Concept
General Intangibles
Is the collateral an account?
General Intangibles
An asset that no other category of Article 9 collateral claims is a general intangible. The definition works by subtraction: it starts with all personal property, strikes a list of specific types, and gives the name to what remains.1 The category matters most at its border with accounts, because a right to payment can fall on either side of that border depending on where it comes from. A seller's right to the price of goods is an account; a lender's right to repayment of money it advanced is not.2 The categories are mutually exclusive,3 so the label decides which rules govern the asset and what a security agreement must say to reach it.
The first subsection below shows how the residue is built and what it holds. The second takes up the payment intangible, the general intangible that most closely resembles an account.
The Residual Category
Section 9-102(a)(42) defines a general intangible as any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction. The same sentence adds three items by name: controllable electronic records, payment intangibles, and software.4 The definition describes no asset by its own features. It labels as general intangibles the personal property that the other definitions leave over.5 A right that fails the account test, and that no specialized category claims, ends here.
Because the other definitions do the removing, the residue cannot overlap with them. An asset that fits a specific category has already been struck from the list, so each asset carries one label and one set of rules.6
The exclusion lists in the account and general-intangible definitions mirror each other. The account definition removes chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights and letters of credit, and rights evidenced by an instrument.7 The general-intangible definition removes those same types, and accounts as well.8 A right that is not an account because a specialized category claims it therefore goes to that category, not to the residue. A right evidenced by a note is an instrument. A conditional sales contract that creates a security interest in a particular tractor is chattel paper, and when the dealer transfers the contract to a bank, the farmer who signed it is the account debtor.9
The general-intangible list also removes the tangible things and the papers that embody them. A document of title locks title to the goods inside the paper,10 and money is excluded from the category entirely. A security interest in money is perfected only by possession, and once a depositor deposits the money, it ceases to be money as far as the depositor is concerned.11
One account exclusion has no twin on the general-intangible list: rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold, apart from card rights, are not accounts.12 A loan-repayment right that no chattel paper or instrument evidences therefore falls into the residue.13 The next subsection develops that right as the payment intangible.
Perfection follows the label. Filing perfects a security interest in a general intangible.14 Possession cannot do the work. An account may be represented by a writing, but holding the writing gives only evidence of the account, not a legal right to it, so a security interest in an intangible generally cannot be perfected by possession.15
Steps three and four carry most of the weight on an exam, because rights to money are the assets most often mislabeled. A right that looks residual may in fact be an account, an instrument, or a deposit account. The opposite error is just as common: a right to something other than money, such as a right in intellectual property, is not an account merely because it is a right against another person.
Ordinary examples show what the residue holds. Patents, trademarks, goodwill, and architectural drawings are general intangibles.16 So are intellectual property generally and rights under an intellectual-property license.17 Each is intangible personal property that no listed category claims. None is a debt a customer owes for a sale, a writing, or a bank balance.
The sale left the patent's classification untouched and created a second asset, the right to the price. That right fits the first source in the account definition, a right to payment for property sold, leased, licensed, assigned, or otherwise disposed of.18
The same sorting decides a common exam question. A lender whose security agreement covers “all general intangibles” of a retailer holds no security interest in the sums the retailer's customers owe on open account. Those sums are owed for goods sold, so they are accounts, and the general-intangible definition removes accounts by name.19 A lender whose agreement names only accounts, by the same logic, takes no interest in the retailer's trademark. Both categories are intangible, so intangibility cannot decide the classification. The source and form of the right decide it.
The three express inclusions add no new test. The payment intangible has its own subsection below. Controllable electronic records joined the category in the 2022 amendments and take their definition from Article 12.20 Software appears in the definition by name.21
Payment Intangibles and Loans
A payment intangible is a general intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a monetary obligation.23 Because an account debtor is a person obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible, the account debtor on a payment intangible is the party who owes the money.24 The standard example is the right to repayment of a loan that no promissory note or other instrument evidences.25 Of all the general intangibles, this one looks most like an account, since each is an intangible right to be paid by someone else. The choice between them turns on where the payment obligation came from.
When the obligation arises from a sale of goods or the furnishing of services, the right is an account and cannot be a payment intangible.26 When the right is repayment of money advanced, the account definition's exclusion removes it from that category, and the general-intangible definition takes it in.27 Card rights are the exception to the exclusion: a right arising out of the use of a credit or charge card stays an account, because the exclusion expressly steps around it and the account definition lists it.28 A seller who ships on credit and a lender who advances cash both hold a right to be paid, yet the seller holds an account and the lender a payment intangible.
No right to payment is both, and that fact governs the drafting of a security agreement. A description limited to accounts does not reach a loan receivable. A description of general intangibles does, because payment intangibles are named members of that category.29
Both lenders advanced the same sum, and the paper alone moved the classification. The general-intangible definition excludes instruments and chattel paper by name, so a repayment right that either one evidences cannot be a payment intangible.30 When A buys real estate from B on credit and signs a negotiable note, B's right to payment is not an account but an instrument, specifically a promissory note, and the note is B's asset.31 The definition of account debtor draws the same line, since it does not include a person obligated to pay a negotiable instrument, even if the instrument evidences chattel paper.32 The two categories also behave differently in practice. A note can be enforced only by its holder, and a holder is a person in possession. A secured party that possesses the note therefore leaves no one else able to enforce it, and possession perfects. A bare repayment right gives its owner nothing to possess.33
An outright sale of a loan receivable shows why Article 9 names the payment intangible. Article 9 applies to sales of these assets, not only to loans secured by them, because a sale is difficult to tell apart from a transaction that creates a lien to secure an obligation. Nothing in Article 9 decides which one a given transaction is; the characterization rests on all the facts and circumstances.34 That result fits a major theme of the Article, that substance governs over form, so the same economic deal can be structured in different ways and the structure alone does not control.35 A lender that sells a $100,000 share of a $1,000,000 loan receivable, a loan that no instrument or chattel paper evidences, is selling part of a payment intangible, and the sale falls within Article 9.36
Perfection of a sale is easier than perfection of a security interest. A sale of a payment intangible is perfected automatically, and so is an assignment of payment intangibles that does not transfer a significant part of the assignor's outstanding payment intangibles.37 Section 9-309 gives the same treatment to sales of promissory notes.38
The 2022 amendments added the controllable payment intangible: a payment intangible evidenced by a controllable electronic record that provides that the account debtor undertakes to pay the person who has control of the record.39
Step three matters in any problem that mentions a signed note, because that one reference to paper moves an otherwise identical repayment right out of the category. Step two does the opposite work for the student who sees the word loan or the name of a bank and calls the right a payment intangible. A right to the price of goods or services is an account even when a financial institution holds it.