-105, the right is a controllable account, a kind of account, and still not an instrument.16 Whether a purchaser of a controllable account takes free of a defense is a question for Sections 9-403 and 9-404, and Section 9-403 ordinarily gives effect to the account debtor’s agreement not to assert claims or defenses.17
Chattel Paper
Chattel paper heads the list of exclusions.19 It is a record or records that evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in, or lease of, specific goods.20 Its holder owns a package of two rights: the right to be paid and, if the obligor defaults, the right to possession of the goods.21 The Instruments discussion asked what evidences a right to payment; this one asks whether the obligation to pay is itself secured by the goods that were sold or leased.
The installment sale shows the package forming. A retailer sells goods to a consumer for household use and takes back the consumer’s promise to pay over time together with a security interest in the goods sold. When the retailer borrows from a bank and offers the consumer’s obligation as collateral, the bank takes a security interest in chattel paper and not in an account, because the consumer’s obligation was itself secured.22 A dealer’s sale of a tractor to a farmer under a conditional sales contract works the same way. The contract is a security agreement covering specific equipment, so once the dealer transfers it to a bank, by sale or to secure a loan, the contract is chattel paper. The bank is the secured party, the dealer is the debtor, and the farmer is the account debtor.23
The classification changes what the financier holds. A bank that takes a bare account holds the customer’s promise to pay and nothing behind it; a bank that takes the tractor contract holds the same promise with the tractor behind it. The steps that protect the financier differ as well. Chattel paper is tangible or electronic, and tangible chattel paper, represented by paper documents, can be held; perfection by possession protects the secured party better than filing alone, as it does for an instrument.24 A company’s loans secured by automobiles are therefore chattel paper that must be perfected by filing or possession, while its credit card receivables are accounts, which are automatically perfected unless they make up a significant part of its accounts.25
The only fact that moved between the two sales was the security interest in the goods sold. When a seller’s installment contract is pledged to a lender, ask whether the buyer’s obligation is itself secured by the goods sold. If it is, the lender holds chattel paper, and the account label is unavailable.
A signed note does not settle the classification by itself. A negotiable note standing alone is an instrument, but when a transaction is evidenced both by a security agreement or lease and by an instrument, the records taken together constitute chattel paper. A dealer who takes back a negotiable note along with a security agreement covering the goods sold therefore holds chattel paper, not an instrument.26 Check the seller’s paper for a security interest in specific goods before letting the note decide the label.
The security interest in chattel paper is one that a record evidences, as a security agreement does, and a lien that arises under other law is a different right. A repairer who fixes a farmer’s tractor, for example, has under state law other than Article 9 a lien on the tractor to secure the repair bill as long as the repairer keeps possession, and that lien coexists with any consensual security interest the farmer granted a bank to finance the tractor.27 Because the lien comes from other law and not from a record of the parties’ agreement, the repairer’s right to the bill, a right to payment for services rendered, does not become chattel paper merely because a lien stands behind it.
The definition of chattel paper itself leaves out two kinds of right: a right to payment arising out of a charter or other contract for the use or hire of a vessel, and a right to payment arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.28 Both stay accounts, because the account definition names each as a source. Leases fall on the chattel-paper side of the line: a lease contract is chattel paper, so a lessor that sells its lease contracts sells chattel paper, and Article 9 governs the sale.29 The account definition also lists property leased among its sources, so ask whether a record evidences the lease of specific goods together with the obligation to pay. That pairing is what makes the right chattel paper.
Deposit Accounts
Clause (iii) of the exclusions takes deposit accounts out of the account category, and the opening words of the definition reinforce the point by carving “deposit account” out of the defined term.31 The doubling is deliberate, because a bank balance is the asset that ordinary speech most readily calls an account. The earlier exclusions turned on a writing; this one turns on the obligor, since the party that owes the money on a deposit account is a bank.
The vocabulary collides inside the Code itself. Article 4 defines account essentially as a deposit account or credit account at a banking institution, other than a certificate of deposit. Article 9 defines account essentially as any right to payment of a monetary obligation in return for an interest in property or services, and it uses deposit account for any account at a bank not evidenced by an instrument.32
A depositor’s balance is, in structure, a claim against the bank. At common law the depositor was essentially one who loaned money to the bank, and the relationship was a contractual, debtor-creditor one, which largely remains true today.33 That structure explains why the exclusion is needed: a balance looks like a right to be paid by someone else, the same shape as a receivable, and without a specific carve-out the account definition could reach it. Article 9 treats the two differently. An account is money owed to the debtor by a third party, a deposit account is Article 9’s name for a bank account, and the two are perfected and foreclosed upon differently.34
Article 9 defines a deposit account as a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank, and it excludes investment property and accounts evidenced by an instrument.35 Bank carries its own definition: an organization engaged in the business of banking, including savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies.36 Together the two definitions yield a short screen for any balance a debtor holds.
The second question is where the vocabulary trap bites twice. A money market account at Brokerage Inc., a securities firm not engaged in the business of banking, is called an account but is not maintained with a bank, so it is not a deposit account.37 The character of the institution decides the classification, whatever name it gives its product. A balance at a credit union qualifies, because the definition of bank names credit unions.
The label matters most at perfection. A security interest in an account is perfected by filing.38 A direct security interest in a deposit account as such can be perfected only by control, though when the deposit account is claimed as proceeds, perfection in the original collateral may carry over under Section 9-315.39 Control is often arranged by making the bank account a joint account between the debtor and the secured party, so that both can make withdrawals, and a depositary bank that is itself the secured party automatically has control under Section 9-104(a)(1).40 Enforcement follows the same split: on default, a secured party with control withdraws the money and applies it to the debt.41
An exam stem in which a borrower pledges its receivables together with its operating account at First Bank is built to test this sorting. The receivables and the bank balance are two collateral types that call for two perfection steps, and a filing covers only the first.
One limit remains. The definition excludes an account evidenced by an instrument,42 so a bank deposit represented by a writing that meets the instrument definition is an instrument and is perfected as any instrument is, by possession or by filing.43 A bank deposit that no instrument evidences, such as an ordinary savings balance, remains a deposit account.
Commercial Tort Claims
The second exclusion removes commercial tort claims from the account category.45 A claim in tort may end in a payment of money, so a student can be tempted to file it with the receivables. But an account is a right to payment on a transaction the definition lists, such as a sale, a lease, services, or insurance, whereas a tort claim rests on a wrong done to the claimant. The exclusion keeps the claim out of the account category even when a business would like to borrow against it.
Article 9 defines the category with two limits. A commercial tort claim arises out of the debtor’s business or profession, and it does not include a claim for the personal injury or death of an individual.46 The category is a creation of the 1999 Code, which narrowed the earlier Code’s exclusion of tort-claim transfers from Article 9 and, by naming commercial tort claims as a collateral type, brought those claims inside its scope.47 An individual’s claim for bodily injury is not a commercial tort claim and falls outside the new category.
A commercial tort claim is also not a general intangible, because the residual category lists commercial tort claims among the types it excludes.48 It is a collateral type of its own, and a secured party perfects an interest in it by filing a financing statement.49
Two claims arising from highway accidents show the line. A delivery business’s claim for the loss of its truck arises out of the business and is not a claim for personal injury or death, so it is a commercial tort claim. An individual’s claim for injuries suffered on a family vacation arises outside any business and rests on bodily injury, so it is not.
The classification question is what the right rests on. A sale or service listed in the definition makes an account; a wrong arising out of the debtor’s business makes a commercial tort claim.