Concept
Secondary Obligors
Is the collateral an account?
Secondary Obligors
Article 9's vocabulary falls into three families: collateral types, transaction types, and actor types.1 This unit works in two of them. It starts with an actor, the secondary obligor, and then returns to the definition of account to finish its list of excluded collateral types.
A single secured loan can involve three kinds of actors, and Article 9 names each by the question it answers. The debtor is a person with an interest in the collateral, other than a security interest or other lien, whether or not that person owes anything on the loan.2 The obligor owes payment of the debt or is otherwise accountable for payment or other performance of it.3 The secondary obligor is an obligor of a special kind, a person whose duty stands behind someone else's, usually a surety or guarantor.4
Section 9-102(a)(72) reaches an obligor in either of two ways. The obligor's own obligation may be secondary, or the obligor may hold a right of recourse, on an obligation secured by collateral, against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.5 Either alternative suffices, and the next two subsections take them in turn. Older materials cite the same definition as 1999 § 9-102(a)(71).6
The label matters because enforcement against collateral reaches the secondary obligor. A secured party's enforcement actions may affect the secondary obligor's liability for any remaining debt and the duties the secondary obligor owes the debtor.7 Article 9 therefore needs a name that separates the person standing behind the debt from the borrower and from the owner of the collateral.
Secondary Obligations
Paragraph (A) makes an obligor a secondary obligor when "the obligor's obligation is secondary," and the clause explains nothing by itself.8 It repeats the word it defines, and one commentary calls it a "mysterious tautology."9 The working content comes from outside the definition. In practice the label marks a surety or guarantor, and suretyship law, the body of law that governs those relationships, says whose promise stands behind whose.10
Applied to the Keller facts, the test asks what sets each promise in motion. Keller's promise is the one the loan exists to create, so Keller's obligation is primary. The parent's promise comes into play only if Keller fails to pay, so the parent's obligation is secondary. Keller is therefore an obligor and a debtor but not a secondary obligor, because Keller owes the debt directly and owns the pledged accounts. The parent is a secondary obligor but not a debtor, because the parent holds no interest in the collateral even though it may have to pay.11 Everyday speech would call both of them debtors, and an exam that puts two names on one loan rewards the student who asks, for each name, whose promise stands behind whose.
Article 9 leaves other questions about the guarantor to suretyship law as well. Suppose a guarantee covers only $200,000 of a $1 million debt that is owed to several creditors, and the debtor defaults as to one creditor only. Whether that creditor takes the entire $200,000 or shares it pro rata among all the debts is a question for suretyship law, and Article 9 gives no answer.12
The label earns its place in the enforcement rules. Section 9-618 asks whether a secondary obligor has taken over the secured party's position, by receiving an assignment of the secured obligation, by becoming subrogated to the secured party's rights, or by assuming the secured party's duties.13 When a secondary obligor fits any of those subsections, the transfer of repossessed collateral to that person is not a disposition under Section 9-610 and cannot establish a deficiency against the debtor.14 Take a $1 million secured loan from Bank to Manufacturer, guaranteed by Purchaser. Bank repossesses the collateral and sells it to Purchaser for $100,000, and Purchaser then repays the remaining $900,000. Purchaser is subrogated to Bank's rights to pursue Manufacturer, but the $100,000 sale is not a Section 9-610 disposition and does not establish Manufacturer's liability for a deficiency.15
The guarantee itself belongs to a different Article 9 category from the person who gave it. The guarantee is a supporting obligation of the right it backs, while the guarantor is a secondary obligor.16 Suppose a seller sells goods on credit and a third person guarantees the price. The buyer's obligation to pay the price is an account, the guarantee is a supporting obligation of that account, and the guarantor is the secondary obligor.17 A security interest in the account attaches automatically to the supporting obligation, and perfection in the account perfects the interest in the guarantee as well, with no separate filing.18 One guarantee therefore yields two labels, one for the promise and one for the promisor, and an answer that blends them misclassifies one or the other.
The definition of account also mentions the secondary obligation, from a different angle. A right to payment for a secondary obligation incurred or to be incurred is itself an account, such as a fee owed to a guarantor for giving the guarantee.19 The guarantor's duty to the lender and the guarantor's right to be paid for undertaking it are separate things.
Rights of Recourse
Paragraph (B) makes an obligor a secondary obligor when the obligor has a right of recourse, on an obligation secured by collateral, against the debtor, another obligor, or property of either.21 A right of recourse is a right to turn to someone else after paying, so the paragraph looks at what the obligor can recover and ignores what the obligor's promise is called. Paragraphs (A) and (B) are alternatives, and an obligor who satisfies either one is a secondary obligor.22
Paragraph (B) is the prong a student can apply most directly. Paragraph (A) needs suretyship law to say what "secondary" means, while paragraph (B) asks one concrete question: after paying, whom could this person pursue? The question also explains why recourse matters. A secured party's enforcement actions may affect a secondary obligor's liability for any remaining debt, so a person who must pay another's secured debt has a stake in how the secured party treats the collateral.23
Suretyship law supplies one such right of recourse. When a secondary obligor fulfills the primary obligor's obligation to the secured party, the secondary obligor succeeds to the secured party's rights to enforce its lien against the collateral and must then follow Article 9's enforcement rules as if it were the secured party.24 Purchaser's subrogation to Bank's rights against Manufacturer, in the example above, is a right of this kind.25 A contractual right to reimbursement from the borrower is another.
Step three tracks the roles that Article 9 keeps apart. The person who owes the debt and the person who owns the collateral are often the same, but they need not be, so a paying guarantor may look to the borrower, to a different owner of the collateral, or to property that either holds. The phrase "the debtor, another obligor, or property of either" covers each combination.26 A right to collect from a stranger to the transaction fits none of them, and neither does a right that exists where no collateral secures the debt, because the paragraph speaks only of an obligation secured by collateral.
A loan with two names on it and no word guarantee still calls for the recourse question. Liability on the debt does not answer it, because a primary obligor is liable too and recovers from nobody.
Deposit Accounts
The remaining subsections leave the actors and return to the collateral types, finishing the list of rights that the definition of account excludes. The word account carries two meanings in the Uniform Commercial Code, and most mistakes with bank balances come from confusing them. Article 9 defines an account as a right to payment of a monetary obligation, such as the price owed for goods sold or services rendered, and the third sentence of the definition lists deposit accounts among the rights the term does not include.28 The definition also carves out phrases such as "deposit account" and "commodity account," where the word keeps its everyday sense.29
The confusion starts inside the Code. Article 4 uses "account" as a substitute for "deposit," while Article 9 defines "account" and "deposit account" to mean two entirely different things.30 A bank relationship that Article 9 does not treat as a deposit account may still be a bank account under another statute, the common law, or the law of contracts.31 In an Article 9 problem, a debtor's "account at First Bank" therefore usually describes a deposit account, and the rules for receivables do not govern it.
Article 9 defines a deposit account as a demand, time, savings, passbook, or similar account maintained with a bank, and the definition excludes investment property and accounts evidenced by an instrument.32 A bank is an organization engaged in the business of banking, a group that includes savings banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and trust companies.33 The institution therefore matters as much as the product. A checking or savings balance at a bank is a deposit account, while a money market balance at a brokerage firm that does not engage in banking is not, whatever its label.
The exclusion is needed because a bank balance resembles a receivable. At common law a depositor was essentially one who loaned money to a bank, and the relationship remains a contractual debtor-creditor relationship.34 Without the carve-out, the balance could satisfy the account definition, even though the party who owes it is a bank holding the depositor's funds and not a customer who bought something.
The instrument carve-out follows the same pattern. Article 4's definition of account excludes a certificate of deposit,35 and the former Article 9 definition of deposit account excluded an account evidenced by a certificate of deposit.36 The current definition states the exclusion more generally, removing any account evidenced by an instrument. A secured party that holds an instrument can perfect by possession, which protects it better than filing.37
The classification matters most at perfection. A security interest in an account is perfected by filing.38 A direct security interest in a deposit account, by contrast, can be perfected only by control.39 The methods differ because money deposited in a bank ceases to be money as far as the depositor is concerned, and what the depositor holds is a claim against the bank.40 The depositary bank automatically has control of the account it maintains, so a bank that takes a security interest in its own customer's account has nothing further to do, while any other secured party must obtain control under §§ 9-312(b)(1) and 9-314.41 Proceeds are the exception: when a deposit account holds proceeds of other collateral, perfection in the original collateral may also constitute perfection in the proceeds under § 9-315.42
The two assets are also collected differently after default. A secured party with a security interest in a deposit account can withdraw the money and apply it to the debt, while an account is money owed by a third party to the debtor, so the secured party must look to that third party.43
The two assets in that example are the same size and belong to the same debtor, and the only difference is who owes the money, a customer or a bank. Ask that question about each asset before choosing a perfection step.
Other Excluded Rights
The third sentence of Section 9-102(a)(2) lists seven rights that the term account does not include: chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights and letters of credit, rights to payment for money or funds advanced or sold, and rights to payment evidenced by an instrument.45 Earlier subsections covered chattel paper and deposit accounts, and the instrument exclusion needs only a reminder. The other four need attention here. Each exclusion decides which rules apply, because the rules for creating, perfecting, enforcing, and prioritizing a security interest depend on the type of collateral.46
The instrument exclusion turns on how a right to payment is evidenced. A buys real estate from B on credit and signs a negotiable note. The right to payment is not an account but an instrument and a promissory note, and the note is an asset of B.47 Even a paper that is not a negotiable instrument may still be an instrument under Article 9 if it is customarily transferred by delivery of the paper and indorsement.48
Commercial tort claims, covered earlier in this chapter, are claims arising in tort, such as an organization's claim for damages caused by a wrongful act, and the definition of account excludes them.49 The definition of general intangible excludes them too, so a commercial tort claim is neither an account nor a general intangible but a collateral type of its own.50
Investment property means a security, whether certificated or uncertificated, a security entitlement, a securities account, a commodity contract, or a commodity account.51 Securities accounts and commodity accounts carry "account" in their names, yet each is investment property, so the account definition excludes them and the deposit account definition excludes them as well.52 A balance at a brokerage firm that does not engage in banking therefore falls outside the deposit account category, and what it is instead depends on what the customer actually holds. Priority disputes over investment property are complicated because a secured creditor can perfect by control, by filing, and in some cases by possession or delivery.53
Letter-of-credit rights are rights arising from a letter of credit transaction. Generally they are the rights of the beneficiary, whether or not the beneficiary has earned them.54 The account definition excludes them along with letters of credit, and the general-intangible definition excludes them too.55
The funds-advanced exclusion is the one most easily mishandled, because an exception reverses part of it. A right to payment for money or funds advanced or sold is not an account, so a lender's right to be repaid falls outside the definition.56 If no instrument or chattel paper evidences the loan, the right falls into the residual category, because rights to payment of a loan not evidenced by chattel paper or an instrument are general intangibles.57 The right to repay such a loan is a payment intangible.58 Article 9's coverage of sales of payment intangibles brings the sale of loan participations into the Article.59
A credit card balance looks like the same thing, since the issuer advanced money for the purchase, and a student who applies the exclusion mechanically will call the cardholder's debt a payment intangible. The exclusion rules that answer out, because it does not reach rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card or information contained on or for use with the card.60 A cardholder who buys a television on a card issued by Argon Bank therefore owes Argon Bank an account. Treating card receivables as accounts, together with the coverage of payment intangibles and promissory notes, brings almost all securitization within Article 9.61
When a right to money turns up on an exam, ask what it is owed for and who owes it. A mechanic who repairs a farmer's tractor holds a right to be paid for services rendered, which is an account, even though state law outside Article 9 also gives the mechanic a lien on the tractor for as long as the mechanic keeps possession.62 The lien secures the right to payment and is not the right to payment itself. A price owed by a customer for goods or services is an account, and so is a card balance owed to an issuer. A claim for damages in tort, an interest held through a securities account, a right under a letter of credit, and a plain loan repayment each lead somewhere else.