Concept
General Intangibles
Is the collateral an account?
General Intangibles
The preceding sections removed rights from the account category one at a time: instruments, chattel paper, deposit accounts, commercial tort claims. Each exclusion sent a right to a category with a name and rules of its own. General intangibles hold what no specialized category claims, a group that runs from patents and trademarks to the goodwill of a business.1
The account and the general intangible are drafted as mirror images. The general-intangible definition excludes accounts by name,2 and the account definition excludes rights to payment for money or funds advanced, apart from credit and charge card rights,3 so no right to payment sits in both categories. A seller's right to the price of goods shipped on credit is an account. A lender's right to repayment of cash it advanced is not an account, and when no instrument or chattel paper evidences it, the right lands in the residue. Both are rights to be paid money, which is why students run them together. What separates them is what the money is owed for and what evidences the right.
The first subsection builds the residual definition and its everyday members. The second takes up the payment intangible, the general intangible that most resembles an account, and supplies the questions that tell the two apart.
The Residual Category
Section 9-102(a)(42) defines a general intangible as any personal property, including things in action, other than accounts, chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, documents, goods, instruments, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, letters of credit, money, and oil, gas, or other minerals before extraction.4 The same provision adds that the term includes controllable electronic records, payment intangibles, and software.5
The definition describes no asset by its own features. It starts with all personal property and subtracts whatever another Article 9 definition has claimed, and what survives is a general intangible. The subtraction also runs the other way: the account definition removes chattel paper, commercial tort claims, deposit accounts, investment property, letter-of-credit rights, and rights evidenced by an instrument.6 Each right therefore carries a single label.
The label matters because it fixes how a lender perfects. A security interest in a general intangible is perfected by filing.7 Possession cannot do the work. Possession of a writing that records an intangible right is possession of evidence of the right, not of the right itself, so a security interest in an intangible generally cannot be perfected by possession.8 A negotiable note is different: only its holder can enforce it, and the holder is the person in possession, so a lender who holds the note leaves no one else able to enforce it.9
The third and fourth questions carry most of the weight, because rights to money are the assets most often mislabeled, and a right that looks residual may turn out to be an account, an instrument, or a deposit account. The first two questions keep the opposite error in check, since an object or a document never reaches the residual category.
What survives the elimination is a varied group. Patents, trademarks, the goodwill of a business, and architectural drawings are general intangibles,10 as are intellectual property generally and rights arising under an intellectual-property license.11 None is a bank balance or a price owed for something sold, and no specialized category claims any of them.
A single credit sale shows the line from both directions. When A buys goods on credit from B, A's obligation to pay B is an account and an asset of B.12 A's right to receive the goods is a right to performance, not a right to payment, so it fails the account definition at the outset.13 It is personal property that no listed category claims, so it falls into the residue and is a general intangible of A.14 Classification is a separate question from transferability. Article 9's approach to attachment is that a debtor should be free to create a security interest in its assets even if a contract or the legal rules governing that type of asset say the debtor cannot transfer its rights in the asset.15
Every item on Marlin's list is intangible, and that is the trap: intangibility decides nothing. The source of the right and the form it takes decide the classification, and the definition applies those tests before it awards the residual label.
Three members of the category are named in the definition itself. A computer program embedded in goods is treated as goods, but a program affixed to a movable medium such as a disc, CD, DVD, or thumb drive is not goods,16 so the program on the disc is software, and software is a general intangible.17 Controllable electronic records, added by the 2022 amendments, join the category by name.18 The third member, the payment intangible, is the general intangible closest to an account and has the next subsection to itself.
Payment Intangibles Versus Accounts
A payment intangible is a general intangible under which the account debtor's principal obligation is a money obligation.20 The 2022 amendments added a variant: a controllable payment intangible is a payment intangible evidenced by a controllable electronic record that provides that the account debtor undertakes to pay the person who has control of the record.21 The term account debtor reaches anyone obligated on an account, chattel paper, or general intangible, so the person who owes the money on a payment intangible carries that label; the term does not reach someone obligated to pay a negotiable instrument.22
The payment intangible is the part of the residual category that most resembles an account, since both are claims to money against someone else. Intangibility cannot separate the two, and neither can the money obligation, because each has one. The source of the money and the form of the paper behind it do the separating.
The two definitions are drafted so that each money claim lands in one category. The account definition lists eight sources of payment, among them property sold or leased, services rendered, insurance, energy, and the use of a credit or charge card, and it excludes rights to payment for money or funds advanced, other than card rights.23 The general-intangible definition removes accounts by name.24 A monetary right owed for a listed source is therefore an account. A monetary right that fits no listed source and no specialized category is a payment intangible. The rules that follow each label differ, as the end of this section shows, so the classification has to be right.
The first question looks to the origin of the debt, not to who holds it or how large it is. A seller who ships goods on credit and a lender who advances cash each hold a right to be paid money, yet the seller holds an account and the lender holds a payment intangible. If the payment obligation arises from the sale of goods or the provision of services, the collateral is an account and not a payment intangible.25
The loan participation shows the other side of the line. A lends B $1,000,000 and sells another lender, C, a $100,000 participation in the loan, so that C in effect owns the right to receive $100,000 of what B owes. A's sale of that participation is a sale of a payment intangible and falls within Article 9.26 The money was advanced, and no sale or service produced it, so the funds-advanced exclusion removes the right from the account category.27 A right to repayment of a loan that no chattel paper or instrument evidences is a general intangible.28
The category has a history that matters when reading older cases. Before 1999, rights to payment arising from a loan were general intangibles, not accounts, and accounts arose only on the sale of goods or services.29 The 1999 Code brought additional forms of collateral within Article 9,30 and the new definition of payment intangibles, with its inclusion in § 9-109(a)(3), brings the sale of loan participations into the Article. A reader of older cases must therefore check whether the court applied the post-1999 rules.31
Form matters as much as source. Suppose A buys real estate from B on credit and signs a negotiable note for the price. A's obligation is not an account; it is an instrument, a promissory note, and an asset of B.32 A promise to repay a loan is treated the same way: if it takes the form of an instrument, the right is not a payment intangible.33 A contract that pairs the payment obligation with a security interest in specific goods is a third case. When Dealer sells a tractor to Farmer on a conditional sales contract and transfers the contract to a bank, the contract is chattel paper, and Farmer is the account debtor on it.34 Paper also changes what a lender can hold: possession of a note perfects the holder's interest, and perfection by possession of an instrument or of chattel paper provides better protection.35
Credit card sales put the sorting to work on one transaction. A customer buys a television with a card issued by Argon Bank, and the bank advances the price. The customer's obligation to Argon Bank is an account: the account definition lists rights arising out of the use of a credit or charge card as a source, and it excepts those rights from its exclusion for funds advanced.36 A bank's right to repayment of an ordinary cash loan that no instrument evidences is a payment intangible,37 while its right to repayment of a card purchase is an account.
The label has practical consequences for perfection. A security interest in an account or a general intangible is perfected by filing.38 The sale of a payment intangible is perfected automatically, while an assignment of accounts is perfected automatically only when it does not transfer a significant part of the assignor's outstanding accounts.39 Credit card receivables are accounts, so a buyer who takes a significant part of a seller's receivables must file.40 A buyer who skips a needed filing risks a later buyer or creditor obtaining an interest superior to its own.41